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Over the years, shortage of funds has resulted in a huge deficit in government budgets for 
infrastructure, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Due to the huge costs involved in 
infrastructure procurement in relation to other competing demands on government spending, it 
is no longer feasible for governments to bear the entire burden of infrastructural development. 
This is especially the case in Nigeria, where annual infrastructure deficit is estimated at a 
massive $8 billion. Moreover, public officials have demonstrated incompetence in making 
public corporations profitable. Accordingly, Nigeria has adopted the public-private partnership 
model of infrastructure procurement to allow for the participation of the private sector in the 
design, funding, construction, management, and operation of public infrastructure. However, 
Nigeria’s legal framework for managing public-private partnership is not clearly defined, 
leading to gaps in policy and overlapping laws that make implementation of PPP very difficult. 
Unsurprisingly, public-private partnership in Nigeria have, thus far, produced mixed results, 
thereby raising a need for clear policy guidelines on streamlining overlapping laws to attract, 
sustain and reward investor interest. In what ways do Nigeria’s legal and policy framework for 
public-private partnership protect private investors’ funds?  This study examines the concept 
of PPP and its practice in Nigeria, arguing that the regulatory framework be designed or 
enhanced to protect investors’ assets in public-private partnership projects and ensure they 
achieve proportional return on investments. Beyond the problem of overlapping laws, the study 
finds that political interference, weak institutional mechanisms and poor respect for the rule of 
law and sanctity of contract underlie the ineffectiveness of public-private partnership in 
Nigeria. Drawing from the public-private partnership experience in South Africa, it 
recommends holistic strategies for protecting investors’ assets and unlocking the local financial 
market for sourcing project funding. These strategies are notably the provision of guarantees, 
making the process less cumbersome, provision of incentives for investors and project 
companies and ensuring that the host community for public-private partnership projects are 
involved in the process from inception to operation to get their support. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
…We also have a huge infrastructure deficit for which we require foreign capital 
and expertise to support whatever resources we can marshal at home. In essence, 
we seek public private partnerships in our quest for enhanced capital and 
expertise.1 
 
1.1 Background to the Study 
 
 
This study investigates the legal and institutional framework for the administration of public-
private partnership (PPP) in Nigeria with a view to determining how the law protects investors’ 
assets in PPP transactions. The framework in South Africa is also examined to provide 
comparative insight. Well-managed and effective regulation of PPP will not only ensure that 
PPP projects are successful but will also result in the provision of much-needed infrastructure, 
while making investment in infrastructure attractive to both local and foreign investors. The 
argument of this thesis is that the law and framework for PPP in Nigeria should be designed or 
enhanced to protect the assets of investors in PPP projects. 
Traditionally, governments made use of state resources to provide for all the 
infrastructural needs of the public.2 But in the modern era, the huge costs involved in 
infrastructure procurement as well as budgetary constraints make it impracticable for the public 
sector alone to meet all the infrastructure needs of any given jurisdiction.3 This is the reason 
why governments around the world are seeking alternative means to fund and deliver 
infrastructure.4 One such alternative is the adoption of the PPP model of infrastructure 
procurement.5 The PPP model is, in brief, a collaboration between the public sector and the 
                                                      
1 Excerpts of speech of President Muhammadu Buhari on 23 August 2015. See 
http://www.icrc.gov.ng/assets/uploads/2017/10/Presentation-by-Ag-DG-at-IOD-FF.pdf 
2 Darrin Grimsey & Mervyn K Lewis Public Private Partnerships: The Worldwide Revolution in Infrastructure 
Provision and Project Finance (2004) at 1. 
3 The  World Bank Attracting Investors to African Public-Private Partnership: A Project Preparation Guide 
(2009) at 2. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Jeffrey Delmon Creating a Framework for Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Programs: A Practical Guide for 
Decision-makers (2014) at 1. 
 2 
private sector to design, fund, manage and operate a public facility.6 While PPP is becoming 
popular in both developed and developing economies, in many developing countries whatever 
gains that the model can provide are often eroded by failures caused either by a weak 
framework or by a lack of political will on the part of public policy makers.7  
This study asserts that the law has a key role to play in fashioning successful PPP 
relationships, especially in developing economies. Respect for these relationships and for the 
sanctity of contracts is a driver for PPP growth. Policy makers should therefore ensure that the 
law and the institutions that regulate PPP are open to reform to cope with changing times. 
Secondly, ‘importing’ a framework from a developed country without taking into cognisance 
local circumstances may be inviting failure at the outset. It is important that in their quest for a 
framework to suit the needs of their economy, policy makers consider jurisdictions with similar 
traits. For example, it will serve a developing country better to study a framework that has been 
successful in another developing country rather than in a developed one. 
It is argued in this study that South Africa offers a good model for the design, 
administration, regulation, funding and operation of PPP facilities in the continent of Africa. 
This is not to say that the framework in South Africa is entirely flawless: indeed, the study 
makes some recommendations for its improvement.  
 
1.2 Research Questions and Objectives 
 
The research addressed the overarching question: In what ways do Nigeria’s legal and 
policy framework for public-private partnership (PPP) protect investors’ funds? This question 
stems from the need to address the concern of prospective investors regarding the safety of 
their investment. It is indeed trite that without private sector investments, there would be no 
PPP arrangements. Consequently, the research question is explored  using four sub-questions 
as follows: 
i. What measures are required to protect private funds invested in PPP projects? 
ii. What legal and policy provisions and practices are offered  for the development 
of PPP practice in Nigeria? 
iii. How adequate are the current pieces of legislation, in terms of the protection of 
PPP investments in Nigeria? 
                                                      
6 Ibid. 
7 E R Yescombe Public-Private Partnerships in Sub-Saharan Africa: Case Studies for Policy Makers (2017) at 
3. 
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iv. What lessons can be learned from South African law, policy and practice on 
PPP? 
To address the above questions, the study examines the concept of PPP and its practice in 
Nigeria and weighs the advantages and disadvantages of adopting PPP over other forms of 
procurement. Case studies of PPP projects are examined to highlight how the law is being 
followed and what changes need to be made to improve the performance of PPP transactions. 
Furthermore, an analysis of the framework in South Africa is undertaken to provide 
comparative insight to policy makers and PPP practitioners on the way forward for the 
development of PPP practice in Nigeria. The study similarly highlights areas where South 
Africa needs to implement change to improve on the current standard of practice. 
 Ultimately, this research aims to contribute to the development of an infrastructure 
investor-friendly legal and policy environment for PPP in Nigeria that emphasises the 
protection of investors’ assets, so as to attract both local and foreign direct investments (FDI) 
into the country’s infrastructure space. To achieve this aim, the study identifies the following 
five objectives: 
i. Identify the process, challenges and critical success factors (CSFs) for PPPs; 
ii. Analyse the effectiveness of PPPs in relation to other or traditional procurement 
methods; 
iii. Study the framework of PPP in Nigeria to determine what measures should be enhanced 
or put in place to secure assets invested in PPP projects; 
iv. Comparatively analyse the framework for PPP in South Africa, focusing on 
infrastructure financing and provisions for the protection of investments; and 
v. Analyse the findings and make recommendations for future practice. 
 
1.3 Meaning of Infrastructure 
 
The term ‘infrastructure’ recurs in this study and it makes sense to provide a definition of the 
concept at the outset. Infrastructure consists of the essential facilities and services upon which 
the economic productivity of society depends.8 The role infrastructure plays in economic 
development is significant, indeed, it is a determining factor in the growth of any given 
                                                      
8 J P Morgan Asset Management ‘Insights: Infrastructure investing: Key benefits and risk,’ available at 
https://www.jpmorgan.com/jpmpdf/1158630194855.pdf, accessed 9 March 2018. 
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economy.9 It follows that ‘poor infrastructure impedes a nation’s economic growth and 
international competitiveness.’10 
 A legal definition of the term can be found in Nigeria’s Infrastructure Concession 
Regulatory Commission (Establishment Etc.) Act of 2005, as follows: 
 
‘infrastructure’ includes development projects which, before the 
commencement of this Act, were financed, constructed, operated or 
maintained by the Government and which, after the commencement of the Act, 
may be wholly or partly implemented by the private sector under an agreement 
pursuant to this Act including power plants, highways, seaports, airports, 
canals, dams, hydroelectric power plants, water supply, irrigation, 
telecommunications, railways, interstate transport systems, land reclamation 
projects, environmental remediation and clean-up projects, industrial estates or 
township development, housing, government buildings, tourism development 
projects, trade fair complexes, warehouses, solid wastes management, satellite 
and ground receiving stations, information technology networks and database 
infrastructure, education and health facilities, sewerage, drainage, dredging, 
and other infrastructure and development projects as may be approved, from 
time to time, by the Federal Executive.11 
 
 The South African Infrastructure Development Act No. 23 of 2014 uses this 
abbreviated definition of the term: 
 
 ‘infrastructure’ means installations, structures, facilities, systems, services or 
processes relating to the matters specified in Schedule 1 and which are part of 
the national infrastructure plan.12 
 
Schedule 1 of the Act, however, bears the heading ‘Public installations, structures, facilities, 
systems, services or processes in respect of which projects maybe designated as strategic 
integrated projects’ and lists the following: national and international airports, communication 
and information technology installations, education institutions, electricity transmission and 
distribution, health care facilities, human settlements and related infrastructure facilities, 
economic facilities, mines, oil or gas pipelines, refineries or other installations, ports and 
harbours, power stations or installations for harnessing any source of energy, productive rural 
and agricultural infrastructure, public roads, public transport, railways, sewage works and 
                                                      
9 Olufemi Soyeju ‘Legal framework for public private partnership in Nigeria’ (2013) De Jure at 814. 
10 Jeffrey Delmon Public-Private Partnership Projects in Infrastructure: An Essential Guide for Policy Makers 
(2011) at 1 
11 S 36 Infrastructure Concession and Regulatory Commission (Establishment Etc) Act of 2005. 
12 S 1 Infrastructure Development Act 23 of 2014. 
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sanitation, waste infrastructure, water works and water infrastructure. There seems thus to be 
considerable agreement as to what constitutes infrastructure as far as the law in Nigeria and 
South Africa is concerned.  
 
1.3.1 The Need to Improve on Infrastructure Assets 
 
Just as infrastructure investments need to be substantially increased in emerging markets and 
developing economies (EMDE) in order to meet social needs and support more rapid economic 
growth,13 it is imperative that there be a corresponding legal and policy framework to ensure 
the protection of such investments and assets.14 Otherwise, there will continue to be a 
significant number of ‘infrastructure investment opportunities’ with little or no interest from 
local or foreign investors. 
Table 1: Examples of Infrastructure Assets 




Oil & gas pipelines Cable networks Education facilities 




Health care facilities 













   
Source: Morgan Stanley Investment Management. 
                                                      
13 OECD, ‘Fostering investment in infrastructure: Lessons learned from OECD investment policy reviews (2015), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/Fostering-Investment-in-Infrastructure.pdf, accessed 
9 March 2018. 
14 It needs to be reiterated as well, that while good policies and reforms are key to ensuring the right kind of 
development, the law could play an expansive role not only in guiding the market environment but also assuming 
a new role in encouraging the right players to participate in the process. See Sam Amadi ‘Improving electricity 
access through policy reform’ in Yinka Omorogbe & Ada Ordor Ending Africa’s Energy Deficit (2018) at 375-6. 
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In the light of the foregoing, several countries have entered into arrangements that allow the 
private sector to design, fund, build, maintain and provide infrastructure services. Public-
private partnership (PPP) in infrastructure is described by Delmon as one of ‘the tools in a 
policy maker’s arsenal to help increase investment in infrastructure services and improve its 
efficiency.’15 Thus, PPP creates a platform for both the public sector and a consortium of 
private sector interests to provide for the infrastructure needs of the public. It offers an 
opportunity for the public sector to tap private capital.16 Although PPPs cannot solve all of a 
country’s infrastructure problems, they offer a means to access significant financing where 
there are bankable projects.17 Given the peculiar dearth of funding for infrastructure in sub-
Saharan African countries, there is a huge need for countries to adopt the PPP model to 
accelerate infrastructure delivery and availability.18 
 Nigeria adopted the PPP model of public procurement with the passing into law of the 
Infrastructure Concession and Regulatory Commission (Establishment Etc.) Act (ICRC Act) 
2005 and the subsequent establishment of the Infrastructure Concession Regulatory 
Commission (the ICRC) on 27 November 2008 to administer the PPPs in the country.19 The 
ICRC is responsible for regulating PPP transactions that involve the federal government or any 
of its ministries, departments or agencies (MDAs),20 in line with the 1999 Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended).21 
                                                      
15 Jeffrey Delmon op cit note 10 at 2. 
16 Fida Rana & Chidi Izuwa ‘Infrastructure and Africa’s development: The PPP imperative,’ available at 
http://blogs.worldbank.org/ppps/infrastructure-africa-s-development-ppp-imperative, accessed 10 March 2018. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, the United Nations ‘Financing Africa’s infrastructure development’ 
(2015) Policy Brief at 1-2 available at www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf, accessed 16 November 2018. 
19 Olufemi Soyeju op cit note 9 at 184. 
20 Some states including Lagos, Ekiti, Akwa Ibom, Rivers, Cross Rivers and Niger have enacted their own PPP 
Laws within their jurisdictions, to give PPP transactions the backing of law. 
21 The ICRC is a creation of an Act of the National Assembly, the country’s federal legislative arm. Section 4(1) 
of the Constitution vests the National Assembly (which consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives) 
with powers to make laws for the peace, order and good governance of the federation as it relates to matters 
covered in the Exclusive Legislative list set out in Part I of the Second Schedule to the 1999 Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), while Section 4(3) empowers the various state Houses of Assembly to 
make laws for the peace, order and good governance of the various states constituting the federation with respect 
to matters in the Concurrent Legislative List set out in Part I of the Second Schedule to the 1999 Constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). 
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Significantly, under the country’s current PPP framework, some projects have been executed. 
Regrettably, however, the PPP process in the country continues to face tough challenges that 
have led to the outright cancellation or buy-back of hitherto well-defined and people-oriented 
PPP transactions/projects.22 This situation is worrying, as PPP failures make both local and 
foreign investors question not only the possibility of commensurate return on investments (RoI) 
but also the safety of the assets invested. 
Before Nigeria adopted PPP as an alternative to traditional public-sector procurement, 
the federal government of Nigeria (FGN) under the administration of President Olusegun 
Obasanjo23 embarked on a privatisation programme that culminated in the divesture of 
government interests in some public sector-owned enterprises. The transactions were 
administered by the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), authorised by the Public Enterprises 
(Privatisation and Commercialisation) Act 28 of 1999. The aim was to make the former public-
sector establishments efficient and reliable, and to discontinue subsidising them, since they 
would now become profitable ventures. Unfortunately, however, President Olusegun 
Obasanjo’s administration’s privatisation programme was poorly executed and has been the 
object of severe criticism.24 There were also allegations that government assets were being sold 
off to politicians and their cronies using pseudo companies.25 The mishandling of the 
privatisation of the now moribund Nigeria Telecommunications Company (NITEL) and the 
experiments with the former Nigeria Electric Power Authority (NEPA) are indicators that the 
country’s privatisation programme was poorly organised.26 The shift to PPP has therefore been 
welcomed as a better option than the privatisation programme. 
Yet the move towards PPP has not been without challenges. The problems associated 
with the Murtala Mohammed Airport Terminal 2 Concession, the Lagos-Ibadan Expressway 
                                                      
22 Oluwaseun Oluwasanmi & Odun Ogidi ‘Public private partnership and Nigerian economic growth: Problems 
and prospects’ (2014) 5 International Journal of Business and Social Science at 137. 
23 President Obasanjo was Nigeria’s civilian president between May 29, 1999 and May 29, 2007, before handing 
over to the administration of the late President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua. 
24 D O Adeyemo & A Salami ‘A review of privatisation and public enterprises reforms in Nigeria’ (2008) 
Contemporary Management Research 412. See also E Okpanachi & P C Obutte ‘Neoliberal reforms in an 
emerging democracy: The case of the privatisation of public enterprises in Nigeria, 1999-2014’ (2015) 7.3 Poverty 
& Public Policy at 253–257. 
25 D E Arowolo & C S Ologunowa ‘Privatisation in Nigeria: A critical analysis of the virtues and vices’ (2012) 
1.3 International Journal of Development and Sustainability at 792. 
26 Kabir Mohammed, David Chapolsa & Ashiru Bello ‘The state of Nigerian economy in the 21st century: 
Privatisation and commercialisation programmes under Obasanjo/Atiku Regime’ (2013) 9.19 European Scientific 
Journal at 92. 
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Concession and the recent buy-back of the Lekki-Epe Toll Road Concession,27 threaten the 
future growth of PPP in the country and could result in investor apathy. This is because private 
sector investors are concerned about return on investment (RoI) and the safety of their invested 
assets. Such concern is heightened by the fact that a PPP investment is usually secured by the 
project itself and in the event of failure, lenders may be unable to recover credit advanced to 
debtors. This situation poses a lot of questions in the minds of investors. An example of this is 
the pulling out of the private sector consortium from the Rivers State Mono Rail PPP Project.28 
To allay the fears of the private sector in relation to investing in infrastructure assets or 
investment vehicles in Nigeria, in the face of recurrent project failures and policy somersaults, 
this research investigates the protection offered to investors’ funds under the country’s PPP 
legal framework, in order to make recommendations for its strengthening or reform. Again, 
with plans in the pipeline to channel pension fund assets currently managed by various pension 
fund administrators (PFAs) into infrastructure financing, there is a heightened need to provide 
assurances of fund safety to both the PFAs and individual contributors.  
 
1.4 Justification for the Research 
 
 
Nigeria’s former Coordinating Minister for the Economy during the tenure of President 
Goodluck Jonathan,29 Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, asserted that the country requires about $14 
billion annually to fund infrastructure in order to make up the country’s infrastructure deficit 
but can only afford to spend $6 billion per annum.30 The allocation for capital expenditure has 
typically been 25 per cent of the budget, with recurrent expenses taking up a gargantuan share 
                                                      
27 The gubernatorial candidate of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) in the build-up to the race for the Lagos 
State 2015 elections considered the stopping of toll collections on the Lekki-Epe Expressway a good campaign 
promise even before the Lagos State Government bought back the concession. The issue of PPP projects also 
came into focus during the Debates at the Business Sector, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zdrdYot78T8, 
accessed 15 February 2015. 
28 Vanguard ‘No Rivers State fund was misappropriated by Amachi’s govt – Ex-commissioners’ 12 October 2015, 
available at http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/10/no-rivers-state-fund-was-misappropriated-by-amaechis-govt-
ex-commissioners/, accessed 7 February 2016. The private sector partner TSU Property and Investment Holdings 
Ltd pulled out of the project because of its inability to contribute its equity share of 80 per cent. 
29 President Goodluck Jonathan succeeded the late President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua upon the latter’s demise in 
2011. President Jonathan handed over to President Muhammadu Buhari on May 29, 2015. 
30 Dr Okonjo-Iweala made the assertion while she was addressing a PPP stakeholders’ workshop organised by the 
African Development Bank in Abuja, Nigeria. This formed the editorial ‘Nigeria’s $8 billion infrastructure deficit’ 
in the Daily Independent 12 November 2014. 
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of 75 per cent. The current administration of President Muhammadu Buhari raised the 
allocation for capital expenditure to 30 per cent in the 2016 Budget.31 
 Furthermore, being heavily reliant on oil revenue, Nigeria has been negatively affected 
by reduced oil prices, and renewed militancy in the Niger Delta area has in recent times resulted 
in lower production levels. With less funding thus available to the federal government under 
present realities, it has become increasingly challenging for the government to embark on 
infrastructure development without recourse to the private sector for funding support. 
 It is worthy of note that PPP project failures in Nigeria aggravate the problem of the 
unavailability of long-term financing. It does not augur well for the growth of PPPs if projects 
do not get beyond the pipeline stage or fail mid-way through execution. If there is any doubt 
that their assets enjoy a considerable degree of protection under the law, potential investors are 
likely to become apprehensive and turn to alternative investment options. 
 The Nigerian government considers PPP beneficial in the realisation of the country’s 
Vision 20:2020 Objective.32 Given that Nigeria occupies a leadership position in sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) as well as within the West African sub-region, the results of this study should be 
of benefit to other countries in SSA. 
Although there is a body of literature about PPP in Nigeria, with a significant number 
of contributions from management analysts and experts within the built environment, there is 
a dearth of literature written from a legal perspective. Worthy of note are the contributions of 
George Anachebe Nwangwu, whose work essentially covers the allocation of risk in PPP 
transactions,33 and that of Olufemi Olugbemiga Soyeju, whose work highlights the need to 
unlock access to finance for PPPs in the country.34 While the latter study deals with 
infrastructure financing, there is a gap in the literature which leaves the question of the safety 
                                                      
31 The Guardian ‘Economists laud 2016 budget, raise concerns on 38 dollars oil benchmark’ 22 December 2015, 
available at http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/2015/12/economists-laud-2016-budget-raise-concerns-on-38-
dollars-oil-benchmark/, accessed 7 March 2018. 
32 Under the Country’s Vision 20:2020 Objective as stated in the National PPP Policy Document, the goal is to 
make the country one of the 20 leading economies in the world by the year 2020. To achieve the objective, 
infrastructure development is considered vital.  
33 George Anachebe Nwangwu A risk-based approach to enhance public-private partnership projects in Nigeria 
(Unpublished PhD Law Thesis, The University of Hull, 2013). 
34 Olufemi Olugbemiga Soyeju Public assets financing in Nigeria: The imperatives for legal reforms to unlock 
domestic financial resources and foreign capital for infrastructure development (Unpublished LLD Thesis, 
University of Pretoria, 2012). 
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of funds invested in PPP projects unaddressed. This study attempts not only to fill this gap but 
also to indicate a way forward as far as infrastructure project finance in Nigeria is concerned. 
 But before focusing on the need to unlock finance for new PPPs, it is important to 
provide security for assets already invested, in the form of assurance that investments will be 
protected. In this sense, making a case for more funding as Soyeju has done without building 
on the foundation of asset protection is like putting the cart before the horse. 
 
1.5 Research methodology 
 
The methodology for this research is doctrinal. Legal research makes a distinction between 
primary and secondary sources. While primary sources are the official pronouncements of the 
governmental lawmakers, court decisions, legislation and regulations that form the basis of 
legal doctrine, secondary sources are works which are themselves not law, but which discuss 
and analyse legal doctrine.35 This distinction is important given that in some disciplines, the 
terms ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ source typically refer to, say, a letter or contemporary 
newspaper article, and a later scholarly analysis, respectively.36  In carrying out the research, a 
large number of documents derived from primary and secondary sources were reviewed. The 
primary sources are made up of statutes and decided cases while the secondary sources include 
text books, journal articles, working papers, theses, newspaper articles and reports, magazines, 
government publications and other materials available via online sources. 
The study begins with a background on the need to provide protection for PPP assets, 
followed by literature review covering the evolution of PPP, the legal framework for PPP and 
the PPP experience in Nigeria.  Comparisons are drawn with PPP law and practice in South 
Africa, particularly with regard to the protection of PPP investments, procurement, regulation 
and administration. The rationale for choosing a comparative method to analyse the 
frameworks in Nigeria and South Africa is to highlight the structures in both systems as well 
as to show where and why the differences that exist may be appropriate.37 Moreover, a 
comparativist does not just compare, he or she contrasts and provides some critical analysis.38  
                                                      
35 Kent C Olsen Principles of Legal Research (2009) at 7. 
36 Ibid at 7. 
37 J Paul Lomio, Henrik S Spang-Hassen & George D Wilson Legal Research Methods in a Modern World: A 
Coursebook (2011) at 61. 
38 Ibid. 
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Comparison also makes it feasible to identify best practices in one jurisdiction that may inform 
the development of a field in another jurisdiction and the position of Nigeria and South Africa 
as the two leading economies in Africa, a continent grappling with major infrastructure deficits, 
makes comparison compelling39. 
A case study approach is adopted in order to investigate the law in practice and the 
cause(s) of failure or success of PPP transactions in both Nigeria and South Africa. The overall 
aim is to make recommendations to ensure a healthy environment that will promote private 
sector participation in infrastructure procurement via the PPP model in Nigeria as well as for 
South Africa. The case study method, through reports of past investigations, enables the 
exploration and understanding of complex issues.40 Through this method, an investigator can 
discern and explain both the process and outcome of a phenomenon through observation, 
reconstruction and analysis of the case(s) under investigation.41 Hence, in chapters four and 
five of this study which deal with the practice of PPP in Nigeria and South Africa respectively, 
a review of empirical studies and reports was undertaken to investigate the law in practice. 
 
 Choice of South Africa for Comparative Insight 
 
 
The Economist Intelligent Unit in collaboration with several banks, measured the readiness 
and capacity of 15 countries in Africa with regard to their legislative/regulatory/frameworks, 
institutional capacity, operational maturity, investment climate, financing facilities and 
subnational capacity, and found that apart from South Africa these countries had a low or very 
low ability to implement infrastructure PPPs.42  
 The choice of South Africa as a benchmark for comparison with Nigeria is motivated 
by at least five factors: 
                                                      
39 Bamidele Seteolu & James Okuneye ‘The struggle for hegemony in Africa: Nigeria and South Africa relations 
in perspectives’ (2017) African Journal of Political Science and International Relations at 57 
40 Zaidah Zainal ‘Case study as a research method’ (2007) 9 Jurnal Kemanusiaan at 1. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Steven Shrybman & Scott Sinclair A Standard Contract for PPPs the World Over: Recommended PPP 
Contractual Provisions Submitted to G20 (2016) at 7. 
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First, South Africa occupies the leading position in sub-Saharan Africa and the continent at 
large. Before 2014, South Africa was the largest economy in Africa,43 a position that the 
country regained in the second quarter of 2016 as Nigeria slid into recession. 
 Secondly, South Africa has a good track record of PPP success, having developed a 
peculiar PPP programme that should be a model for developing countries.44 Yescombe notes 
that PPPs started in South Africa in the mid-1990s and mentions the N4 toll road45 and the R3 
billion PPP for the upgrading and tolling of part of the N3 (between Pretoria/Johannesburg and 
Durban) as among the PPPs completed and operational in SA. 
 Thirdly, in comparison with South Africa’s benchmark, i.e. other emerging middle-
income and developing economies (EMDE), the country enjoys relatively good 
infrastructure.46 In line with this, the number of partnerships between the public sector and the 
private sector has grown progressively with legislative framework developed at the national, 
provincial and municipal levels.47  
 Fourthly, South Africa is considered a country with strong public-sector institutions.48 
As weak public institutions can be a bane for a successful PPP regime, the South African model 
is a good one for other emerging economies. 
 Fifthly, there is continuing, sustained interest on the part of the private sector in PPP 
infrastructure and social services projects in South Africa. This has enabled an expansion of 
market presence as well as business volume.49 
                                                      
43 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa Urbanisation and Industrialisation for Africa’s 
Transformation (2017) 52.  
44 E R Yescombe Principles of Project Finance (2007) at 47. 
45 This road connects South Africa with the port of Maputo in Mozambique. 
46 Zeljko Bogetic & Johannes W Fedderke ‘International benchmarking of South Africa’s infrastructure 
performance’ (2006) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3830. 
47 Dominic Mitchell ‘Partnerships between government and business in South Africa: A practical guide’ (2007), 
available at http://led.co.za/sites/default/files/cabinet/orgname-
law/document/2012/gtz_partnerships_between_government_and_business_in_south_africa_2008.pdf, accessed 
19 September 2016. 
48 Vickram Cuttaree ‘Successes and failures of PPP projects,’ a World Bank Presentation delivered at Warsaw 
on June 17, 2008, slide 3, available at 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:dn1JCFJLnQgJ:siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEC
AREGTOPTRANSPORT/Resources/Day1_Pres2_SuccessesandFailuresPPPprojects15JUN08.ppt+&cd=3&hl
=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk&client=firefox-b, accessed 19 September 2016. 
49 Kaiser Associates ‘Public private partnerships benchmarking study’ (2005) 26, available at 
http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/electronicreport/downloads/volume_4/business_case_viability/BC1_Research
_Material/KZN_PPP_Bench.pdf, accessed 19 September 2016. 
 13 
 
The final stage of the investigation presents the findings, draws conclusions and makes both 
recommendations for practice and suggestions for further study.  
 
 
Figure 1-2: Research methodology 
  
 
1.6 Outline of the Thesis 
 
This study is divided into seven chapters.  The first chapter is the general introduction to the 
research. It describes the research problem, identifies the research questions, justifies the 
research, sets out the methodology, describes the structure of the research and introduces the 
literature. 
In the second chapter, the study focuses on the theoretical foundations for the research. 
The rationale for the choice of concepts/theories as well as the theories themselves are 
discussed. The concepts/theories considered include the rule of law, law in development and 
the sanctity of contract. 
Chapter Three analyses the PPP concept, traces its evolution and development in 
Nigeria, and examines its merits and demerits as a form of procurement in that country.  
The fourth chapter deals with the law and practice of PPP in Nigeria. The legal and 
institutional frameworks for PPP are discussed, as well as some examples of completed PPP 
projects/transactions.   
Chapter Five discusses the law and practice of PPP in South Africa. Case studies of 
selected PPP contracts arranged and executed in the country are reviewed. 
 Chapter Six offers a comparative analysis of the framework and practice of PPP in 
Nigeria and South Africa. The aim is to highlight areas where reforms are needed in both 
jurisdictions, especially where these concern the protection of assets invested in PPP 
transactions.  
Literature review











The seventh chapter presents a summary of the findings, observations, conclusions and 
recommendations for practice and further study.  
Given that this research is multidisciplinary in scope, literature dealing with diverse 
areas of study such as law, economics, project finance, public administration and political 
economy make up the body of the literature reviewed. Again, because there is a limited number 
of works written from the legal point of view per se, with the majority of the research so far 
conducted by writers in fields other than law, this researcher deliberately undertakes a project 
informed by various perspectives but anchored in legal enquiry. The core of the study is 
directed at identifying ways of protecting the investments of private sector interests in the 
infrastructure market space in Nigeria, to stimulate the interest of both foreign and local 
investors. The thesis attempts to link the rule of law, sanctity of contract and the instrument of 
the law to the development of a holistic and efficient legal, institutional and regulatory 
framework to ensure that assets invested in PPP are safe. 
 
1.7 Preliminary Literature Review 
 
With a current estimated population of 183 million people,50 Nigeria is the most populous 
African country. It is one of the world’s fastest growing economies, an emerging major player 
in the global economy and, until the second quarter of 2016, Africa’s largest economy.51 In the 
last few years, falling oil prices have resulted in declining government revenue. 
 The country aims to be among the top 20 economies of the world by the year 2020, as 
represented in its Vision 20:2020 Objective of attaining a minimum GDP of $900 billion and 
a per capita income of no less than $4000 per annum.52 It is imperative that the country fix its 
deplorable infrastructure as this is crucial to the battle against poverty and the realisation of the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).53 
                                                      
50 Worldometers ‘Nigeria: Population,’ available at http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/nigeria-
population/, accessed 8 January 2016 
51 Jannie Rossouw ‘South Africa just leapt over Nigeria to become Africa’s largest economy again’ Quartz Africa 
16 August 2016, available at http://qz.com/758947/south-africa-just-leapt-over-nigeria-to-become-africas-
largest-economy-again/, accessed 27 October 2016. See also BBC, ‘South Africa regains Africa’s biggest 
economy title from Nigeria,’ available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-37045276, accessed 12 
February 2018. 
52 Solomon Thomas & Marcin Brycz ‘Nigeria Vision 20:2020: Can dream become reality?’ (2014) 7.3 Journal of 
International Studies at 162–70. 
53 See the United Nations ‘About sustainable development goals’ (2019) available at 
www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/, accessed 11 February 2019. The 
Sustainable Development Goals have replaced the Millennium Development Goals discussed in Ochei Ailemen 
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The current state of Nigeria’s infrastructure is shocking, considering that the country has 
experienced massive revenue generation from various oil boom periods. It is disheartening to 
note that little was done by successive governments to change the infrastructure fortunes of the 
country, other than making good plans that have seldom been followed through to fruition. 
Where upgrades are carried out on existing infrastructure, no clear maintenance plan is 
followed. 
 With a land mass of 9,110,000 square kilometres, the country has an estimated 
197,000km road network, of which only a discouraging 18 percent is paved.54  Over 70 per 
cent of federal roads, totalling 34,123km, are in bad shape.55 The railways are currently not 
fully functional despite several attempts to resuscitate rail travel in the country by successive 
administrations. The plans of the current Buhari administration for the construction of 
additional rail lines to link different parts of the country are still only on paper. With respect to 
housing, Nigeria requires about 17 million housing units and about N60 trillion naira to meet 
these housing needs.56 
 
1.7.1 Investing in Infrastructure in Nigeria 
 
According to the Nigerian National PPP Policy Document, the federal government is 
committed to addressing the infrastructure deficit as well as improving the quality of public 
service to meet the Vision 20:2020 Objective.57 The Policy Document provides for the federal 
government to contract the private sector to manage some public infrastructural services, and 
to design, build, finance and operate some infrastructure.58 The federal government’s key 
                                                      
Ikpefan ‘Challenges of public-private partnership in infrastructural financing in Nigeria,’ available at 
http://eprints.covenantuniversity.edu.ng/1330/1/models%20of%20ppp.pdf, accessed 9 January 2016. 
54 African Development Bank ‘An infrastructure action plan for Nigeria: Closing the infrastructure gap and 
accelerating economic transformation,’ available at http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/ 
Project-and-Operations/An_Infrastructure_Action_Plan_for_Nigeria_Closing_the_Infrastructure_Gap_and 
_Accelerating_Economic_Transformation.pdf, accessed 7 January 2016. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ochei  Ailemen Ikpefan op cit note 53. 
57 Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission ‘National Policy on Public-Private Partnership (PPP)’ 
(2013) at 1 Section 2. 
58 Ibid. 
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policy objectives for its infrastructure investment programme for PPP encompass three 
dimensions, economic, social and environmental. These have the following aims:59 
 
i. Accelerate investment in new infrastructure and ensure that existing infrastructure is 
upgraded to a satisfactory standard that meets the needs and aspirations of the public; 
ii. Ensure that all investments provide value for money; 
iii. Improve the availability, quality and efficiency of power, water, transport and other 
public services; 
iv. Provide investment opportunities for local and foreign investors in the provision of 
infrastructure; 
v. Ensure balanced regional development; 
vi. Encourage direct or indirect participation of small and medium sized enterprises in PPP 
projects; 
vii. Protect and enhance the natural environment. 
 
Following from the above, the federal government of Nigeria has set a 30-year infrastructure 
plan for the country beginning from 2014 until the year 2043 known as the National Integrated 
Infrastructure Master Plan.60 The administration of President Goodluck Jonathan designed the 
key areas of focus to include energy, transport (which includes rail, roads and aviation), ICT, 
housing, water, mining and agriculture.61 Table  2  lists the projections set in 2014: 
 
Table 2: 30 Year Infrastructure Plan for Nigeria 2014-2043 
Sectors Amount Required (USD) 
Roads 150 billion, 22  billion to be 
invested in the first five 
years. 
                                                      
59 Ibid Section 3 
60 National Planning Commission ‘Nigeria’s National Integrated Infrastructure Master Plan’ (2014) Final Draft 
Report at 15. 
61 Vanguard ‘FG develops 30-year national integrated infrastructure master plan’  Vanguard 24 June 2014 
available at www.vanguardngr.com/2014/06/fg-develops-30-year-national-integrated-infrastructure-master-
plan/, accessed 17 November 2018. 
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Rail  75 billion, 5 billion required 
in the first five years. 
Aviation 50 billion,  5 billion to be 
spent in the first five years. 
Maritime  50 billion. 
Urban transport 250 billion 
Power  600 billion 
Oil  and gas 400 billion 
ICT 325 billion 
Housing 350 billion 
Education 30 billion 
Healthcare 4 billion for the construction 
of 108 hospitals 
 Source: National Planning Commission 
 
Importantly, the federal government commits to providing an appropriate enabling 
environment for PPP and allowing a fair return to private investors for the project risks that 
they will take.62 Furthermore, the federal government commits to ensuring that its economic 
policies provide a stable and predictable environment for investors.63 
 According to a report published by the World Bank, ‘poor infrastructure impedes a 
nation’s economic growth and international competitiveness.’64 Considering that countries 
around the world are challenged by budget constraints, the development of infrastructure 
projects with private sector funds has become an acceptable phenomenon in both developing 
and developed countries globally.65 In essence, the PPP model of procurement is a 
collaboration between the public and private sectors to enable the design, funding, provision 
and maintenance of infrastructure for a given period of time, say between 20 and 30 years, after 
which the facility is transferred from the private sector back to the public sector. PPPs are also 
                                                      
62 Ibid Section 3. 
63 Ibid Section 4. 
64Jeffery Delmon op cit note 10 at 1. 
65 Hans-Withelm Alfen, Yu Chien Amberjan, Satyanarayana N Kaladindi & L Boeing Singh ‘Introduction to PPP 
concept’ in Bauhaus-Universitatwelmar (ed) Public-Private Partnership in Infrastructure Development (2009) at 
1. 
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‘considered to provide better value for money and thereby reduce government debt levels, and 
for this same reason, Nigeria has turned to PPPs to help finance infrastructure and provide 
public services.’66 
Much has been written about the wide infrastructure gap currently experienced globally and 
particularly in Africa. The continent’s largest deficit is found in energy and roads. According 
to the World Bank Group, ‘the 48 countries of SSA (with a combined population of 800 
million) generate roughly the same amount of power as Spain (with a population of 45 
million)’; in the same vein, ‘only one-third of Africans living in rural areas are within two 
kilometres of an all-season road, compared with two-thirds of the population in other 
developing regions.’67 The African Development Bank (AfDB) Group estimated the financing 
requirement for Africa’s infrastructure deficit in 2010 as $93 billion annually until the year 
2020.68 The AfDB Group also argue that investments in infrastructure in the continent have 
not kept pace with increasing demand, which further widens the deficit. Their findings show 
that less than 40 per cent of the African population have access to roads and only 5 per cent of 
agriculture is under irrigation. The implication is that Africa faces higher access costs to 
infrastructure compared to other developing nations around the world.69 Nigeria’s core stock 
of infrastructure has been estimated at between 20 to 25 per cent of the country’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). It has been noted that this is a poor result when compared with other 
emerging/middle income economies (the country’s peers) that record an average of 70 per cent, 
leaving an estimated gap of about $300 billion.70  
Government investment in infrastructure in Nigeria in the ten-year period between 1999 
and 2009 did not achieve desired objectives. The Nigerian Technical Committee on 
Privatisation and Commercialisation estimated that $90 billion was invested in public sector-
owned enterprises. Despite this colossal investment by the Nigerian government, not more than 
                                                      
66 George Nwangwu ‘The legal framework for public-private partnerships (PPPs) in Nigeria: Untangling the 
complex web’ (2012) 7 European Procurement and Public Private Partnership Review at 268. 
67 Bill Banks ‘Addressing Africa’s infrastructure deficit,’ available at http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Industries/ 
Government---Public-Sector/Dynamics---collaborating-for-growth_Addressing-Africas-infrastructure-deficit, 
accessed 15 September 2016. 
68 African Development Bank Group ‘Infrastructure deficit and opportunities in Africa’ (2010) 1.1 Economic 
Brief.  
69 Ibid at 2. 
70 Chinelo Anohu-Amazu ‘Mend the gap: Fixing Nigeria’s $300bn infrastructure deficit,’ available at 
http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2015/10/05/mend-the-gap-fixing-nigerias-300bn-infrastructure-deficit/, 
accessed 16 September 2016. 
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2 per cent return on investment was achieved, resulting in Nigerians suffering from ‘both a 
lack of availability and poor quality of infrastructure service delivery.’71 An example is the 
inefficiency of the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA), which resulted in an estimated 
cost of $1 billion per annum, with only 12 per cent of Nigerians having access to metered 
electricity.72 
 Africa has been described as a continent of the future.73 However, for the continent to 
realise its full potential, there is a need to reduce the huge infrastructure deficit to achieve both 
structural transformation and market integration.74 This explains why several countries on the 
continent, including Nigeria, are looking towards alternative means of reducing their 
infrastructure deficit. This is because ‘good infrastructure has always played a leading role in 
economic development, from the highways and aqueducts of ancient Rome to Britain’s railway 
boom in the mid-19th century.’75 
 Considering that government funding for infrastructure globally is limited because of 
budget constraints and other demands, governments are turning to the private sector to finance, 
design, build, operate as well as manage infrastructure assets. This method of involving the 
private sector to supply infrastructure assets and services which have traditionally been 
provided by the government is commonly referred to as public private partnership.76  
According to the United Kingdom Her Majesty (UK HM) Treasury, the rationale for involving 
the private sector in the design, building, finance and operation of public infrastructure is the 
delivery of good quality and well maintained assets that provided value for money for the tax 
payer.77 The United Nations also identifies, in addition to the constraints of limited traditional 
                                                      
71 Cambridge Economic Policy Associates Ltd ‘Mobilising finance for infrastructure: Nigeria country case Study’ 
(2015), available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a0897d40f0b649740000dc/61319-
DfID_7_Private_financing_in_Nigeria.pdf, accessed 1 September 2016. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Rabah Arezki & Amadou Sy ‘Financing Africa’s infrastructure deficit: from development banking to long-term 
investing’ (2016) 2 Global Views at 1. 
74 Ibid. 
75 The World Bank Why PPP? Toolkit for Public-Private Partnership in Road and Highways 1, available at 
https://www.ppiaf.org/sites/ppiaf.org/files/documents/toolkits/highwaystoolkit/6/pdf-version/1-11.pdf, accessed 
16 September 2016. 
76 The International Monetary Fund Public-Private Partnership (2014) at 3. 
77 HM Treasury A New Approach to Public Private Partnerships (2012) at 5. 
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funding for infrastructure, the lack of capacity of governments to implement many projects at 
the same time as a reason for engaging private sector interests in PPPs.78  
 
1.7.2. Attracting Investors 
 
There are several ways in which the public sector may engage the private sector in the provision 
and/or operation of public infrastructure assets. These include privatisation, deregulation, 
outsourcing, government downsizing, as well as the transfer of assets to the private sector 
which would in turn transfer back the assets to government at the end of a concession period.79 
It is this last type of public sector engagement with the private sector that forms the core of this 
study. 
Whereas the infrastructure gap in Africa and in Nigeria in particular may appear to be 
a major challenge for government, the same gap could present itself as a huge investment 
opportunity for discerning private sector investors. For example, before the return to civil rule 
in Nigeria in the year 1999, telephony was the exclusive preserve of the upper class in society.80 
The lack of infrastructure in that area was massive. The subsequent growth of (especially) 
mobile telephony and the returns on investment recouped by investors so far, is an indication 
that where effectively and efficiently structured, private sector investment in infrastructure has 
the potential, first, to reduce the infrastructure deficit, secondly, to stimulate economic growth 
by creating jobs in the sector, and thirdly, to enhance business activities generally.81 
The conceivable benefits of the private sector’s involvement in infrastructure include 
helping fill the wide funding gap for projects, creating a competitive environment, providing 
technological expertise, maximising profits, and effecting a reduction in operational costs that 
is essential for financial viability. The rationale is that active private companies generally have 
a wealth of experience that can be applied to turn around non-performing government 
infrastructure projects.82 
                                                      
78 The United Nations A Guidebook on Public-Private Partnership in Infrastructure (2011) at 1. 
79 M Armstrong & D Sappington ‘Regulation, competition and liberalisation’ (2006) 44 Journal of Economic 
Literature at 325–66. 
80 There were only three telephone lines per 1000 people, which was considered at that time to be one of the lowest 
tele-densities in the world. See the World Bank Implementation Completion and Results Report for the 
Privatisation Support Project (2011). 
81 The World Bank op cit note 3 at 1. 
82 Dambudzo Muzenda Increasing Private Investment in African Energy Infrastructure 44, available at 
https://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/43966848.pdf, accessed 16 September 2016. 
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The question that arises is, how does the private sector secure funding for infrastructure 
considering the volume of funds involved in the design and building of infrastructure projects? 
Yescombe notes that funding for PPP is closely linked to the financing technique for project 
finance, but he draws a distinction between project finance for pure public-sector projects and 
finance for a PPP project.83 This is because the public sector may use a ‘public-sector debt 
instrument’ to source funds for infrastructure projects – for example, through the sale of 
Treasury Bills. The lenders in such a case are not considered partners in the provision of the 
infrastructure assets and are only purchasers of a government debt instrument. According to 
Delmon, PPP consortiums may raise funds by issuing bonds or shares or borrowing from 
commercial banks or the government. Importantly, he notes that these options are available to 
‘well-managed infrastructure firms in favourable investment climates.’84 This latter 
qualification is a key concern for the present study: the fact that investors are usually not 
interested in committing to places where the investment climate is not favourable. 
When funding is secured for PPP in Nigeria, it is sometimes accessed as foreign direct 
investment (FDI) or debt into the infrastructure market place. It is therefore imperative that 
government makes the legal and policy framework conducive to and convenient for foreign 
capital importation, as well as for the repatriation of invested funds and profits when due. In 
this regard, Ikpefan argues that government must make the local conditions clear to foreign 
investors to attract their interest.85 A stable foreign currency exchange regime is also a very 
important factor, because project finance debt sourced from a foreign lender in a foreign 
currency would need to be repaid by revenues generated in the currency of the country where 
the project is located. In the event of a currency devaluation that is not properly worked out 
and taken into account ab initio, the cost of the debt can increase significantly.86 For example, 
if the construction of an airport in Kano, Nigeria, is estimated to cost $50 million United States 
dollars and the funds were sourced and received at a time when the exchange rate is 
US$1/N200, the cost of the debt would soar if the naira is devalued and the exchange rate rises 
to US$1/N500. Thus, an erratic foreign exchange regime hampers FDI in infrastructure 
financing. 
                                                      
83 E R Yescombe Principles of Project Finance (2007) at 113. 
84 Jeffrey Delmon op cit note 10 at 62. 
85 Ochei A Ikpefan op cit note 53. 
86 The World Bank Group ‘Risk allocation, bankability and mitigation in project financed transactions,’ available 
at http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/financing/risk-allocation-mitigation#currency, accessed 
16 September 2016. 
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Another factor that affects private sector involvement in infrastructure development is the ease 
with which one can engage in business in the country. This is a significant driver for both local 
and foreign investment. For instance, in the World Bank’s Doing Business Report for 2016, it 
is reckoned that contract enforcement in Nigeria takes 509.80 days87 and costs 57.70 per cent 
of the value of the claim. The results of this research place Nigeria 143 in a ranking of 189 
economies on the ease of enforcing contracts.88 
As far as the business environment is concerned, the World Bank Doing Business 
Report ranks Nigeria a woeful 169 out of 189 economies.89 In comparison, South Africa is 
ranked 78. It is therefore mandatory that the regulatory environment for business in Nigeria in 
general and PPP in particular be addressed if the country is to become an investment hub for 
infrastructure in SSA. 
A major challenge for infrastructure funding in Nigeria is the inability to access long-
term finance from the commercial banks in the country. According to the Cambridge Economic 
Policy Associates Limited, local commercial banks are not able to offer long-term financing 
beyond seven years given the short-term nature of their liabilities.90 This is compounded by the 
country’s macroeconomic outlook. Inflation is currently in the double digits and the recession 
that has been experienced from early 2016 and which has continued into 2018 further raises 
questions about long-term financing in relation to the risk of doing business in the country. 
 The political economy risk is yet another factor to be considered. Private sector 
investors will usually be concerned about having long-term sustainable agreements with the 
public sector if the policy, legal and regulatory environment is weak. The failure of government 
to respect the terms of PPP agreements or, in some instances, obey pending court orders works 
against PPP development.91 Specifically, concerns about political economy risk increase when 
policy inconsistencies arise from not only a change in government but also from changes in 
individual ministers or officials responsible for infrastructure regulation and administration. 
Again, because PPP is a recent phenomenon in Nigeria, there is a lack of policy framework in 
some sectors. For example, there is no clear-cut policy framework to help develop and 
                                                      
87 Considerably more than one calendar year. 
88 The World Bank Group Doing Business 2016: Economy Profile 2016 Nigeria 13 ed 105, available at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/Reports/Subnational-
reports/~/media/giawb/doing%20business/documents/profiles/country/NGA.pdf,   accessed 10 March 2016. 
89 Ibid at 8. 
90 Cambridge Economic Policy Associates Ltd op. cit. note 71 at 52. 
91 Ibid at 12. 
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implement projects in the transport sector, even though there is a policy for the use of toll roads 
to bring additional investment to the sector.92 There have also been disputes between the federal 
and state governments, which reveal the relative inexperience of the regulator.93 
 The challenges notwithstanding, some successful PPP projects have been recorded. 
These include the Island Power Concession, a BOT concession between the Lagos State 
Government and Negris Group,94 the Lagos Rapid Bus Transit Scheme, and the Murtala 
Mohammed Airport Terminal 2.95 In this regard, Oluwaseun Oluwasanmi notes that in the 
context of Nigeria’s vision to be among the top 20 economies in the globe by the year 2020, 
its large market is an obvious advantage that can help steer positive investor decisions towards 
the country.96 However, he insists that sincerity of purpose on the part of government is 
required in order to earn the trust of investors.97 
 Investing in infrastructure assets provides a means of diversification for investors, 
especially given the volatility of equity investments.98 It follows therefore that a system that 
makes comprehensive provision for the protection of invested assets, especially with regard to 
the infrastructure market space, would attract the attention of investors. Again, since 
infrastructure assets are less liquid than traditional assets, and given the long duration of the 
investment, investors need to be reassured that they can recoup their investments and make a 
profit. It is the inadequacy of the existing law to address this concern that informs the focus of 
this research, which seeks to investigate the role the law can play in not only improving the 
investment climate but also in providing investors with the confidence they need to commit 
their funds to long-term infrastructure financing in Nigeria. 
 Despite the opportunities that PPP offers, it has not been without significant challenges 
in the country. In the first place, PPPs are a measure to surmount the previous problems that 
                                                      
92 P A Oyadiran & A M Aregbesola ‘Road transport policy and traffic management in Nigeria’ (2008) 6 Journal 
of Research in National Development at 21. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Kazeem Ugbodaga, ‘Gains from PPP: The Lagos example’ PM News 19 December 2011. 
95 Despite the dispute involving the Bi-Courtney Aviation Services Limited and the Federal Airports Authority of 
Nigeria (FAAN) surrounding the terms for the management of the airport, the project is already operational and 
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96 Oluwaseun Oluwasanmi ‘Public private partnership and Nigerian economic growth: Problems and prospects’ 
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plagued public-sector establishments in the country, such as mismanagement and corruption. 
However, corrupt practices seem to bedevil PPPs as well. According to Sotola and Ayodele, in 
2010, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was invited to probe PPP 
projects in the north central state of Niger.99 The researcher is however of the belief that 
corruption is not a major issue with PPP execution in Nigeria as there have only been a few 
incidences of transactions being marred by corrupt practices. 
 The buy-back of the Lekki-Epe Concession Project by the Lagos State Government100 
exposes the teething troubles militating against a successful PPP regime in the country. While 
the intention for the launch of the Lekki-Epe Project was to ease the traffic congestion 
experienced at the Lagos Island axis and provide a system that would guarantee good road 
maintenance, the initiators of the project did not reckon with the need to carry the immediate 
community along.101 The resistance to the project by members of the community and the fear 
that the All Progressive Congress (APC) could lose the 2015 gubernatorial elections in Lagos 
State worked against that PPP. Corder and Andzenge note, and rightly so, that ‘one of the major 
challenges facing private sector investment sustainability is the allure of policy somersaults by 
government to pander to populist demands that are ill advised in the long-term. Electoral cycles 
tend to make elected governments take short-term decisions that affect long-term sunk 
investments.’102 It is submitted that the policy change by the Lagos State government (LASG) 
was more of a political manoeuvre than one made in the public interest. The decision is bound 
to affect investor interest in future toll road concessions with the LASG. The current situation 
in Nigeria is akin to that in Canada when PPP was first introduced, described as “Problem, 
Problem and Problem.”103 
 Soyeju identifies the financing problem as one of the hurdles in the path of successful 
PPPs in the country. He cites for reference purposes the concession for the new domestic 
terminal at the Murtala Mohammed Airport (MM2) that was awarded by the federal 
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government to Bi-Courtney Limited, a limited liability company, ‘to develop, finance, manage 
and operate the Lagos Airport Terminal 2 (and ancillary assets) under a Build-Operate-Transfer 
(BOT) arrangement.’ Unfortunately that project and a sister project, the Lagos-Ibadan 
Expressway concession, experienced setbacks due to funding problems.104 Soyeju therefore 
recommends inter alia the development of the capital market long-term debt instruments and 
the promotion of the involvement of the private sector to finance infrastructure.105 In addition 
to these financial measures, this researcher is of the view that there needs to be a legal 
framework that provides assurance regarding funding security and some indication of potential 
RoI, rather than the creation of funding instruments for infrastructure financing. That is the 
heart of this research. 
 
1.8 Definition of Key Terminology 
 
Several technical terms are used in this research. Given that researchers tend not to have 
uniform definitions for certain words in academic research, it is imperative to define some key 
words or phrases in the context which they are used in the investigation. Operational definitions 
for these words or terms appear below:  
 
‘Bidder’: This is a respondent to a request for Expressions of Interest or an invitation to submit 
a bid in response to a Project Brief. Typically, a bidder will be a consortium of parties with one 
lead party responsible for the provision of all contracted services on behalf of the consortium9 
‘Business case’: This provides an overview of a partnership approach to how the project will 
be delivered, taking into account the impact of the project and market response. 
‘Commercial banks’: These are private-sector banks which supply financing for PPP projects. 
‘Concession’: A type of PPP in which the public pays service fees in the form of tolls, fares or 
other charges for using the facility. 
‘Concessionaire’: The private sector partner in a PPP arrangement involving a concession. 
‘Investment bank’: A bank that arranges PPP investment funds but does not on its own provide 
debt or funding. 
‘Lead arranger’: This is the bank arranging and underwriting the Project Companies’ debt. 
‘Mezzanine debt’: This is a subordinated debt provided by a third party other than investors in 
the project. 
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‘Naira’: The Nigerian currency. 100 kobo make one naira (N1) 
‘Private party’: The private sector entity with which the government contracts in a PPP. 
Traditionally the private party has been a special purpose vehicle created specifically for the 
purposes of the project. 
‘Project company’: This is the special purpose vehicle which is the public authority’s counter 
party under the PPP contract. 
‘Public authority’: The public-sector counter party to the PPP contract. 
‘Return on Investment’: Expected profits investors look forward to for committing their assets 
to the project. 
‘Risk’: A situation involves risk if the randomness facing the economic entity can be expressed 
in terms of specific numerical probabilities (objective or subjective). 
‘Risk allocation’: This is the allocation of responsibility for dealing with the consequences of 
each risk through a specified mechanism which may involve sharing the risk. 
‘Sponsors’: The investors who bid for, develop and lead the project through their investment 
in the project company. 
‘SPV’: Special purpose vehicle. Usually a legal entity with no other activity other than those 
connected with its borrowing. 
‘Value-for-money’: This refers to the optimum combination of whole-of-lifecycle costs, risks, 
completion time and quality to meet public requirements. 
‘Whole-of-lifecycle’: The cost associated with the ongoing repair and maintenance of a facility 




In this chapter, a synopsis of the thesis has been provided. The background indicates that 
Nigeria is currently experiencing a huge infrastructure deficit occasioned by several years of 
poor funding for the sector as well as the poor management of existing facilities. Since 
infrastructure is vital for the economic growth of the country, it has been established that the 
public sector is obliged to seek for alternative funding for the procurement of public 
infrastructure. It is in this light that the PPP model of infrastructure procurement becomes an 
option to consider. Since the inception of a PPP framework in Nigeria, it has produced mixed 
results. The need to seek for ways to ensure that the practice is improved upon necessitates this 
study. Further, to get the participation of the private sector in infrastructure procurement 
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requires that the process for PPP is clear-cut, less cumbersome and one that promotes the 
protection of the assets of investors and lenders. 
 South Africa’s success in PPP practice compared to other sub-Saharan African (SSA) 
countries provides a model that can be studied to improve on the performance of PPP in 
Nigeria. This study therefore, examines the legal framework for PPP in Nigeria in its socio-






























Much of what we call the developing world has stopped developing, while 
growth in other regions has slowed. As a result, billions of people remain 
trapped in poverty, despite decades of foreign aid and lending by multilateral 
institutions such as the World Bank. In the past, economists prescribed 
liberalisation and privatisation to governments seeking to improve their 
economic performance. But dissatisfaction with these remedies in many 





Having identified the research problem, research questions and the aim of the study in the 
previous chapter, this chapter seeks to explore the theories and concepts that provide an 
analytical framework to support the enquiry. Three main legal constructs have been selected to 
support the argument of the study: the rule of law, law in development and the sanctity of 
contracts.  This chapter accordingly builds on three fundamental assumptions. The first is that 
respect for the rule of law by both the public sector and the private sector is key to sustaining 
commerce. Secondly, if any gains from a partnership between the public and private sectors 
are to be realised, the need for effective institutions cannot be over-emphasised. Thirdly, the 
development of a sound framework that underscores the protection of assets invested in a 
combined public sector/private sector initiative will promote the development of a sustainable 
market for private sector investment in infrastructure. Such a market will not only ensure good 
returns on investments but will also broaden access to both domestic and foreign capital. 
 The concept of the rule of law essentially advances the need for respect for the law on 
the part of those in authority and those whom they lead.107 The theory of law in development 
is centred on the instrumentality of the law in bringing about socio-economic development.108 
In the context of this research, the law can be a tool to promote efficiency within government 
institutions in their dealings with the private sector, as well as provide an environment that 
protects the assets invested by the private sector to finance public infrastructure.109 The doctrine 
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of the sanctity of contract recognises that ‘the moral basis of contract is that the promisor has 
by his promise created a reasonable expectation that it will be kept.’110 
 The theories selected for this study recognise the role of law in promoting development 
in society. The law is here regarded as a tool to help develop a market for private sector 
investment in infrastructure, and also to ensure that assets invested in the market are protected 
so as to sustain the growth of the market. Furthermore, since investment in infrastructure 
enables economic development, sustaining a flow of investments in infrastructure is 
fundamental to that development. The law is also necessary to give effect to government policy.  
 
2.2. The Rule of Law 
 
The concept of the rule of law is multi-dimensional. It has been studied by lawyers, political 
scientists and economists.111 The rule of law encompasses a wide variety of subjects ranging 
from the security of person and property rights to checks on government and the control of 
corruption.112 There are also writings linking the rule of law with economic development.113 
The famous words of the philosopher Thomas Hobbes insist on the need for the rule of law: 
outside of a social contract, he declared, human life is ‘short, nasty and brutish.’114 
 
2.2.1 The Rule of Law Defined 
 
Whilst there is no consensus about how to define the concept of the rule of law, various 
definitions that have been advanced are of immense value for this study. 
For every society, the rule of law is an essential subject.115 The rule of law describes that aspect 
of the law which envisages a political system where life is organised according to laws that 
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guarantee a good degree of objectivity in dispensing justice, defending freedom, promoting 
peace and prosperity, because law is a reasonable expression of integrity.116 
 To Tamanaha, the rule of law ‘imposes legal limitations on and coordinates the 
behaviour of government officials and it imposes legal limitations on and coordinates the 
behaviour of citizens.’117 He further states that the public sector is subject to two distinct 
limitations:118 
 
i. The first limitation is that government officials must abide by valid laws in force at 
the time of any given government action; and 
ii. Officials must remain within established legal bounds when exercising the power 
attached to their public positions. 
 
 Dam highlights the long history of the concept of the rule of law, from classical Greece 
to early England and up to the birth of the American republic.119 He approvingly quotes Plato: 
‘the state in which the law is above the rulers, the rulers are inferior to the law, has salvation 
and every blessing which the gods can confer.’120 In early England Bracton wrote that even the 
King was ‘subject to God and the law.’121 The Constitution of the United States in 1780 
included the phrase ‘Ours is a government of laws, not of men.’122 This phrase was brought to 
bear in Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion on the power of judicial review in the US 
Supreme Court,123 in the matter of Marbury v Madison.124 The rule of law therefore establishes 
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the position that the powers of state and government can be exercised only within the bounds 
of applicable laws. 
 The works of political theorists like Aristotle, Montesquieu and Locke also address the 
subject of the rule of law. These theorists proposed devising limits to the power of the 
government. Aristotle advocated that law rather than any single one of the citizens ruled, and 
thus the ideal society is one governed by reason and not by passion.125 Montesquieu proposed 
a system of institutional restraints that could limit the government’s exercise of power against 
its citizens and guarantee the individual’s freedom from fear and the threat of violence.126 In 
order to achieve this objective, the political system must be able to prevent the whims of the 
king or the discretion of the legislature from falling upon individuals. He proffered the solution 
of an independent judiciary to check the powers of the executive.127 Locke’s thesis promoted 
the preservation of individuals’ property – the chief aim of men entering a political society was 
guaranteed by three conditions: first, established law agreed to by consent; secondly, an 
independent judge with power to decide controversies according to law; and third, a power to 
execute the sentence.128 
 A V Dicey is famous for his work on the subject. He defined the rule of law as follows: 
 
[It] means in the first place, the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular 
law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, and excludes the existence 
of arbitrariness, of prerogative, or even of wide discretionary authority on the 
part of government…. It means, again, equality before the law, or the equal 
subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land administered by the 
ordinary courts… [and], lastly…that, in short, the principles of private law 
have with us been by the action of the courts and Parliament so extended as to 
determine the position of the Crown and of its servants; thus the constitution 
is the result of ordinary law of the land.129 
 
As formulated by Dicey, the rule of law has three basic interpretations. First, no one is 
punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of 
law established in the ordinary legal manner; secondly, no one is above the law; no matter his 
rank or condition, he is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction 
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of ordinary tribunals; and thirdly, the rule of law may be used as a formula for expressing the 
fact that with us the laws of the constitution, the rules which in foreign countries naturally form 
part of a constitutional case, are not the source but the consequence of the rights of individuals 
as defined and enforced by the court.130 
 W Wade and C F Forsyth’s theorisation of the rule of law identified the important 
attributes of the rule of law as:131 
 
i. All acts must be in accordance with the law to be valid; 
ii. Government activity must be conducted within a framework of defined rules and 
regulations; 
iii. Disputes involving the legality of government actions must be decided by the courts 
independent of government; 
iv. There should be no undue privileges and discrimination in the society; and 
v. No one should suffer punishment outside the authority of law. 
 
2.2.2 Key Schools of Thought on the Rule of Law 
 
Discourses on the rule of law distinguish between an institutional and a substantive view, and 
between an instrumental and an intrinsic conception. These are discussed briefly below. 
 
a. Institutional Conception of the Rule of Law 
 
Proponents of this view place emphasis on the efficacy of a system of rules. According to 
Joseph Raz, a leading advocate of this view, the rule of law entails two fundamentals, namely, 
that government action should be authorised by law, and that laws should be capable of guiding 
people’s conduct for them to plan their lives.132 Thus, for people to be able to plan their lives, 
laid down rules should be prospective and stable.133 The institutional view emphasises the 
characteristics of a legal system that ensures that laws are available and are capable of being 
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adhered to.134 Such characteristics include generality, publicity, prospectiveness, clarity, non-
contradictoriness, conformability, stability and congruence.135 When laws reflect these traits, 
the addressees are able to ‘know what they are commanded to do’ and ‘to do what is 
commanded of them.’136 The main concern of the institutional view is to see to it that the 
qualities and mechanisms of a legal system are maintained. As such, the emphasis is not on the 
content of the law and the values it upholds but ‘rather on whether the legal system has the 
formal characteristics that make it work.’137 
 
b. Substantive Conception 
 
This view of the rule of law is primarily concerned with the substance of the laws rather than 
the legal system. Thus, the public can ‘foresee with certainty how the government would use 
its coercive power in given circumstances and thus plan accordingly.’138 Individuals are able 
to determine what applies since government is bound by rules laid down in advance. In the 
words of Friedrich Hayek: 
 
Under the rule of law the government is prevented from stultifying individual 
efforts by ad hoc action. Within the known rules of the game the individual is 
free to pursue his personal ends and desires, certain that powers of government 
will not be used deliberately to frustrate his efforts.139  
 
 
Alvaro argues that the judiciary ‘must look not only at whether the executive has acted within 
its powers – whether the authority was legally entitled to act – but also whether the substance 
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c. The Intrinsic Version 
 
The leading proponent of the intrinsic view is A V Dicey. His work analysed ‘rule, supremacy; 
or predominance of law’ as one of the distinguishing characteristics of English institutions. To 
Dicey, due process, authority’s submission to its own laws, and a constitution consisting of 
judicially declared rights for which there are enforceable remedies, are qualities to be exhibited 
in any community governed by the rule of law.141 
 
d. The Instrumental View 
 
This view is essentially concerned with how the rule of law can enhance economic 
development and thus strengthen commerce. The idea is that the rule of law presupposes that 
when individuals enter business relationships the outcome should be predictable and therefore 
lead to economic growth. Max Weber’s work on the relationship between ‘rational law’ and 
economic development elucidates this view.142 
 
Table 1: Rule of Law from Different Angles 
Institutional view Substantive view Intrinsic view Instrumental view 
Emphasis is on the 
legal system. 
Emphasis is on the 
laws in application. 
Emphasis is on 
regard for the law. 
Emphasis is on using 





2.2.3 Common Rule of Law Assumptions 
 
Kristen E Boon has identified three common assumptions regarding the rule of law.143 First, 
that there is a relationship among law, peace and development; secondly, that institutions and 
legal systems can be reformed; and thirdly, that specific types of laws, such as secure property 
rights, will promote peace and development. These assumptions are described in summary. 
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a. Relationship among Law, Peace and Development 
 
The application of law that is devoid of ambiguity and well enforced can assist in securing 
peace as well as promoting economic development. Where this is the case, there is always a 
sense of predictability. Should a dispute arise, it can be channelled to well-entrenched judicial 
institutions. 
 
b. Reformation of Institutions and Legal Systems 
 
Weak institutions constitute a drawback to developing economies as they result in poor 
application of the law and an inefficient judicial process. It appears that the problem is not as 
much with laws that are deficient as with the existence of good laws that are honoured in the 
breach. 
 
c. Laws Promoting Development 
 
Laws can be used as a tool to promote development and to implement policy decisions. In the 
case of Nigeria, the Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission Act 2005, which 
underscores the Federal Government of Nigeria’s policy towards private sector participation 
in the provision of public infrastructure, illustrates how law can be channelled for 
developmental purposes. 
 Since the rule of law ensures predictability, investors often consider a country’s regard 
for it when making business decisions, especially when these involve foreign direct investment 
(FDI). The Chief Justice of South Africa, the Hon. Mogoeng Mogoeng argued in favour of the 
rule of law as follows: 
 
Why do we not witness in France, Singapore and the UK problems that have 
become familiar in Africa? We have oil, gas, gold, diamonds, platinum, 
chrome, coal etc. in abundance, and breath-taking tourist attractions. The UK 
is the size of a game reserve in South Africa known as the Kruger National 
Park. South Korea is about the size of a province in South Africa known as 
KwaZulu-Natal – where Durban is – and Singapore was very poor and 
insignificant in 1965 but is now rightly counted among the big world 
economies although it has nothing but its people and a tiny piece of land. A 
closer examination of the operations of their judiciaries would, without 
ignoring the damage done by our painful history, be quite revealing.144 
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Consequently, if Nigeria and other sub-Saharan African countries are desirous of attracting a 
positive response from prospective investors, they must take deliberate steps to improve on 
their rule of law record. Where there is flagrant disregard for court orders and rulings, mistrust 
and a lack of investor confidence is created.  
 
2.3 Law and Development Theory 
 
The major thrust of the law and development theory is that ‘law is central to the development 
process,’ or better still, that law is an ‘instrument that could be used to reform society and that 
lawyers or judges could serve as social engineers.’145 The law and development construct,  
embodies those theories that seek to connect law and development by formulating a framework 
that allows for the role of law in development to be understood by policy makers to enhance 
development.146 Law and development is a branch of scholarship, that can be utilised to 
investigate the relationship between law and socio-economic growth.147 This appears to be the 
distinction between law so-called and the field of law148 and development.149 Therefore, a 
development -driven approach to law denotes considering the law as a tool for development 
through the use of legal rules and the institutions in a legal framework to formulate, guide, 
implement and support development policies to ensure that objectives are achieved. In the 
sphere of law and development, institutions are a key driver to development.150 It follows that 
having efficient institutions to support government policies will stimulate economic growth, 
hence it has become a focus for law and development theorists.151 
Ordor identifies that law and development scholarship has opened several approaches to the 
study of the relationship between law and development.152 What is important is that each 
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country in the developing world should structure the law and development narrative to ensure 
that it meets the goals of that society.153 First, for example, law and development should address 
issues concerning weak state institutions in Nigeria as well as the challenge of poor governance 
strategy which has stifled economic growth over the years. Secondly, the law is ineffective 
where the institutions that are responsible for enforcing it are absent.154 
   It follows that law should, be effectively used to promote good governance by giving 
effect to policy.155 Thus, policy becomes law the implementation of which, is dependent on 
law’s alignment with the needs and aspirations of the people.156 However, policy or law, no 
matter how well couched, is not a magic wand. There must be the will to ensure that the law is 
observed not in the breach.157  
 The proponents of this theory believe that there is a gap between law in books and law 
in action in developing countries, and they therefore advocate professional legal education as 
a possible solution. More importantly, they posit that the law could lead social change, the law 
itself being an engine of change.158  
 The theory was developed by the Law and Development Movement (LDM) as a 
specialised area of academic interest in the US in the 1960s. The LDM centred their study on 
the relationship between legal systems and development in relation to social, economic and 
political changes that occur in developing countries.159 Trubek notes that the law and 
development theorists sought to interest development agencies in the importance of reform and 
showed the relationship between law and development based on the intellectual agenda.160 
It is noteworthy that the relationship between law and economic development has been at the 
core of modern social theory, building on the theses of Marx, Durkheim and Weber.161 Tom 
Ginsburg argues that the law and development movement sought to export US models of law 
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and legal education.162 The same opinion is shared by Tor Krever, who notes that transplanting 
US institutions to the developing world would empower the state and facilitate the exercise of 
macroeconomic control.163 Indeed, in the words of Trubek: 
 
The state had to undertake many key economic roles, from banking to 
manufacture and state corporations were a dominant form of activity…. [The] 
private sector in some countries was not oriented toward effective economic 
action so that the state had to try to transform key private actors through 
regulatory law. This orientation on the role of law led to an emphasis on public 
law and regulation as well as to sweeping legal reforms of traditional economic 
sectors.164 
 
 The law and development movement faded from prominence in the mid-1970s after 
highpoints between the 1960s and early 1970s.165 It has recently resurfaced on a far larger scale 
and is at the ‘forefront of development policy making, as government agencies, international 
organisations, and the non-profit sector advocate the rule of law in developing countries.’166 
Although legal institutions still occupy a central position in law and development theory, the 
field is now much broader than the question of reforming laws and legal systems in developing 
countries to mirror the developed world, having grown to include democracy indices and 
economic liberalisation.167  
 Law and development theory is made up of sub-theories that overlap and diverge in 
various respects. For the purposes of this study, the focus is on modernisation theory, 
dependency theory and economic growth theories. 
 
2.3.1 Modernisation Theory 
 
This theory is anchored on the hypothesis that developing countries’ ‘development prospects 
depend, for the most part, on convergence with the policies and institutions of developed 
Western societies, including assigning a prominent role to both liberal political values 
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(democratic institutions and a welfare state) and liberal economic institutions, a prominent role 
for private markets.’168 
 Based on the foregoing, developing countries would be better off if they mirrored 
formal laws relating to property and commercial laws that obtain in the developed world, to 
ensure the predictability and security that are needed for fostering investment.169 
 
2.3.2 Dependency Theory 
 
Dependency theory developed as an offshoot from the work of Raul Prebisch.170 Based on the 
work of Prebisch, the theory holds that increase in the wealth of developed countries was at the 
expense of poorer ones. In its extreme form, dependency theory draws inspiration from the 
Marxist perception that globalisation is merely the exploitation of the developing world and 
the spread of market capitalism in return for obsolete technologies supplied by the West.171 
Prebisch and his colleagues were troubled that economic growth in advanced nations did not 
necessarily result in growth in poorer countries. On the contrary, their studies aver that 
economic activity in richer countries often results in economic problems in poorer countries.172 
 Proponents of the theory advocate an ‘inward looking’ approach to development and 
‘an increased role for the state in terms of imposing barriers to trade, making inward investment 
difficult and promoting nationalisation of key industries.’173 The inefficiencies associated with 
state involvement in the economy and the growth of corruption are seen in Zimbabwe’s land 
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reform policies as well as in Nigeria’s nationalisation policy of the 1970s, which turned out to 
be anti-development.174 
 
2.3.3 Economic Growth Theories 
 
The economic theories briefly discussed here are Adam Smith’s theory, the Keynesian theory 
and neo-classical economic theory. 
 
a. Adam Smith’s Comparative Advantage Theory 
 
 
Adam Smith gained the reputation of being the founder of modern economics. His work titled 
The Wealth of Nations popularised his view on comparative advantage. He argued that 
unrestricted trade and free international competition are more beneficial to a nation than the 
mercantilist economic policy that existed in many parts of Europe in the 18th century.175 
 Smith advocated the division of labour as he claimed that it leads to the greatest 
improvement in the productive powers of labour: 
 
First […] the increase of dexterity in every particular workman; secondly, […] 
the saving of time which is commonly lost in passing from one species of work 
to another; lastly, […] the invention of a great number of machines which 
facilitate and abridge labour, and enable one man to do the work of many.176 
 
b. Keynesian Theory 
 
Keynesian economics gets its name and concepts from John Maynard Keynes, a British 
economist. He is regarded as the founder of modern macroeconomics. According to Keynes, 
inadequate overall demand could lead to prolonged periods of high unemployment. His theory 
rose to prominence against the backdrop of the Great Depression of the 1930s. He argued that 
government should provide an adequate public policy solution to spearhead production and 
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employment.177 Keynes’s popular treatise, The Genera Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money (1936) and his earlier work, A Treatise on Money (1930) analysed economics in terms 
of the flow of incomes and expenditures, thereby opening new vistas for further economic 
analysis.178 
 The central theme of this theory is that government intervention can stabilise the 
economy and that monetary policy and taxes can be used as tools to stabilise the economy. For 
example, reducing interest rates to encourage investments and using taxes to cool down rising 
inflation. This is the sub-field in economics known as macroeconomics. Keynesian economics 
therefore focuses on major aspects of the macro economy such as gross domestic product 
(GDP), national income and wealth, the money supply, unemployment, the consumer price 
index (CPI), as well as the growth pattern of the economy. This distinguishes Keynesian theory 
from neoclassical theory, which focuses on markets per se.179 Money forms an important aspect 
of the theory. Although prices and incomes are expressed and determined in monetary terms, 
the role of money as a means of payment is distinguished from money as expressing prices or 
income.180 
c. Neo-Classical Theory 
 
This theory, in simple terms, maintains that private sector management in a competitive 
environment is intrinsically more efficient than the public sector, and consequently private 
sector participation in the procurement, management and maintenance of public infrastructure 
will result in better quality service delivery.  
 Neo-classicists maintain that ‘capitalist societies are societies that establish and protect 
two key institutions. The first is private property: each citizen has the power to freely own, 
buy, or sell his or her resources and produced goods. The second is a system of fully 
competitive markets: no citizen has any power to control prices, and all buyers and sellers take 
market process as facts on which to base their decisions. When both institutions exist, a society 
possesses what is typically called a “private enterprise market economy.”’181 Neo-classical 
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theorists support an economy that encourages private sector enterprise, with a major emphasis 
on a free market and free competition.  
 The proponents of neo-classical theory believe that human beings have inherent rational 
and productive abilities to produce the maximum wealth possible in society. Everyone is 
defined in terms of that person’s consumption of goods and services and capitalism is the 
optimum society.182 
 In the context of development, the law is a tool that can be used to enforce government 
policy directions. As it relates to PPP, whatever directions or changes government intend to 
pursue, the law can serve to achieve that purpose. Where the law makes it mandatory that the 
local community is involved from the inception to the approval of PPP projects, this provides 
a solution to the problem of community stakeholder challenges to implementation of projects. 
This is similar to, for example, the enactment of a statute to remove custom tariffs of certain 
imported products to promote free trade following a trade agreement between two or more 
countries to reflect a change in government policy.183 It remains to be stated that Law and 
Development theories could provide direction for the formulation of a PPP framework to suit 
the requirements of any given country or territory. Such theories can provide the foundation 
for policy decisions to be carried out by the public authority in support of a successful PPP 
regime. 
 
2.4 Sanctity of Contract 
 
In the first place, a contract is ‘an agreement made between two or more parties which is legally 
binding on them.’184 It is an agreement enforceable by the law, between two or more parties, 
to do or to abstain from doing some act or acts, their intention being to create legal relations 
and not merely to exchange mutual promises.185 The law expects that the parties are competent 
to enter into a legally binding agreement.186 According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a contract 
is: 
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 A deliberate engagement between competent parties, upon a legal 
consideration, to do, or abstain from doing some act…. It is an agreement 
creating obligation, in which there must be competent parties, subject-matter, 
legal consideration, mutuality of agreement, and mutuality of obligation, and 
agreement must not be so vague or uncertain that terms are not ascertainable.187 
 
 Such agreements are considered fundamental to business.188 An agreement is not a 
contract unless there is an intention for the agreement to be legally binding between the 
parties.189 It follows that if parties willingly enter into a contract, the terms of that contract are 
to prevail except if they are illegal or impossible to perform. Thus, it is not all promises that 
should be legally enforceable.190 For example, an agreement between friends to meet at the 
cinema by 4.00 pm on Saturday must be assumed to be an agreement of a social nature and not 
meant to be binding on the parties. Generally, the setting in which the agreement is made can 
help to determine the intention of the parties. If the agreement was made in a social or domestic 
setting, the courts would view it as a social or domestic agreement. On the other hand, if the 
agreement was made in a commercial setting, it is to be assumed, unless proven otherwise, that 
there was an intention on the part of the parties to the agreement that legal obligations were 
created.191  In Amadi v Pool House Group Co,192 the plaintiff was a stacker who claimed to 
have won a lump sum. The defendant successfully denied any liability by relying on an honour 
clause that the contract was not intended to be binding.  
It is a truism that the commercial and economic life of people in society is woven 
around agreements. It follows that commerce and trade would become chaotic if the law 
allowed a promisor to break his or her promises without, at least, placing him or her under the 
obligation to pay a compensation to their promisee for the loss caused by their default. This is 
because the law generally regards contracts as sacrosanct: the principle of sanctity of contract. 
Thus, where parties duly enter a contract, they must honour their obligations under the contract.  
 The law of contract is concerned with determining whether there is a legally binding 
agreement between the parties and ensuring that there is a remedy in a situation where a party 
fails to perform an obligation in accordance with the terms of the agreement. It becomes clearer 
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where there is some form of exchange between the parties based on their agreement.193 The 
standard for determining whether the parties intended to create a legally binding agreement is 
that of a reasonable man. In common law, the question is, will a reasonable person, observing 
the words and the conduct of the parties objectively and considering the nature and context of 
the agreement, consider that there was an intention to create legal relations? If the answer is in 
the affirmative, then the court would order that the party in breach compensate the injured 
party.194 
 For an agreement to be considered a contract, there must be the communication of a 
promise to undertake or assume an obligation.195 Adam Smith thought that contracts should be 
enforced because they induce reasonable expectations.196 The law, therefore, should recognise 
a promise as a contract when a reasonable person in the promisee’s position would expect 
performance or equivalent compensation.197 
 The principle of the sanctity of contract has, in the context addressed by this study, 
become more compelling due to the emergence of private sector participation in the provision 
of infrastructural services, with far-reaching effect.198 The consequences of the failure of the 
government to adhere to the principle of sanctity of contract are severe, shaking the confidence 
of prospective investors in taking an investment decision.199 Sanctity of contract entails that 
obligations in a contract must be honoured because the contract was entered into willingly.200 
Contracts freely entered into must be honoured and, where necessary, enforced by the courts.201 
The doctrine of sanctity of contract, also known as pacta sunt servanda came into question in 
the South African case of Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd,202 
where the court invoked ‘the age-old contractual doctrine that agreements solemnly made 
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should be honoured  and enforced (pacta sunt servanda).’203 The decision of the Supreme Court 
of South Africa in  Mohammed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel (Pty) Ltd204 
reinforces the need to ensure that contractual agreements are respected especially when the 
terms of the contract are not against public policy. Hence, the principle of pacta sunt servanda 
should be applied. The case before the Supreme Court was an appeal against the decision of 
the Gauteng Local Division of the High Court. The court of first instance had entered 
judgement in favour of the plaintiff (Southern Sun Hotels Interest (Pty) Ltd on grounds that an 
eviction of the plaintiff based on their breach of clause 20 of the lease agreement for failing to 
pay rent to the defendant on the due date is manifestly unreasonable, unfair and offend public 
policy. The Supreme Court held that ‘it was a material term of the agreement that should the 
respondent fail to pay the rental on due date, then the appellant would be entitled to cancel the 
lease and retake possession.’205 It therefore follows that in so far as enforcing a contract will 
not lead to an illegality or where doing so does not offend  public policy, the parties must 
respect the terms of the agreement206. 
 In South Africa, the principle of sanctity of contract is applied in line with the 1996 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,207 which promotes the principles of dignity, 
equality and justice.208 In the case of Brisley v Drotsky,209 Cameron JA used section 39(2) of 
the Constitution to connect the common law of contract with these constitutional values. 
Similarly, in Brendenkamp & Ors v Standard Bank of SA Ltd,210 the court inter alia held that 
contractual promises should be kept and that the exercise of a contractual right, which does not 
involve public policy considerations or constitutional values, does not have to be fair to warrant 
being set aside when it is not in breach of the constitutional values of equality and justice.   
 The Supreme Court of Nigeria was firm in upholding the duty to honour binding 
agreements involving the public sector or governments in their sovereign might, as illustrated 
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in Attorney General Nassarawa State v Attorney General Plateau State.211 At the creation of 
Nassarawa State out of the former Plateau State, the Military Administrators had a meeting 
with General Abacha, the then Head of State, during which some areas of Plateau State were 
by agreement allocated to Nassarawa State. Later, the government of Plateau State failed to 
abide by the agreement and the Nassarawa State government instituted action to enforce the 
agreement. The Supreme Court noted: 
 
If mutual agreement entered by parties to it shall be treated lavishly and that 
any party shall be allowed to unilaterally resile from the commitment both 
parties have signed to bind themselves, then the essence of any agreement or 
mutual contract is woefully defeated.212 
 
Further deprecating the attitude of the Plateau State government in seeking to unilaterally 
resile from its agreement with the Nassarawa State government, Peter-Odili JSC said: 
 
This attempt by the defendant is reckless with capacity to encourage 
lawlessness and disobedience to constituted authority and the Rule of Law 
which outcome would not rule out chaos. People or those in charge of 
institutions or government at every level should be cautious and wary of taking 
steps that are definitely not in keeping with the peace and order of this nation. 
The defendants are bound and stopped from going against that Agreement.213 
 
 It has been noted that for a prospective investor who wishes to enter a contract with the 
public sector in a developing economy, the following questions may arise: first, would such a 
contract in writing be respected? Secondly, can the investor enforce the terms in case of 
default? Thirdly, would an investor have a remedy? And where there is a remedy, would the 
Government honour the remedial measures? Fourthly, if there is a change in government would 
a previous administration’s commitments be respected by the succeeding administration? 
Fifthly, would the government as a party honour its own obligations under the contract?214  
The importance of respect for contracts by government came into question in the United 
States215 in Perry v United States,216 when the court per Chief Justice Hughes held as follows: 
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The United States are as much bound by their contracts as are individuals…. 
When the United States, with constitutional authority, makes contracts, it has 
similar rights and incurs responsibilities similar to those of individuals who are 
parties to such instruments…. The [contrary] argument…is in substance that 
Government cannot by contract restrict the exercise of a sovereign power. But 
the right to make binding obligations is a competence attaching to 
sovereignty…. The binding quality of the promise of the United States is of 
the essence of the credit which is…pledged. The fact that the United States 
may not be sued without its consent is a matter of procedure which does not 
affect the legal and biding character of its contracts.217 
 
It is pertinent to note that sanctity of contract is enshrined in the Constitution of the United 
States under Article I, Section 10. It provides, in the relevant part, that: “No state shall … pass 
any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the obligation of contracts. What 
this means is that the US government is prohibited by the Constitution from taking any action 
that may retroactively alter the terms of a contract.”  
 When a private entity deals with government, certain questions arises. First, can the 
investor enforce the terms of the agreement where government defaults? Secondly, where the 
investor obtains remedy against the government, will such a remedy be honoured and thirdly, 
what happens if there is a change in government, will the new government honour the 
agreements of its predecessor in office? The answer to these questions is hinged on sanctity of 
contract and therefore investors consider whether a country’s legal and regulatory environment 
favours cross-border projects.218 In a contractual relationship between the state and a private 
sector entity, both parties are bound by their agreement. In BFI Group Corporation v Bureau 
of Public Enterprises,219 the respondent advertised for expression of interest by interested 
bidders for the privatisation of the Aluminium Company of Nigeria. The appellant completed 
the request for proposals (RFP) issued by the National Council on Privatisation (NCP). The 
RFP contained the term that a bidder will be selected on the basis of and selection procedure 
approval by the NCP and contained in the RFP.  The relevant clause in the RFP stipulated that 
bid proposals shall remain valid for 60 days after the submission date and that proposals shall 
be binding offers, acceptable by BPE to form binding contract between parties during the 
validity period. Undertakings and agreement signed by the appellants also contained a clause 
                                                      
217 Ibid at 551–54. The case of the Attorney General of Nassarawa State v the Attorney General Plateau State 
cited Supra,  
218Paul Obo Idornigie ‘Towards adopting an appropriate dispute resolution mechanism to promote investments to 
enhance energy access in Africa’ in Yinka Omorogbe & Ada Ordor (eds) Ending Africa’s Energy Deficit (2018) 
at 164. 
219 (2012) All FWLR 676 
 48 
that 10 per cent  of the acceptable bid price shall be paid within 15 working days of the signing 
of the share purchase agreement, and that the outstanding 90 per cent  shall be paid within 90 
calendar days. The appellant was successful in his bid of $410 million for the 77.5 per cent 
shares of the Federal Government in ALSCON. By a letter dated 17 June 2006, the respondent 
in confirming the appellant’s success, unilaterally introduced a term stipulating that 10 per cent 
of the bid price must be paid within 15 days of the appellant’s receipt of the letter. The appellant 
fulfilled all conditions for the validation of its bid including the procurement of a bid bond. 
The respondent however repudiated the agreement on the basis that the 10 per cent of the bid 
price was not paid within 15 days of the receipt of its letter dated 17 June 2006. The appellant 
instituted a suit at the Federal High Court claiming various declaratory and injunctive reliefs. 
The trial court dismissed the claims. The appeal to the Court of Appeal was also dismissed. 
Aggrieved still, the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, in a decision 
in favour of the respondents, held inter alia that the court must treat as sacrosanct the terms of 
an agreement freely entered by the parties.  
 As Parry notes, the doctrine of sanctity of contract was greatly influenced by the 
Ecclesiastical Courts in England as well as by the Court of Chancery. These courts sought to 
provide a remedy by filling the wide gap in law left under the common law. Thus, where a 
promisor had made a pledge and failed to perform his agreement, his failure constituted at that 
time an ecclesiastical offence for which he was answerable in church courts as a sinner in need 
of correction. This was because the King’s courts only ratified or enforced contracts made 
under a pledge of faith and the Constitutions of Clarendon, 1164.220 
 
 
2.4.1 Classical Approach to Sanctity of Contract 
 
The doctrine of sanctity of contract had a primary role in classical law in securing a 
transactional framework. It prevented contractors from avoiding some or all of their obligations 
in a contract by raising excuses as to why they could not perform. However, contractors could 
be released from the terms of the contract through interpretation of the doctrines of frustration 
and mistake.221 
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2.4.2 Modern Approach to Sanctity of Contract 
 
In modern times, the approach is more an interventionist one. This is quite different from the 
classical model as the core question in the modern approach centres on whether is it reasonable 
to hold a contractor to an apparent bargain.222 The difference in the two views is illustrated in 
the English case of L Schuler AG v Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd.223 In that case, ‘L’ and 
‘M’ entered an agreement which stipulated as a condition that ‘W’ must visit the named 
manufacturers under Clause 7(b) of the agreement. The majority decision of the House of Lords 
was that Clause 7(b) was not a condition in the strict sense, i.e. ‘L’ had no right to withdraw 
when ‘W’ breached the term. However, it was the dissenting opinion that highlights the 
principle of the sanctity of contract. Per Lord Wilberforce: 
 
To call the clause arbitrary, capricious or fantastic, or to introduce as a test of 
its validity the ubiquitous reasonable man, is to assume, contrary to the 
evidence, that both parties to the contract adopted a standard of easy-going 
tolerance rather than one of aggressive, insistent punctuality and efficiency. 
This is not an assumption I am prepared to make, nor do I think myself entitled 
to impose the former standard upon the parties if their words indicate, as they 
plainly do, the latter.224 
 
Following from the above, it can be deduced that Lord Wilberforce’s judgment was that the 
agreement between the parties should be respected and that sanctity of contract be upheld. That 
view represents the classical view that a contract must be respected in its entirety. However, 
the modern approach to sanctity of contract is represented by the majority House of Lords 
judgment, which considered that the obligation to visit a named manufacturer does not go to 
the root of the contract and warrant its termination; rather, the parties should read the contract 
through the lens of reasonableness. 
It remains to be stated by way of conclusion that the doctrine of sanctity of contract cannot be 
convincing without genuine freedom of contract. Even though in the modern era, courts tend 
to consider whether it is reasonable for the parties to perform the terms of a contract, it is 
sacrosanct that parties who of their own volition enter contractual obligations respect the terms 
of their agreement. As pointed out in Perry v United States, above, nation states who enter into 
contractual obligations with private parties must be held accountable like individuals. 
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2.5 What Makes a Good Public-Private Partnership Law 
 
Having examined the theoretical constructs upon which the argument of this thesis is anchored, 
it remains to consider what a good PPP law should entail. It is imperative that PPP laws address 
key issues that relate inter alia  to finance, changing attitudes to risk allocation, improved 
contract management, public investment management and regular reviews to ensure 
achievement of expected value for money.225 In order to address some of the areas of concern 
regarding project failures, it is beneficial that the legal and regulatory framework for PPP cater 
to important aspects of the PPP process such as implementing the law and policy, assigning 
procedures and responsibilities for the identification, selection, preparation and approval of 




This chapter examined three theories that lay the foundation upon which the research rests. 
First, the principle of the rule of law advocates that the public authority is not above the law, 
no more than any ordinary citizen or corporate entity. According to this principle, the public 
authority must be held accountable for the actions or inaction of those in authority. Secondly, 
the theory of law and development insists upon the role of law in bringing about economic and 
social change. The law should be actively used to help achieve societal goals. Thirdly, the 
principle of the sanctity of contract holds that the requirement that parties adhere to contractual 
agreements should equally apply to nation states. This is seen in the US Supreme Court case 
Perry v United States,227 where it was held that when the United States, with constitutional 
authority, makes contracts, it has rights and incurs liabilities similar to those of individuals who 
are party to such instruments. 
 However, there are cases where the public authority may not be under obligation to 
honour a contract. These are exceptional circumstances. For example, under the doctrine of 
fettering discretionary powers, the courts should be reluctant to interfere with a decision taken 
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by the public authority as a matter of public policy or in the public interest.228 Another example 
of a case where the courts would not enforce a PPP contract is where the process is leading to 
the award of the contract is flawed on grounds of illegality.229 This will also be the position of 
the law where fulfilling the obligations under a contract have become illegal, the contract 
cannot be enforced.230 
 In conclusion, it is imperative that the state and as well as individuals231 are subject to 
the law. The law must also be in consonance with the times to support development and protect 
commerce. Similarly, all promises intended to have legal obligations must be honoured to the 
letter, except in cases where it is impossible to perform the obligations or where it is illegal to 
do so. This is important because every investor considers profit before investing capital. In the 
case of foreign investors, it is not enough for there to be the prospect of good returns on the 
investment: the law must also provide a guarantee for the repatriation of profits made from 
legitimate business concerns. Importantly also, it is not enough to make good laws to encourage 
investments: the institutions of state have a corresponding duty to ensure that the laws are 
implemented and respected. It is only in this way that the law can have a positive impact on 
the economy. 
 In the next chapter, the focus moves to analysis of the theory and practice of public-
private partnership, its merits, demerits and contractual nature. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP IN PRACTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE 
CONCEPT, ITS MERITS AND DEMERITS, AND CONTRACTUAL NATURE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In contemporary times, private sector financing of the procurement of ‘new or the rehabilitation 
of existing public infrastructure is increasingly becoming popular across many countries.’232 
The reason for this ‘partnership’ between the public sector and the private sector is due to the 
challenge of budget deficits and competing demands for state resources. Thus, governments 
can no longer afford to fund all state infrastructure projects as they previously did. This study 
is concerned with  private-sector backed or financed infrastructure projects arranged as a PPP. 
It is important to state at the outset that not all private sector financing of infrastructure projects 
qualify as a PPP:233 financing is only one element.234 This is the reason why a discussion of 
PPP must begin with an appropriate definition of the term, to avoid confusing it with other 
similar forms of public procurement.  
 Although there is no agreement among scholars as to a universal definition for public-
private partnership (PPP), many of the definitions highlight the fact that PPP entails a 
collaboration between the public sector and the private sector to provide a service that was 
traditionally exclusively provided by the public sector. 
 This chapter examines various definitions of public-private partnership and identifies 
elements internal to PPP arrangements as well as surrounding factors essential to the operation 
of PPPs. Establishing the nomenclature pertaining to PPP is essential to creating new legal 
provisions or applying existing ones to achieve the goals of parties agreeing to PPP 
arrangements/transactions. 
 
3.2. Defining Public-Private Partnerships 
In this section, definitions provided by institutions, scholars and statutes are discussed. The 
goal is thus to arrive at an appropriate working definition to avoid confusing PPP with other 
forms of procurement. It is submitted that several definitions of PPP that have been proposed 
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do not actually distinguish between PPP and, say, a service or management contract where the 
public sector hires a private sector contractor to provide a service – for example, the collection 
and disposal of refuse. While some authors have included this form of partnership within the 
purview of PPP, this writer is of the view that they have done so in error.   
 
3.2.1 Institutional Definitions 
 
Under this sub-section, the study examines definitions put forward by the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Union (EU) and the African Development 
Bank (AfDB). 
 The World Bank defines PPP as follows: 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are a mechanism for government to procure 
and implement public infrastructure and/or services using resources and 
expertise of the private sector. Where governments are facing ageing or lack 
of infrastructure and require more efficient services, a partnership with the 
private sector can help foster new solutions and bring finance.235 
 
This definition appears to be too broad and does not provide any detail as to what makes a 
partnership between the private and public sectors a PPP. According to the World Bank’s 
definition, service contracts would also be deemed PPPs since it is possible for the private 
sector to provide only a service at a public facility without providing any finance or being the 
owner of the facility during the period of the contract. For example, a private sector firm may 
be hired to provide cleaning services at a government-owned facility. This would appear to fit 
into the above definition, but for the purposes of this study, cannot be considered a PPP. 
 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) states that PPP refers to: 
 
Arrangements where the private sector supplies infrastructure assets and 
services that traditionally have been provided by the government.236 
 
 
This definition does not distinguish PPP clearly from traditional procurement other than by the 
phrase ‘services that traditionally have been provided by the government.’ The definition raises 
doubt as to what PPP truly is. This is because even in traditional public procurement, the 
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government often contracts out the building of facilities to the private sector. This is the case 
when, for instance, the public sector designs the facility, with the private sector only contracted 
to undertake its construction. The project is entirely funded by the government. 
 For its part, the European Union (EU) defines PPP as follows: 
 
PPPs describe a form of cooperation between the public authorities and 
economic operators. The primary aims of this cooperation are to fund, 
construct, renovate or operate an infrastructure or the provision of a service.237 
 
 
It is submitted that although the EU’s definition is more precise than those of the World Bank 
and the IMF, the EU definition is defective in that it makes no reference to the ownership of 
the facility during its construction and operational phases.  
 Rather curiously, the African Development Bank (AfDB) does not provide a definition 
of public-private partnership on the PPP section of its website, merely commenting on the 
emergence of PPP as follows: 
 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) have emerged over the last decade as one 
of the best ways to foster development, fuelled by insufficient investment, 
growing pressures on government budgets and a general concern about service 
provision by state enterprises and agencies.238 
 
3.2.2 Definitions under Statutes 
This sub-section examines some definitions of PPP provided in statutes. 
The Infrastructure Concession and Regulatory Commission (Establishment etc.) Act 
2005 (ICRC Act 2005), which sets out a PPP framework at the national level in Nigeria, does 
not provide a definition of PPP. It does however offer a definition of the term ‘Concession,’ 
which is a PPP genre. This seems deliberate as the Act in Nigeria seemingly only recognises 
the concession type of PPP (as indeed the title of the Act appears to indicate). Section 36 of the 
ICRC Act 2005 defines a concession as: 
 
A contractual arrangement whereby the project proponent or contractor 
undertakes the construction, including financing of any infrastructure, facility 
and the operation and maintenance thereof and shall include the supply of any 
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equipment and machinery for any infrastructure and the provision of any 
services. 
 
This definition as provided in the ICRC Act 2005 does not accommodate the private finance 
initiative (PFI) type of PPP, which is the norm in countries like the United Kingdom and 
Australia. The major difference between the PFI model and the concession model is that in the 
case of the former, the government pays the private sector consortium for the use of the facility 
whereas in the case of the latter, the end-user (i.e. the ordinary member of the public) pays a 
toll or a charge for using the facility. Taking the above into consideration, where there is, for 
example, a need for the construction of a prison facility by the private sector, a concession type 
of PPP would not be suitable. 
 Interestingly, at the sub-national level, the Rivers State Government recognises that 
there may be occasions where the PFI model is preferable. This is provided for in the Rivers 
State PPP Law which is a verbatim repetition of Section 16(1) of the South African Public 
Finance Management Act No. 1 of 1999. It is noteworthy that both laws avoided the use of the 
word ‘concession’ in the title to avoid confusion. The Rivers State Public-Private Sector 
Participation in Infrastructure Development Law of 2009 defines PPP as: 
 
A commercial transaction between the public sector and a private party in 
terms of which the private party 
(a) Performs an institutional function on behalf of the government; 
(b) Acquires the use of state property for its commercial purposes; 
(c) Assumes substantial financial, technical and operational risks in 
connection with the performance of the functions of the government and/or 
use of state property; and 
(d) Receives a benefit for performing the institutional function or from 
utilising the state property either by way of: 
i. Consideration to be paid by the institution which derives a revenue 
fund or, government business enterprise from revenues of such 
institution; or  
ii. Charges or fees to be collected by the private party from users or 
customers of a service provided to them; or 
iii. A combination of such consideration and such charges or fees.239 
 
Although the above definition provides for a PFI procurement if the need arises, it fails to 
clearly differentiate PPP from traditional public-sector procurement. It also fails to consider 
the element of ownership of the facility during the life span of the PPP agreement. It is 
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submitted that this is a gap that needs to be addressed in future amendment of the Rivers State 
Law. 
 
3.2.3 Definitions by Individual Authors 
Several definitions of the term PPP have been offered by authors writing on the subject or on 
project finance more generally. Significantly, the definitions proffered have been influenced 
by the various writers’ backgrounds. 
 To Delmon, a lawyer, ‘PPP is used here in its most inclusive form, to mean any 
contractual or legal relationship between public and private entities aimed at improving and/or 
expanding infrastructure services but excluding public work contracts’ (emphasis added). In 
his definition, Delmon seeks to distinguish between PPP and traditional procurement. With 
respect, his definition leaves out certain fundamental elements of a PPP.240 
 Yescombe, a lawyer and a management and project finance specialist, offers a 
description of PPP based on the following elements: 
 
i. A long-term contract (a ‘PPP Contract’) between a public-sector party and a private-sector 
party; 
ii. For the design, construction, financing, and operation of public infrastructure (the Facility) 
by a private-sector party; 
iii. With payments over the life of the PPP contract to the private-sector party for the use of 
the Facility, made either by the public-sector or by the general public as users of the 
Facility; and 
iv. With the Facility remaining in public-sector ownership or reverting to public-sector 
ownership at the end of the PPP contract.241 (emphasis added.) 
 
 Akintoye, Beck and Hardcastle, experts in the built environment, define a PPP as ‘a 
long-term contractual arrangement between a public-sector agency and a private sector concern 
whereby resources and risks are shared for the purpose of developing a public facility’.242 
                                                      
240 Jeffrey Delmon Creating a Framework for Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Programs: A Practical Guide 
for Decision-makers (2014) at 6. 
241 E R Yescombe op cit note 44 at 3. 
242 A Akintoye, M Beck & C Hardcastle Public-Private Partnerships: Managing Risk and Opportunities (2003) 
at 2. (Emphasis added). 
 57 
For the purposes of this research, and taking into consideration the definitions advanced above, 
in the opinion of this writer, a PPP can be defined as a long-term contractual relationship 
between a government or any of its agencies on the one hand, and a private sector consortium 
on the other, for the design, construction or rehabilitation and the management of a public 
facility, with risk transferred to the private sector entity for the duration of the contract, after 
which the facility is returned to the public authority.  
 The above definition does not include service contracts provided by the private sector 
which typically do not cover designing, building or rehabilitating and managing public 
facilities. It is only PPP contracts that fall within the ambit of this definition that constitute the 
focus of this research. This clarification is important in the sense that policy makers ought not 
to leave room for any ambiguity of purpose when they seek to partner with the private sector.243 
 Finally, the outlook for PPP in terms of how it is defined and presented in future laws 
or policy statements, should be reflect the importance of the protection of the assets of investors 
in PPP projects. Such an outlook for PPP in the Nigerian environment would help in creating 
as well as sustaining the interest of investors in PPP projects in the country. 
 
3.3 Origins and Related Terminology 
In this section of the study, the historical evolution of PPP is discussed. There is also brief 
discussion of some of the terminologies used in place of PPP in certain jurisdictions. 
 
3.3.1 The Origin of PPP 
 
The collaboration between the public and private sectors for the provision of infrastructure is 
not a new phenomenon. The modern-day adoption of public-private partnerships (PPP) is at 
best the revival of an old tradition:244 it is the terminology that is recent in usage. 
 Toll roads are not new. The Salassi tribe was given a toll concession by the Roman 
Empire in return for maintaining the pass and providing guidance and porterage across the 
mountain range as far back as in 21AD.245 In the middle ages, tolls were used to support the 
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cost of the construction of bridges in the UK. This included London Bridge (1286) and the toll 
road from London to Philippe Litchfield.246 
 In France, PPP can be traced back to 1438 when the French nobleman Luis de Bernam 
was granted a river concession to charge fees for goods transported on the Rhine.247 In 1792, a 
concession for water distribution was granted to the Perrier brothers in Paris.248 
 In the modern era, the PPP concept was rejuvenated in the UK in the early 1990s.249 
Because of the decline in infrastructure investment following the 1973 oil crisis and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) intervention three years later, successive governments in 
the UK imposed substantive cuts in public sector capital spending. Under the Labour 
administration in 1974/75, the net public sector investment was £28.8 billion.250 This nosedived 
to more than half decades later, in both 1988/89 and 1998/99.251 At about this time, the UK 
government was burdened by some unprecedented privatisation-related payments as well as 
North Sea Oil revenues.252 
 The administration of Mr John Major introduced PPP as a key policy tool in 1992 and 
a strategy to close the infrastructure gap in the UK.253 The PPP model adopted by the UK was 
the private finance initiative (PFI).254 Prior to the introduction of PFI, the use of private funds 
for public assets had been restricted by the Ryrie Rules.255 
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The relative success of the PFI in the UK made it attractive to other countries, and the strategy 
has since gained prominence in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, continental Europe and Latin 
America.256 
 South Africa adopted a PPP policy in April 1997, having approved the appointment of 
an inter-departmental task team to develop a package of policy, legislative and institutional 
reforms. The task team created an enabling environment for PPPs as well as set up pioneering 
projects for the N3 and N4 toll roads that same year.257 Nigeria passed a PPP law in 2005 which 
was followed by a National Policy on PPP in November 2008. Since the passing of the Nigerian 
ICRC Act of 2005, several arrangements have been concluded. 
 
3.3.2 Other Terms Used as Alternatives for PPP 
 
The term PPP became widely used in 1997 under the Labour government in the UK, even 
though the new programme was structured along the lines of the PFI previously adopted by the 
Conservative government.258 On the international scene, other terms are used in place of PPP 
even though the same aim – to get the private sector to fund, manage and operate public 
infrastructure – is intended.259 The related terms include:260 
 
i. Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI), which is commonly used by the World Bank 
and within the development-financing sector. The same term has been adopted by South 
Korea; 
ii. Private-Sector Participation (PSP), used in the development-banking sector; 
iii. P3, used in North America; 
iv. Privately-Financed Projects (PFP), used in Australia; 
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v. P-P Partnership (to avoid confusing it with the term ‘purchasing power parity,’ a method 
used to compare currency exchange rates which is also referred to as PPP); and 
vi. Private Finance Initiative (PFI), a term with roots in the UK and now adopted in Japan and 
Malaysia. 
 
3.3.3 Difference between PPP and Public-Sector Procurement 
 
Following from the definitions discussed in Section 3.2, above, it is important for clarity’s sake 
to distinguish between PPP and public-sector procurement. This is because the private sector 
may also be involved in public-sector procurement, especially when the project is not being 
executed by means of direct labour on the part of a government agency. 
 Where traditional public-sector procurement is used, the facility261 is usually procured 
by funding sourced from tax revenues, other forms of government income or public borrowing. 
When there is need for a facility, the public authority sets out with the specifications and the 
design for the project. It then invites bids for the construction of the facility by a private 
contractor in what is commonly referred to as ‘design-bid-build.’ In this case, the public 
authority funds the full cost of construction as well as the cost overruns. Again, the private 
contractor has no business with the management of the facility after construction.262 In the case 
of a PPP, however, the public authority lists its requirements for the facility but leaves out 
specific details regarding its design and construction. It is then up to the private sector 
consortium to design, finance, build and operate the facility in such a way as to meet the initial 
requirements set out by the public authority. As a consideration, the private sector consortium 
is authorised to receive ‘tolls’ or ‘fees’ over the life of the contract on a pre-agreed basis. 
Through this approach, risks are transferred to the private sector consortium during the 
subsistence of the contract. 
 
3.3.4 Difference between Public-Private Partnership and Service Contracts 
 
It is important also to distinguish between PPP and service contracts, because of the practice 
of private sector involvement in a public facility under a service contract. A private sector firm 
may be contracted by the public sector to provide a service only on a public facility. Service 
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contracts are sometimes referred to as management contracts or outsourcing. Under a service 
contract, a cleaning company may be contracted to clean a facility within the period of the 
contract. In this case, although a private firm is involved, there is no PPP as the term is 
understood within this research. Again, if a private firm is hired to operate a public facility and 
there is no transfer of ownership of the facility from the public sector to that private firm during 
the duration of the contract, it cannot be said to be a PPP.263 
 
3.3.5 Difference between Public-Private Partnership and Privatisation 
 
Privatisation refers to the transfer of ownership and control of a government enterprise from 
the public to a private sector entity.264 In countries where there are developed capital markets, 
this may be effected by the sale of shares to the public.265 In countries with less developed 
capital markets, divesture may be by way of sale to a complete entity or a joint venture.266 
 The main difference between PPP and privatisation is that in the case of a PPP the 
ownership of the facility is transferred to the private sector consortium only for the period of 
the contract. Thereafter the ownership reverts to the public authority. In the case of 
privatisation, however, there is a complete and permanent divesture of a part of or, in some 
cases, all the interest of the public sector in the facility. 
 
3.4 Categorisation of Public-Private Partnerships 
For the purposes of this research, PPPs can broadly be categorised into concessions and private 
finance initiatives (PFI).267 The categorisation is based upon who pays for the use of the facility, 
whether it is the end-user or the public authority.268 
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In a concession type of PPP, the end-users pay ‘tolls’ or ‘fees’ for using the facility.269 The 
public authority grants a private investor the right to design, build, finance and operate a facility 
for the public sector. The contract is usually tenured to last for a fixed period of say, 25–30 
years, after which the ownership of the asset is transferred from the private investor back to the 
public authority. During the period of the operation of the concession, the private investor 
recoups its investment, the operating and financing expenses and its return on investment (RoI), 
by collecting tolls or fees from members of the public who use the facility. A good example of 
this are toll roads or concession-built airports.270 
 
3.4.2 Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
 
In a PFI, it is the public authority that pays the private consortium fees for the use of the facility 
by members of the public. In the words of Yescombe, the ‘PFI introduced the concept of 
payment by the public authority.’271 This type of PPP is more suitable for the kinds of projects 
that should be paid for by the government, for example, prisons and libraries. In this case, the 
demand or usage risk rests squarely with the public authority. 
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3.5. Models of Public-Private Partnership 
 
Concessions or PFI-type PPPs may be operated in any of the following modes: 
 
i. Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO): Under this model, the private sector 
consortium designs the facility, builds it, funds it as well as operates it during the 
period of the PPP contract (which could be for a period of 20, 25 or 30 years).272 
ii. Build-Rent-Own-Transfer (BROT):  In a BROT, the private sector partner builds 
the PPP facility, rents it, owns it for a period and transfers it to the public sector at 
the end of the PPP contract.273 
iii. Rehabilitate-Operate-Transfer (ROT): In a ROT, the contract specifies that the 
private sector consortium is to rehabilitate an existing government facility, operate 
it during the tenure of the contract, and transfer the facility back to the public 
authority upon the termination of the contract.274 
iv. Lease-Develop-Operate (LDO): Under this arrangement, the private party leases an 
existing facility from the public authority, and invests its own capital to renovate, 
modernise, and/or expand the facility. At the end of the contract, the facility is 
transferred to the public authority.275 
v. Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT): Here the private investor builds the facility, 
operates it and transfers it to the public authority at the end of the PPP contract.276 
vi. Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT): The private investor builds, owns, operates 
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3.6 Merits of Public-Private Partnership 
 
It has already been noted that in the light of budget constraints, the high cost of infrastructure 
procurement and other competing needs requiring state resources, PPP has become the 
alternative to traditional public procurement. Again, PPPs allow the government to concentrate 
on ‘strategic planning, policies, processes and managing services while the partners undertake 
to deliver the services and implement projects.’278 Besides these, there are several other 
advantages of PPP as a means of procuring public facilities. These are described below under 
the heads of financing, construction and operation. 
 
3.6.1 Merits with regard to Finance 
 
With regard to the funding of the facility, the advantages of adopting PPP include the 
following:279 
 
i. Debt is on the private consortium and not on the public authority; 
ii. Long-term finance is made available as against government having to make large 
allocations to the project in the same year; 
iii. Risk is only on the equity contribution to the project company. 
 
3.6.2 Merits with regard to Construction 
 
The advantages of adopting PPP as far as construction is concerned are:280 
 
i. The expertise of the private sector is brought to bear on the project; 
ii. Creation of a market for after sales service and spare parts; 
iii. Job opportunities are created. 
 
 
                                                      





3.6.3 Merits with regard to Operation 
 
During the operational phase of the project, the advantages of adopting PPP include the 
following:281 
 
i. The project benefits from the technical skill of the private sector; 
ii. There is a reduction in the bureaucracy that often characterises public sector 
managed establishments; 
iii. Less opportunity for embezzlement of funds accruing to the project; 
iv. There is much more professionalism in management. This can be contrasted with 
the way government enterprises are managed. 
 
3.7 Demerits of Public-Private Partnership 
 
The above advantages notwithstanding, there are several disadvantages to the adoption of PPP. 
They are as follows:282 
 
i. Public debt is cheaper to obtain than private debt. The public sector can easily offer 
bonds for sale to the public to raise funds at a cheaper cost than when the private 
sector seeks to borrow. Thus, the overall costs of the project can be affected since 
debt acquired by the private sector could have been obtained at a much higher cost; 
ii. There is the possibility of resistance by the populace against the project where 
people are used to projects being traditionally provided in a way that results in no 
direct cost to them. It may be challenging to introduce a facility that requires the 
payment of tolls or fees, or there may be resistance to a rise in tariffs; 
iii. Since PPP debts are largely secured by the project itself, where there is no high 
margin of PPP success, the likelihood of obtaining further funding by the private 
investor is slim; 
iv. Again, since debt acquired by the investor may have been obtained in foreign 
currency, a slump in the value of the currency in which tolls are paid may negatively 
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affect the investor, since the debt would now cost much more than it did when it 
was obtained.283 
 
It is pertinent to point out that PPPs cannot solve all the infrastructure problems of a country. 
In fact, PPPs may exacerbate some problems with infrastructure procurement. For instance, 
while PPPs may appear to relieve funding problems, they may eventually lead to government 
accepting higher fiscal commitments.284 It is submitted that having considered the demerits of 
PPPs, a decision by the public authority as to whether a project should be undertaken as a PPP 
requires that it be justified based on budget, certainty of outcome, value for money and 
sustainable development. 
 Following the distinctions discussed above between PPP and other forms of 
procurement, it remains to highlight the features that clearly identify a procurement 
arrangement between the public and private sectors as a PPP. These features are:285 
 
i. PPP arrangements properly so called are usually long tenured contracts typically 
lasting between 10 and 30 years or more; 
ii. Given the high capital outlay for PPP projects and the risk associated with them, 
the sponsors of the project usually set up a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) as an 
independent entity. The rationale for this is that a PPP project is unique in the sense 
that the risk is limited to the project. The SPV structure allows for the sponsors of 
the project to raise equity or debt specifically for the project; 
iii. Risk allocation plays a pivotal role in PPP transactions. Essentially, risks associated 
with the design, construction and financial returns are borne by the private 
investor(s), while on the other hand, the public sector assumes those risks associated 
with macro-economic stability – for example, inflation and land acquisition from 
private or communal land owners. 
 
Following from the above, the PPP unit of the South African National Treasury has identified 
three basic tests for PPPs: (i) can substantial risk can be transferred to the private sector? (ii) is 
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the project affordable to the procuring institution? (iii) does the PPP procurement option show 
value for money? 
 




Risk is the chance that an event might occur to cause the actual project circumstances to differ 
from what was initially assumed or forecasted (regarding the benefits or costs of the project).286 
It is vital to note that risk cannot be eliminated. However, it can be allocated in a manner 
agreeable to by the parties. It is always better to transfer risk to the party who is a better manager 
of that kind of risk.287 
 It is common knowledge that over the years, experience has shown that the public sector 
is not a good manager of risk, especially in developing economies. If for example a public 
institution is building a facility, the construction may be completed later than expected and 
budgets may be overspent. This does not augur well for tax payers. On the other hand, if the 
private sector is responsible for the construction, the private investor(s) would not be paid by 
the procuring agency. As pointed out under item (iii) in 3.8, above, only those risks that the 




It is important for the procuring MDA to have the capacity to afford the PPP project, taking 
into consideration available budgets where the public sector is expected to make an equity 
contribution to the proposed project.288The public sector must consider whether a PPP is 
feasible before engaging the private sector.289 It is possible that institutions have no adequate 
budget for their infrastructure and service delivery needs and as such, a proposal to arrange for 
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the procurement of a project where the public sector cannot meet its commitment may likely 
result into a PPP failure from the start. 
 
3.8.3 Value for Money (VfM) 
 
Deciding whether to procure a facility by means of a PPP or via a traditional procurement route 
involves a fundamental test that must be carried out before a conclusion is reached.290 If the 
comparison shows that the PPP option is cheaper in cost, the difference in cost between the 
two is referred to as value for money. Hence if traditional procurement is cheaper, the PPP 
option should be disregarded.291 Value for money (VfM) assessment is therefore crucial to 
deciding on the suitability of PPP in general. The factors that determine VfM are reduced life 
cycle costs, better allocation of risk, faster implementation, improved service quality and 
general additional revenue.292 
 In addition to the features of PPP mentioned above, the Nigerian PPP National Policy 
Document also identifies ‘Public Interest’ as a vital factor for PPPs. To this end, in the 
consideration of public interest, it is required that:293 
 
i. Public authorities should ensure adequate consultation with end-users and other 
stakeholders prior to the initiation of infrastructure projects; 
ii. Private sector participants in a PPP project will contribute to strategies for 
communicating and consulting with the public, customers, affected communities, 
and corporate stakeholders, with a view to developing mutual acceptance and 
understanding of the objectives of the public and private parties; 
iii. Private sector contractors in the provision of vital services to communities need to 
be mindful of the consequences of their actions for those communities and work 
together with the public authorities, to avoid or mitigate socially unacceptable 
outcomes. 
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3.9 Financing Public-Private Partnership 
 
Traditionally, infrastructure finance was sourced mainly from the public budget (through 
taxing and borrowing).294 But for a PPP, finance is sourced usually from a combination of 
equity and debt.295 Equity contributions are the funds invested in the project by the SPV set up 
for the project or what may be termed the ‘project company.’ Debt contributions, on the other 
hand, are the borrowings made to fund the project. These are usually sourced from banks and 
bonds.296 In recent times, as will be discussed in Chapter Six, the creation of specialised funds 
for infrastructure are being used to fund PPP projects. 
 
3.10 The Public-Private Partnership Contract 
 
The PPP contract is a complex form of contract. It consists of the concession/PFI (or main) 
contract together with other sub-contracts, including engineering, procurement and 
construction contracts, and contracts for supplies, operation/management services and 
repairs.297 Designing a PPP contract to be signed by the government and a private sector 
consortium is a challenging undertaking that requires legal and technical expertise.298 Again, 
it is pertinent to note that the term ‘partnership’ in PPP does not mean that the arrangement 
works like the usual business partnership, since the parties have different interests.299 The 
interest of the public sector is to provide infrastructure for its citizens while that of the private 
sector consortium is make a profit. PPP contracts codify the business relationship by defining 
the roles and responsibilities of the partners, including risk sharing and rewards.300 
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3.10.1 The Parties to a Public-Private Partnership Contract 
 
The PPP arrangement involves two main parties, the public sector (government) and the private 
sector consortium. Other key actors in the arrangement include lenders, multilateral and 
bilateral agencies, export credit agencies, the construction contractor, the operator and the end-
user(s). 
 The public sector or the government may be referred to as the grantor.301 The grantor 
is the unit of the government that awards a PPP contract to a private sector consortium upon 
identifying the need for a project.302 In most cases, the agency representing the government, 
sometimes referred to as a ministry, department or agency (MDA) is always a key actor in a 
PPP. The grantor maybe the national, state, regional or local government.  The other key actor 
is the private sector consortium. 
 The private sector consortium is made up of the entities that come together for the sole 
purpose of bidding for the PPP contract. This is because of the capital-intensive nature of PPP 
infrastructure projects.303 The specialised company set up for the contract is usually a special 
purpose vehicle (SPV). SPVs are used because the risk in the project is unique to that project 
alone and this in a way protects the main sponsors of the project, limiting their liability to what 
they invested in the project company.304 
 PPP projects are capital-intensive, often making raising additional funds a necessity. 
Hence, lenders play a leading role in PPP procurement. Again, the funding structure often 
requires the coming together of a team of commercial lenders with export credit agencies, 
bilateral and multilateral finance organisations.305 Sometimes the lenders raise the funds 
required for the project through bonds or sovereign wealth funds. It is pertinent to note that 
lenders are not party to the construction or operation of the facility itself, since they would not 
like to bear risk that is not in line with their regular operations.306  
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Upon the closing of a PPP deal and the raising of the necessary funds, the project company 
appoints by way of a sub-contract, a construction contractor. It is the responsibility of the 
construction contractor to design, build, test, and commission the project. This is usually done 
by way of a ‘turnkey.’307 
 With the project completed, an operator will be engaged to run the day-to-day service 
of the facility. The project operator operates with a mandate spelled out in the sub-contract for 
the operation of the PPP facility. This sub-contract is referred to as the operation and 
maintenance agreement.308 
 
3.10.2 Other Key Actors in a Public-Private Partnership Arrangement 
 
Apart from those discussed above, there are other parties who may not be directly involved in 
the arrangement but who are also key to the success of any PPP. These are the employees of 
the project,309 the local community where the project is located, and the end-users.  
 The employees of the project benefit through their employment and the success of the 
project indicates job security. Consulting with members of the public, especially those who 
reside within the immediate locality of the project, is important. The cases of the Lekki-Epe 
Concession Toll Road in Nigeria discussed in Chapter Four and the Gautrain Rapid Link Rail 
in South Africa discussed in Chapter Five are relevant examples of the key role that 
consultation with the public plays in PPP success. There must always be a strategic plan to 
ensure that these key stakeholders are carried along from the point when the public authority 
conceives the project. It is also important that there be transparency in the entire process right 
from the start. Where there are doubts in the minds of members of the public, there is bound to 
be opposition. For example, even though the Asset and Resource Management Company Ltd 
(ARM) did a good job in the arrangement of the Lekki-Epe Toll Road Project, due to poor 
public relations skills on the part of the ownership of the company, the public was fed with 
rumours that the Governor of Lagos State at that time had a significant interest in the 
concession company. Finally, the managers of the project must consider the interest of the end-
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users of the project. Incessant, unexplained or unjustifiable price hikes often result in massive 
protests. This can turn an otherwise successful project into a failure. 
 
3.10.3 Elements of the Public-Private Partnership Contract 
 
Under the concession/PFI agreement, the grantor grants a series of rights to the project 
company to build and operate a unit or feature of government infrastructure for a determined 
tenure. The main issues to be addressed in a PPP contract are first, the completion date. 
Governments are often motivated by political interest associated with the completion of the 
project during the term of office of the government.  
 It is important that the concession/PFI contract itself makes provision for elements such 
as the obligations of each party, the tenure of the contract, the ownership of the land and 
facility, allocation of risks and consequences, construction, commissioning, operation and 
maintenance of the facility, performance requirements, payments and other financial matters, 
price review adjustments, amendment and variation of the agreement, monitoring and review, 
dispute resolution, termination of contract, end of term arrangements, service delivery 
management, contract compliance and management and renegotiation.310 
 Following a request from members of the Group of 20 countries (G20),311 staff at the 
World Bank were mandated to prepare a report recommending a model language for PPP 
contracts.312 The outcome of the exercise is a number of key ‘Model Contract Terms’ (MCTs), 
set out under eight headings: Force Majeure, Material Adverse Government Action, Change in 
Law, Termination Payments, Refinancing, Lenders’ Step-in Rights, Confidentiality and 
Transparency and Dispute Resolution.313 These new or ‘re-modelled’ terms introduced in the 
report by Shrybman and Sinclair are discussed below. 
 Where there are circumstances which are beyond the control of the parties to the PPP 
contract making it impossible for the contract to be executed, or for the parties to fulfil their 
obligations under the PPP contract – for example, political events such as war, acts of terror, 
nuclear explosions and natural disasters (such as earthquakes, floods, landlines), strikes and 
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protests, a force majeure is said to occur. In the recommendation of the World Bank Group 
(WBG), general labour disturbances such as boycotts and strikes which are unique to the 
private sector partner or sub-contractors and occur outside the country do not constitute a force 
majeure but a default by the private partner.314 The implication of this is that if there is a failure 
on the part of the private sector to fulfil its obligation(s) as a result of strike action outside the 
host country of the PPP project, the private partner bears the risk and will be considered in 
default of the contractual agreement. This is a departure from the conventional norm and ought 
not to be the case. Implementing such a proposal will stifle private sector interest in PPPs, 
especially in countries that do not have a significant market advantage. 
 The WBG’s proposal identifies what is referred to as a Material Adverse Government 
Action (MAGA).315 A MAGA event is said to occur when there is an act or omission by the 
contracting authority or any relevant public authority, which occurs during the term of the 
contract and which renders the private partner incapable of complying with the terms of the 
agreement. When a MAGA event occurs, the private-sector partner shall be excused from the 
performance of the PPP contract to the extent that it is prevented, hindered or delayed in the 
performance of its obligations by reason of the material adverse government action, and shall 
be entitled to compensation under the PPP contract. This proposed new term is commendable, 
but the question of what should constitute adequate compensation needs to be carefully 
considered. It is better that the public authority refrains from committing any MAGA unless it 
is necessary and the interest of public policy. The reason is that one failed PPP project is a 
message to PPP investors and promoters that any future dealings with the public authority 
concerned is vulnerable to cancellation. 
 Based on the recommendations by the WBG, a Change in Law that can affect a PPP 
contract is said to occur where there is the enactment of any new applicable law; the repeal, 
modification or re-enactment of any existing applicable law; the imposition by any government 
entity of any material condition in connection with the issuance, renewal or modification, or 
the revocation or non-renewal (other than in accordance with the existing applicable law) of 
any approval; and/or the imposition or levying of any taxes, which was not foreseeable at the 
date on which the successful bidder submitted its bid and which has a material adverse effect 
on the ability of a party in a PPP contract to fulfil its obligations. The WBG recommends that 
the public sector should bear a Change in Law risk only when it is the author of discriminatory 
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reforms, in which case the private sector should be compensated to leave the latter in no better 
nor worse position than it would have been in had such a law not been made.  
This recommendation is also flawed. It seems that the WBG has not taken into account 
the nature of developing and emerging economies before making this recommendation. The 
situation that the proposal enables may just afford the public authority the room to cleverly 
absolve itself of its obligations by passing a new law that affects the project, while claiming 
that it is not discriminatory.  
 With reference to Termination Payments, the WBG recommendation is in line with 
conventional norms. Thus, where there is a voluntary termination of the PPP contract by the 
public authority, for example, for reasons of public policy, the private sector party is to be 
compensated. Also, where the public authority by way of default, makes it impracticable for 
the private sector party to perform its obligation(s), the public authority is to pay the private 
party compensation to ensure that the latter is left in no better nor worse condition than it would 
have been had the early termination not occurred and the PPP continued until the last day of 
its term. While this insertion in the proposals is commendable and ensures the protection of the 
assets of the investors/lenders, it is important to state that a private sector investor will 
appreciate and derive more satisfaction from a completed project executed from a business 
point of view than from receiving compensation for default by the contracting authority. No 
matter the amount paid out as compensation, it cannot compare with successfully completing 
a project and receiving what is due.316 Therefore the fact that compensation can be paid or that 
a buy-back can be structured should not constitute sufficient reason to cancel a project. 
 With regard to dispute resolution, the World Bank Group (WBG) proposes a reliance 
on the World Bank’s Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) procedure.317 The report 
proposes the following steps for the resolution of PPP disputes: first, a mutual commitment to 
try to resolve the disagreement promptly and amicably; secondly, an agreement that technical 
disputes be referred to an expert to recommend solution; and thirdly, that more intractable 
issues be brought before a dispute board comprised of representatives of both parties, which 
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may be empowered to reach a binding resolution through consensus. The proposal notes that, 
given ‘the time and the cost of international arbitration, serious consideration should be given 
to the use of mandatory alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (such as the dispute 
boards).’318 The report proposes further that, if the board fails to resolve the dispute within 30 
days, the dispute shall be referred to and finally settled by international arbitration.319 
Unfortunately, this recommendation by the WBG clearly seeks to side-line the domestic courts 
of emerging and developing countries.320 One of the first investor-state disputes that attracted 
global interest was that of Aguas del Tunari v Bolivia.321 In that case, the government of Bolivia 
cancelled a water services concession on the grounds of price hikes that triggered public 
protests. The concessionaire subsequently sued under a Bolivia-Netherlands investment 
treaty.322 In its defence, the Bolivian government argued that the concession agreement 
provided for disputes between public authorities and the concessionaire to be resolved ‘in 
Bolivian courts in accordance with Bolivian laws.’323 The tribunal rejected the defence of the 
Bolivian government and rather ruled that the ‘forum selection’ clause in the concession 
agreement was unclear and in its place, asserted that it had jurisdiction over the claim. Clearly, 
there needs to be a balance between the protection of investors’ assets and the public policy of 
a state. Furthermore, if emerging and developing economies can improve on their rule of law 
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It is worthy of note that there are fundamental requirements for the establishment of an efficient 
PPP framework.324 First, the government must articulate its intent to utilise PPP in the 
procurement of infrastructure in the form of a policy. Secondly, there is a need to set up a legal 
framework that enables the government to enter PPPs. The laws must also set out how PPP is 
to be undertaken. Thirdly, there must be in place an institutional framework for the 
administration and regulation of PPP. In most cases, a PPP unit must be created.325 
 In this chapter, the concept of public-private partnership (PPP) and its merits and 
demerits are introduced. In seeking a working definition for PPP, a deliberate attempt is made 
to distinguish PPP from other similar arrangements between the public sector and the private 
sector (for example, service or management contracts, privatisation and traditional 
procurement involving a private contractor). 
 The chapter traces the emergence of PPP from its origins in the 15th century to the 
revived PPP which was launched in the UK in the early 1990s and which has gained wide 
acceptance, but with variations, around the globe, including in Nigeria.  
 A distinction is made between concessions and private finance initiatives, based 
principally on who pays the private consortium for the use of the facility during the operational 
phase of the project. 
 It is noted that in addition to the features of PPP discussed, both South Africa and 
Nigeria have identified additional requirements to consider before adopting the PPP model of 
procurement for any given project. In the case of South Africa, there is a tripartite test to be 
carried out, while Nigeria considers public interest. 
 It is vital to ensure that the law is used as an instrument to effect the desired changes  
in the framework for regulating PPP. In the same vein, PPP contracts should be regarded as 
binding on the parties based on the principle of sanctity of contract. At all times, public 
institutions should be guided by the law and where decisions have been reached by the courts 
in the settlement of conflicts that may arise, all parties must respect the decision. 
 The next chapter discusses the practice, policy and framework for PPP in Nigeria. 
 
  
                                                      




PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP PRACTICE IN NIGERIA: LEGAL, POLICY 




Nigeria is a common-law country and operates a federal system with three tiers of government. 
The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which is the supreme law of the 
country, vests legislative powers in the federal government,326 the 36 states327 as well as the 
774 local governments councils328 that make up the federation.329 Laws passed by the National 
Assembly are referred to as Acts, while those passed by the States and Local Councils are 
referred to as Laws and Bye-Laws, respectively. It is essential to note that each tier of 
government in Nigeria is by law required to operate separate legal frameworks for PPP 
practice. 
This chapter examines the practice, policy, framework and regulation of PPP in Nigeria, 
from the project conception phase through to the operational phase of closed PPP 
arrangements. There will also be discussion of the institutions that regulate PPP, the funding 
structure and selected case studies. While the PPP framework in Nigeria is described in this 
chapter, a critical analysis of the framework, as well as a comparative study of the situation in 
South Africa, appear in Chapter Six of the study. 
 The passing into law of the Infrastructure Concession and Regulatory Commission 
(Establishment Etc.) Act 2005 and the adoption of a National Policy on Public-Private 
Partnership in November 2008 brought into being an administrative as well as a regulatory 
framework for PPP practice at the national level in Nigeria.330 In addition, some states in the 
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country have enacted laws regulating PPP practice at the subnational level.331 Several years 
later, mixed results have been witnessed in terms of project outcomes.332 
Following the aggressive privatisation agenda shortly after the return to civil rule in 
1999,  the federal government of Nigeria has sought to provide a structure for private sector 
participation in the provision of public infrastructure.333 A few concessions were arranged 
under the country’s Privatisation Act even after the ICRC Act had been passed.334 This 
indicates that there has not been a clear line of distinction between PPP and privatisation in the 
past, especially in the first few years of the passing of the ICRC Act 2005. Currently, however, 
the federal government of Nigeria is leaning towards PPP rather than privatisation. 
 
4.2 Legal Framework for Public-Private Partnership in Nigeria 
 
One of the critical success factors (CSFs) for PPP is ‘a transparent and stable legal framework 
which should help make contracts and agreements bankable.’335 The importance of a well 
thought-out policy, legal and regulatory framework for PPP cannot be overstressed, especially 
because PPPs are complex long-term transactions that are affected by many areas of law.336 
Investors also tend to consider whether the legal environment is conducive, since successful 
PPPs depend on the effectiveness of the national and subnational legislative and regulatory 
structures in any given jurisdiction.337 The nature of the legal framework for PPP in any given 
country is largely dependent on whether it is a common law or civil law jurisdiction. This is 
because in civil law systems, government operations are basically prescribed in administrative 
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law that establishes the legal rights and processes that apply to PPP contracts.338 On the other 
hand, in common law jurisdictions, the system is much less prescriptive, with fewer provisions 
implied into a contract by law.339 Thus, contracts in common law jurisdictions tend to be larger 
than in civil law jurisdictions.340 The reason is that importance is given to specifying in the 
agreement the terms governing the relationship between the parties to the agreement, as gaps 
cannot be so easily remedied or resolved through the basic application of the law.341 It is argued 
that PPP legal frameworks should reduce the level of uncertainty in PPP projects and their 
implementation, minimise the risk of legal challenge, increase investor confidence, promote 
and facilitate private involvement and the issuance of various licenses and permits.342 It follows 
that laws should promote the ease of doing business and drive economic gains rather than foist 
cumbersome requirements and onerous tasks on private enterprise. It is submitted that since 
PPPs serve the end of closing the infrastructure gap in the economy, deliberate steps should be 
taken when passing laws to ease the setting up of special purpose vehicles (SPVs), work 
permits for expatriates, building permits, land allocation and the repatriation of the capital and 
profits of foreign investors. Furthermore, the PPP framework should be designed typically to 
facilitate complex long-term contractual arrangements as well as ensure a reduction in 
transaction costs. The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure 
Projects insists that the existence ‘of an appropriate legal framework’ is a prerequisite for 
creating an environment that fosters private investment in infrastructure.343 The document also 
stipulates the need to ensure that PPP laws remain ‘sufficiently flexible and responsive to keep 
pace with the developments in various infrastructure sectors in the economy.’344 Again, it is 
important that the legal framework be commercially oriented.345 While it may not be feasible 
to have a single law regulating PPP in its entirety because of its complex nature, it is submitted 
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that deliberate steps ought to be taken to simplify the PPP process so as to make the 
environment investor-friendly. It follows that ‘a clear and stable legal environment for PPP 
projects, to reduce perception of risk, attract more competition for projects, attract more lending 
and therefore reduce project cost’346 is sacrosanct for a healthy PPP regime. It is further 
submitted that the legal framework for PPP must essentially cover the legal system of the 
jurisdiction concerned as well as the procedure for procurement, execution, maintenance and 
operation of the project. As it relates to the legal system, the environment must be one in which 
the rule of law thrives. This is a primary concern, especially for foreign investors. In the case 
of Nigeria, breaches of the rule of law by the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari 
is a source of concern.347 The reliability of the courts and the judiciary as well as the 
enforceability of international arbitration awards are of interest to investors. 
However, it is worthy of note that in the United Kingdom and some other common law 
countries, ‘PFI-Model PPPs are treated as a variety of government procurement, for which no 
special legal arrangements are needed.’348 This approach is considered to be mainly contractual 
as it allows for flexibility to make changes in the PPP programme.349 This is especially so as 
there is no formal legal framework for PPP in the UK. It is submitted that such an approach is 
best suited to a developed economy and is not appropriate for a developing economy like 
Nigeria that is saddled with the vexed problem of weak institutions. Besides, having a clear-
cut legal framework ensures that the government can confirm its political commitment via 
explicit legislation, clearly set out investors’ rights, allow for the provision of incentives such 
as tax treatment, create a procedure for the public authority to make changes to project 
specifications, and provide a method of compensation to the consortium if this leads to higher 
costs.350 In the same vein, it is required that during the procurement process the law is clear, 
fair, open and transparent and must mandate the public authority to demonstrate the political 
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will to support the PPP process as well as ensure adequate monitoring of projects with the 
relevant PPP unit.351 
The legal framework for PPP in Nigeria is made up of all the laws and regulations that 
control whether, and how, PPPs can be implemented. As such, it is expected that apart from 
providing the legal coverage for parties to enter into enforceable contracts, the legal framework 
should furnish the private sector with the necessary backing to finance, build, operate and 
collect revenues or service payments.352  
The passing into law of the Nigerian Infrastructure Concession and Regulatory 
Commission (Establishment Etc.) Act 2005 and the setting up of the ICRC to administer federal 
PPP transactions across the country is meant to show the government’s political will to adopt 
the PPP model of infrastructure procurement. Yet the legal framework for PPPs in Nigeria has 
been described, and rightly so, as comprising ‘a tangled and confusing web of regulations and 
policies.’353 This section will proceed to examine the body of laws and regulations through 
which PPPs are administered at the national level in the country. Where necessary reference 
will be made to applicable laws at the sub-national level. 
Understandably, it may be inferred from the position of the federal government of 
Nigeria that the legal framework for PPP in the country aims to close the infrastructure gap, 
create job opportunities for citizens, stimulate foreign direct investment (FDI), facilitate 
economic growth, enable government to concentrate on policy making and social development 
programmes and, importantly, save scarce government resources. It is submitted that the 
absence of a clear-cut legal framework for PPP fosters uncertainty and hampers the 
development which PPPs are designed to promote. This writer believes that investors regard 
the process of relief in the event of a dispute or cancellation to be just as important as the 
possibility of doing business in the first place. No matter the business prospect or the return on 
investment, investors are bound to shy away from situations where the framework for doing 
business is not clearly defined. 
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This chapter of the study examines the legislative framework for PPP in Nigeria, identifying 
and discussing the various laws that regulate the practice from inception to handover. The 
expectation is that the legal framework should support the institutions implementing PPP as 
well as regulate them. The approach adopted is to discuss the law regulating PPP first before 
an examination of the PPP policy in Nigeria. 
 
4.2.1 The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 
 
The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is the supreme law of the country. It 
provides the structure upon which all laws in the country rest. The provisions of the 
Constitution have a binding force on authorities and persons throughout the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria.354 Importantly, a law enacted by the National Assembly355 or by a State House of 
Assembly that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution shall be rendered void to 
the extent of that inconsistency.356 The doctrine of the supremacy of the Constitution is well 
entrenched in the 1999 Constitution.357 The question of the supremacy of the constitution was 
brought to bear in the recent case of Dr Olubukola Abubakar Saraki v The Federal Republic of 
Nigeria.358 In that case, the Supreme Court of Nigeria held per Muhammad, JSC, as follows: 
 
The time-honoured principle of law is that wherever and whenever the 
Constitution speaks, any provision of an Act/Statute on the subject matter must 
remain silent. See Independent National Electoral Commission v Musa (2003) 
3 NWLR (Pt 806) 72; Attorney General Ogun State v Attorney General of 
Federation (1982) 2 NCLR 166. 
 
The court per Kekere-Ekun, JSC, also stated as follows: 
 
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. It is the grundnorm i.e. it is 
the basic law from which all other laws of the society derive their validity. 
Section 1 (1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) provides: 1. (1) This 
Constitution is supreme, and its provisions shall have binding force on all 
authorities and persons throughout the federal republic of Nigeria. (3) If any 
other law is inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution, this 
Constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall, to the extent of the 
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inconsistency be void. See Abacha v Fawehinmi (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt 660) 228: 
P.D.P v C.P.C (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt 1277) 485. 
 
Under the provisions of the 1999 Constitution, there are powers exclusive to the federal 
government.359 In other words, there are certain items listed in the Constitution that can only 
be legislated upon by the federal legislature. It follows therefore that state governments are 
precluded from making decisions on them. These items are listed in the Exclusive Legislative 
List.360 They include accounts of the federal government or courts, arms, ammunition and 
explosives, aviation (including airports), awards of national titles, bankruptcy or insolvency, 
banks, banking, bills of exchange, borrowing of moneys within or outside Nigeria for the 
purposes of the federation or a state, census, naturalisation and aliens, commercial and 
industrial monopolies, combines and trusts, construction, alteration  and maintenance of such 
roads as may be declared by the National Assembly to be federal trunk roads, control of capital 
issues, copyright, creation of states, currency, coinage and legal tender, customs and excise 
duties, defence, deportation of persons who are not citizens of Nigeria, designation of securities 
in which trust funds may be invested, diplomatic, consular and trade representation, drugs and 
poisons, elections to the offices of president, vice president, governors and their deputies, 
evidence, exchange control, export duties, external affairs, extradition, finger prints 
identification and criminal records, fishing and fisheries other than fishing and fisheries in 
rivers, lakes, waterways, ponds and other inland waters within Nigeria, immigration or 
emigration, implementation of treaties, incorporation of corporate bodies, maritime and 
shipping, meteorology, military, mines and minerals, national parks, nuclear energy, passports 
and visas, patents and trademarks, police, prisons, public holidays, quarantine and railways. 
The above provision of the 1999 Constitution effectively limits the powers of states to 
negotiate or arrange PPP projects that involve any item on the list. It does not matter whether 
such a project is beneficial to that state, because the federal government can refuse to provide 
its benefits to the citizens of that state. An example is the deliberate abandonment of the East-
West Road linking Imo State with Rivers State that was constructed by the administration of 
Mr Rotimi Amaechi, the then governor of Rivers State, with the expectation that the state would 
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receive a refund from the federal government.361 Even though the construction of the road was 
to the benefit of the citizens of the state, the road is a federal trunk road and as such, the 
construction of the road by the Rivers State Government was ultra vires. Federal trunk roads 
are outside the purview of state governments. If that road had been constructed under a PPP 
arrangement it would have been unlawful. A similar situation applies regarding the 
rehabilitation of federal roads in Ebonyi State in south east Nigeria.362 
It also needs to be pointed out that the construction of airports by states in Nigeria is 
beyond their powers and therefore illegal. Aviation and airports are items within the Exclusive 
Legislative List. Notwithstanding this, a few states have gone ahead and built airports.363 A 
PPP contract involving the construction of a state airport is an illegality as far as the 1999 
Constitution is concerned. As such, one of the puzzles that a potential investor must resolve 
before engaging in a PPP in the country is to determine which of the tiers of government it 
should be dealing with.364 
One of the cases dealing with the construction of infrastructure by a state government 
that involves an item on the Exclusive Legislative List brought before the Federal High Court 
in Lagos is that of Olu Adegboruwa v AG Federation & Three Others.365 Mr Ebun-Olu 
Adegboruwa, a civil rights advocate, challenged the power of the Lagos State Government to 
collect tolls on the Lekki-Ikoyi Bridge. The defendants in the suit were the Attorney General 
of the Federation, the National Inland Waterways Authority, the Lagos State Government and 
the Attorney General of Lagos State. Mr Adegboruwa urged the court to declare that the 
imposition of tolls on users of the bridge amounted to violations of the rights of the users and 
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residents of Lekki Scheme 1, Ikoyi, Ajah, Ibeju-Lekki and Epe communities, since the bridge 
was over an inland waterway which is clearly outside the powers of the Lagos State 
Government. Judgement was entered in favour of the plaintiff. However, the Lagos State 
Government has appealed the decision of the Federal High Court sitting in Lagos.366 
The vexed question begging for answers remains: should state governments in the 
country refrain from embarking on developmental projects, even when they have the capacity 
to provide facilities, claiming they are precluded from doing so because the project comes 
within the scope of the exclusive legislative list? Again, when the federal government decides 
not to undertake projects in any of the states because of political difference between the central 
government and a state government, should the state not step in to execute such a project in the 
public interest? 
 Even though the 1999 Constitution does not specifically refer to PPP, it can be inferred 
from a reading of Section 16 under Chapter II of the Constitution, which deals with the 
Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, wherein the ‘Economic 
Objectives’ of the Nigerian state indicate that private participation in promoting the national 
economy is supported. The Section provides: 
 
(1) The State shall, within the context of the ideals and objectives for which 
provisions are made in this Constitution – 
(a) Harness the resources of the nation and promote national prosperity 
and efficiency, a dynamic and self-reliant economy every citizen on 
the basis of social justice and equality of status and opportunity; 
(b) Control the national economy in such a manner as to secure the 
maximum welfare, freedom and happiness of every citizen on the basis 
of social justice and equality of status and opportunity: 
(c) Without prejudice to the right to operate or participate in areas of the 
economy, other than the major sectors of the economy: 
(d) Without prejudice to the right of any person to participate in areas of 
the economy within the major sectors of the economy, protect the right 
of every citizen to engage in any economic activities outside the major 
sectors of the economy. 
 
Sub-section (4) of the Constitution explains the term ‘major sectors of the economy’ as such 
activities that may, from time to time, be declared by a resolution of each House of the National 
Assembly to be managed and operated exclusively by the federal government, on the date 
preceding the day the section came into force. The implication is that the government may 
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involve the private sector in the management of the economic sector, including through PPPs. 
This right of the private sector to be involved in the management of the economic sector and 
business concerns that were previously government owned has been given judicial recognition 
in Attorney General of Lagos State v Eko Hotels Limited,367 where the court held that the 
government should not be preoccupied with commercial activities but should allow the private 
sector to take over what rightly belongs to them. The government may, however, continue to 
hold shares (but not controlling shares) in a business concern, in line with changes in the global 
economy. 
 A potential PPP investor in Nigeria must determine what tier of government is being 
dealt with in order not to commit to an arrangement that is void ab initio.368  This is because 
state governments are limited by the Constitution and lack the capacity to decide on any of the 
items on the exclusive legislative list. 
  
4.2.2 The Infrastructure Concession and Regulatory Commission (Establishment etc.) 
Act 2005 (ICRC Act) 
 
The ICRC Act 2005 is Nigeria’s main legislation for PPP and provides the primary legal 
framework for private participation in infrastructure development in the country.369 The Act 
empowers government ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) to enter into contracts 
with the private sector for the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of public 
infrastructure.370 It also established the Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission (the 
ICRC), which is managed by a 12-member board consisting of a part-time chairman, the 
Attorney General of the Federation, the Governor of the Central Bank and a person from each 
of the six geopolitical zones371 in the country. It needs to be pointed out that the Act basically 
regulates PPPs that involve the federal government of Nigeria or any of its MDAs, as states 
which desire to adopt a PPP policy are required to provide their own regulatory framework.372 
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 The ICRC’s role is to take custody of every concession agreement made under the Act, 
ensure efficient execution of concession agreements, and perform other functions as directed 
by the President from time to time.373 The Act stipulates that for a private sector consortium to 
undertake a PPP concession with the federal government of Nigeria or any of its MDAs, the 
consortium must possess the financial capacity, together with relevant expertise and 
experience.374 The fact that PPPs are a recent phenomenon in the country raises the question 
of whether local consortiums are disadvantaged by the provisions of the Act when bidding for 
projects, considering the greater experience that foreign consortiums may possess. 
 Notably, the Act provides that no agreement reached in respect of the Act shall be 
arbitrarily suspended, stopped, cancelled or changed, except in accordance with the provisions 
of the Act.375 While this provision gives assurance to a prospective investor that PPP 
agreements will be respected, the Act fails to make provision for the funding376 process for 
projects.377 The Act does not provide detailed rules on how PPP contracts should be 
procured.378 It is also noteworthy that the Act does not give clear directions on the approval 
process for PPP projects or on the method of dealing with unsolicited proposals, nor does it 
spell out provisions for dispute resolution in the event of disputes arising from a PPP 
arrangement.379 
 
4.2.3 The Public Procurement Act 2007 
 
As already noted in Chapter Three of this study, public procurement differs from PPP in the 
sense that in public procurement there is no transfer of the facility to the private sector, while 
in a PPP the facility is transferred to the private sector for the duration of the PPP transaction 
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(i.e. during construction, maintenance and operation). Notwithstanding this, there is currently 
an overlap of the Public Procurement Act in PPP administration in the country. The Act came 
into force in June 2007 and specifically stipulates that anybody engaged in the procurement of 
goods and services that derive at least 35 percent of the funding from the federal share of the 
budget must comply with the provisions of the Act.380 Since the ICRC Act 2005 does not 
specifically exclude any other law regarding the procurement process for PPPs, and since the 
Public Procurement Act 2007 was passed later in time, the correct assumption is that the Public 
Procurement Act is applicable to PPPs as well. Furthermore, given that the Public Procurement 
Act 2007 does not take the ICRC Act 2005 into consideration, as it ought to have, the possibility 
of conflict is high because the Public Procurement Act itself deals with the procurement of 
goods and services for infrastructure projects.381 
 The Public Procurement Act 2007 established the National Council on Public 
Procurement (NCPP)382 as well as the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP).383 These bodies 
regulate and monitor public procurement, harmonising the existing government policies as well 
as setting standards for developing the legal framework and professional capacity for public 
procurement in the country.384 While the BPP performs regulatory and administrative 
functions, the NCPP exerts control over the administration of the BPP to ensure that the 
objectives of the Act are realised. 
 The Public Procurement Act 2007 identifies the main method of procurement as open 
competitive bidding, referred to as ‘sealed bidding.’385 Under this method, the procuring 
authority, based on a defined set of criteria, effects public procurements by offering every 
interested bidder equal, simultaneous information, and the opportunity to offer the goods and 
services needed.386 The aim is to make public procurement transparent and keep corruption in 
check. However, it has been noted that the main challenge to the Act is the reluctance of the 
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federal government of Nigeria to embrace the full implementation of the Act, since a public 
contract can be used to reward political loyalists.387 
Some authors maintain that the Public Procurement Act 2007 may be applied to fill gaps left 
by the ICRC Act 2005 in terms of the procurement of goods and services required in PPP 
projects.388 It is however the submission of this study that the Public Procurement Act does not 
adequately provide for PPPs, and that the existing PPP laws should be developed to cater to 
the needs of PPP arrangements. Most importantly, a clear distinction should be made between 
PPP and public procurement. 
 
4.2.4 The Public Enterprises and Commercialisation Act 1999 (PECA) 
 
Although this Act established the framework for the privatisation and commercialisation of 
public assets in Nigeria, being earlier in time than the ICRC Act it also initially served as a 
guide for concessions in the country.389 Notably, 26 seaports, the Trade Fair Complex, the 
Tafawa Balewa Square, the National Theatre (all in Lagos) and the several hydroelectric power 
plants across the country were transferred to private ownership under the law by the Bureau of 
Public Enterprises (BPE), a creation of the Public Enterprises and Commercialisation Act 
1999.390 The Act also established the National Council on Privatisation (NCP).391 While the 
NCP is charged with the responsibility of setting and administering the federal government’s 
policies and objectives on privatisation and approving transactions, the BPE is responsible for 
actual day-to-day privatisation activities. 
 Even though privatisation is not the same as a PPP transaction, the absence of a PPP 
framework before the creation of the ICRC enabled the conclusion of concessions under the 
supervision of the BPE. Some transactions are still listed under the schedule to the Public 
Enterprises and Commercialisation Act, including airports and railway projects. This overlap 
could lead to conflict between the BPE and the ICRC. 
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4.2.5 The Utilities Charges Commission Act 1992 
 
This Act established the Utilities Charges Commission.392 The Commission is responsible for 
evaluating on a continuous basis trends in tariffs charged by any of the public utilities listed in 
the second schedule to the Act; advising the federal government on guidelines within which 
increases in tariffs should be confined by scheduled utilities; designing and developing an 
adequate information system relating to the scheduled utilities; keeping charges and tariffs 
under constant surveillance and propose measures; regulating tariff charges and preventing the 
undue exploitation of consumers.393 
 As it relates to PPP arrangements, the Utilities Charges Commission is mandated to 
approve the tariffs or charges to be agreed by the Concessionaire and the public sector. The 
utilities specified by the Act include electricity, seaports, railways, postal services and airports. 
 
4.2.6 The Environmental Impact Assessment Act No 86 of 1992 
 
This Act was passed to ensure that an environmental impact assessment is carried out prior to 
the undertaking of any project that is likely to have a significant effect on the environment.394 
The Act stipulates that neither the public nor private sector of the economy shall embark on 
any project without first considering the environmental effects of the project. 395 Under the Act, 
the assessment shall include a description of the proposed activities;396 a description of the 
potentially affected environment, including specific information necessary to identify and 
assess the environmental effects of the proposed activities;397 a description of the practical 
activities, as appropriate;398 an assessment of the likely or potential environmental impacts on 
the proposed activity and the alternatives, including the direct or indirect, cumulative, short-
term and long-term effects;399 an identification and description of measures available to 
mitigate adverse environmental impacts of the proposed activity and an assessment of those 
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measures;400 an indication of gaps in knowledge and uncertainty which may be encountered in 
computing the required information;401 an indication of whether the environment of any state, 
local government area or areas outside Nigeria is likely to be affected by the proposed activity 
or its alternatives;402 and a brief and non-technical summary of the information provided under 
paragraphs (a) to (g) of Section 4 of the Act.403 
 The Act refers to the Nigerian Environmental Protection Agency, a creation of the 
Federal Environmental Protection Act,404 as the agency to make decisions as to whether a 
proposed activity should be authorised.405 The report is to be made available to any interested 
person or group.406 However, the Act provides that an environmental impact assessment is not 
required when the President is of the opinion that the environmental impact of the project will 
be minimal, or the project is required to be carried out during a national emergency for which 
temporary measures have been undertaken by the Government, or if the project is to be carried 
out for the purposes of public health or safety.407 
 Since PPP projects involve construction and significant environmental impact, it is 
mandatory for all such projects to comply with the provisions of the Environmental Impact 
Assessment Act No. 86 of 1992. 
 
 
4.2.7 The Debt Management Office Establishment (Etc.) Act 2003 
 
This Act established a Debt Management Office (DMO).408 Its relevance to PPP transactions 
is that the public authority may provide guarantees for projects or may seek financing for its 
contribution to any PPP project. The responsibilities of the DMO include inter alia maintaining 
a reliable database of all loans taken or guaranteed by the Federal or State Governments or any 
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of their agencies;409 preparing and submitting to the Federal Government a forecast of loan 
service obligations for each financial year;410 preparing and implementing a plan for the 
efficient management of Nigeria’s external and domestic debt obligations at sustainable levels 
compatible with the national goals for growth and development, and participating in 
negotiations aimed attaining those goals;411 verifying and servicing external debts taken by 
State Governments and any of their agencies (where such debts are guaranteed by the Federal 
Government);412 setting guidelines for managing Federal Government financial risks and 
currency exposure with respect to all loans.413 
 PPP transactions may require the Federal government to borrow both externally or 
internally, as well as to issue guarantees in some cases. It is noteworthy that the ICRC Act does 
not countenance this. Potential PPP investors could be stranded if the DMO relying on the 
express powers granted to it under the Debt Management Office Establishment Act decides to 
veto a transaction midstream.414 
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4.2.8 The National Inland Waterways Act 1997 
 
This Act established the National Inland Waterway Authority (NIWA).415 The objectives of 
the NIWA are to improve and develop inland waterways for navigation;416 to provide an 
alternative mode of transportation for the evacuation of economic goods and persons;417 and to 
execute the objectives of the national transport policy as they concern inland waterways.418 It 
was pointed out above under sub-head 4.2.1 that inland waterways feature as an item on the 
exclusive legislative list. It therefore follows that any PPP project that deals with inland 
waterways must be arranged with the private sector by the Federal Government. The right body 
to deal with for a PPP transaction dealing with inland waterways is the NIWA. 
 The Act provides that all navigable waterways, inland waterways, river-ports and 
internal waters of Nigeria, excluding direct approaches to the ports listed in the Third Schedule 
to the Act and all other waters declared to be approached to ports under or pursuant to the 
Nigerian Ports Authority Act, up to 250 metres beyond the upstream edge of the quay of such 
ports, shall be under the exclusive management, direction and control of the Authority.419 
 Following from the foregoing, the effect of the provisions of the National Inland 
Waterways Act and the Second Schedule to the 1999 Constitution is that state governments are 
precluded from arranging PPP transactions that involve inland waterways. 
 
4.2.9 The Federal Highways Act 1971 
 
The Federal Highways Act 1971 empowers the Minister of Works and Housing to control 
federal highways.420 It is the responsibility of the Minister to plan the construction and 
maintenance of federal highways as well as see to the regulation of traffic on them.421 The Act 
however provides that this power may be delegated to the government of a state in respect of 
traffic on federal highways.422 It must be emphasised that what may be delegated to state 
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governments is the control of traffic on federal highways and not the construction of such 
highways. The Act points out that the powers to be delegated refer to restriction on type or 
class of vehicle and vehicle inspection,423 road diversion424 or closure where necessary as a 
temporary measure and the prohibition of parking or waiting as the case may be on federal 
highways;425 prohibition of the erection of hoardings and other forms of advertising within a 
distance of 300 feet from the middle line of any road formation in the vicinity of a federal 
highway or within the distance aforesaid from the middle line of the Federal highways;426 and 
generally ensuring the uninterrupted flow of vehicular and pedestrian traffic.427 
 The power to erect, equip and maintain toll gates on any federal highway is vested in 
the Minister with the approval of the President.428 It has been argued that when there is a 
concession in respect of any federal road in the country and there is a need for tolling, the 
authority to do so lies with the Minister in charge of roads in consonance with the Federal 
Highways Act 1971.429 Regrettably, however, the ICRC Act 2005 does not make any reference 
to the Federal Highways Act 1971.  
 The Act also provides for compensation to be paid to land owners where land is 
acquired for the construction of federal highways in accordance with the Land Use Act 1978. 
There is confusion here regarding the question of who should be responsible for the payment 
of the compensation to land owners, since the Land Use Act provides that the Governor of the 
State concerned should pay such compensation430 for lands acquired for overriding public 
interest, taking into cognisance that federal highways are strictly the concern of the federal 
government. The issue now is why should the state pay compensation for land acquired by the 
federal government for the construction of a federal highway, given that federal highways are 
on the exclusive legislative list? A serious problem could arise if the government of a state is 
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not disposed to pay compensation to land owners whose land is acquired for the construction 
of highways.431 
 
4.2.10 The Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007 
 
The Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) was passed in 2007 and amended in 2011 to provide for 
prudent management of the country’s resources, to ensure the long-term macro-economic 
stability of the national economy, secure greater accountability and transparency in fiscal 
operations within the medium-term fiscal policy framework, and to establish the Fiscal 
Responsibility Commission (FRC) to ensure promotion and enforcement of the Nation’s 
economic objectives.432 The 2011 amendment of the Act empowers the FRC to enforce 
remittance or revenues of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation. 
 Basically, the Act is meant to impose limits on the country’s spending and 
borrowing.433 It follows that there ought to be synergy between the ICRC and the Fiscal 
Responsibility Commission whenever there is spending on the part of the government on PPP 
transactions. However, neither the ICRA Act 2005 nor the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007 (and 
the later amendment of 2011) refers to cooperation between the ICRC and the FRC for the 
approval of PPP transactions involving government spending or borrowing. There is thus a gap 
in the law as to the extent of the cooperation between the Commissions to ensure the successful 
approval of PPP transactions in the country. This is particularly worrying because the FRC 
may withhold approval of government spending or borrowing in a project, which may lead to 
government not fulfilling its part in a PPP arrangement, a situation which could in turn lead to 
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4.2.11 The National Planning Commission Act 1993 
 
This Act established the National Planning Commission (NPC). The role of the NPC as it 
relates to infrastructural development in the country include to formulate and prepare long-
term, medium-term and short-term national development plans, to co-ordinate such plans at the 
Federal, State and Local Government levels;434 and to monitor projects and progress relating 
to plan implementation.435 It is noteworthy that the core objectives of the NPC include to 
promote national unity and integration;436 ensure social justice and human welfare at all levels 
of Nigerian society;437 focus on key national development issues and suggest ways for their 
efficient resolution;438 determine how best the Fundamental Objectives and Directive 
Principles of State Policy contained in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 
can achieve the major objectives of optimal development, and suggest amendments that may 
be required from time to time, to achieve those objectives in the light of encountered realities.439 
As such, the focal point of the NPC is to see that there is an equal sharing of federal projects 
(including PPPs) across the country without much regard for the revenue the projects may 
generate, in recognition of the country’s ‘federal character’ principle. It follows that if there is 
no clear cooperation between the NPC and the ICRC there is bound to be a conflict of interests. 
 
4.2.12 Laws Regulating Foreign Direct Investments for Infrastructure 
 
To attract foreign direct investment (FDI) into the Nigerian economy in general, the federal 
government has enacted laws to facilitate the importation of foreign capital. These laws also 
apply where there are foreign participants investing in the provision of infrastructure within 
the country. 
 The laws include the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act 1998, which is 
the country’s principal investment law and regulates the entry of FDI into Nigeria. It 
established the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission, an agency set up to co-ordinate 
and monitor investment promotion activities dealing in foreign capital.  The Foreign Exchange 
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(Monitoring and Miscellaneous) Provisions Act 1995 provides that no enterprise shall be 
nationalised or expropriated by any government of the federation unless it is in the national 
interest and adequate compensation is paid. The Act also provides for the smooth repatriation 
of funds in convertible currency where applicable. 
 It is crucial that the host country provide protection for foreign capital. Foreign 
investors usually require guarantees where or when there is a ‘nationalisation or dispossession 
without recourse to judicial review and payment of appropriate compensation’440 in line with 
the laws of the host nation and applicable rules of international law. However, in the light of 
recent shortages of foreign exchange in Nigeria occasioned by the fall in oil prices, it remains 
to be seen whether the government can provide guarantees that investors can access foreign 
exchange when they seek to repatriate funds. 
  
4.3 Nigeria’s National Policy on Public-Private Partnerships 
 
It is common for policies to be drafted before legislation is introduced that affects any sector 
in the economy. This was not, however, the case with PPP in Nigeria. The main Act regulating 
PPPs, i.e. the ICRC Act 2005, was passed before the National Policy on Public-Private 
Partnerships was introduced in 2008. It has been suggested that the National Policy on PPP 
was designed to fill the many gaps and silences in the ICRC Act 2005.441 
 Nigeria’s National Policy on PPP came into effect in November 2008 during the 
administration of the late President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua. The Policy is born out of the 
following: 
Many years of underinvestment and poor maintenance of infrastructure have 
left Nigeria with a significant infrastructure deficit which is holding back the 
country’s development and economic growth. Nigeria needs to make massive 
investments, beyond the means available to government, in order to close its 
yawning infrastructure gap. The Federal Government (‘the Government’) 
believes that the private sector can play an important role in providing some of 
this new investment through Public Private Partnerships (PPPs).442 
 
The objectives that the federal government of Nigeria seeks thereby to achieve are four-fold: 
economic, social, environmental and value for money. 
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In terms of the economic goals, the country aims to accelerate investment in new infrastructure 
and ensure that existing infrastructure is upgraded to a satisfactory standard that meets the 
needs and aspirations of the public; to ensure that all investment projects provide value for 
money and that the costs to government are affordable; to improve the availability, quality, and 
efficiency of power, water, transport and other public services to increase economic growth, 
productivity, competitiveness, and access to markets.443 The latter would in turn ensure an 
increase in the capacity and diversity of the private sector by providing opportunities for 
Nigerian and international investors and contractors in the provision of public infrastructure, 
encouraging efficiency, innovation and flexibility. Other aims are to ensure that infrastructure 
projects are planned, prioritised and managed to maximise economic returns and are delivered 
in a timely, efficient, and cost-effective manner; to manage the fiscal risks created under PPP 
contracts within the Government’s overall financial and budgetary framework; and to utilise 
federal and state assets efficiently for the benefit of all users of public services.444 
 Given the country’s ‘federal character principle,’ which is defined as ‘the distinctive 
desire of the peoples of Nigeria to promote national unity, foster national loyalty and give every 
citizen of Nigeria a sense of belonging to the nation as expressed in section 14(3) and (4) of 
this Constitution,’445 it is no surprise that the National Policy on PPP lists ensuring balanced 
regional development under the social goals of PPP in the country.446 Other social objectives 
of the Policy include the need to increase access to quality public services for all members of 
society; the need to ensure that user charges for new or improved public services are affordable 
and provide value for money; to respect employment rights and opportunities of existing 
employees and ensure that any redundancy or other social safety net issues are resolved before 
project approval; to enhance the health, safety and wellbeing of the public, as well as to 
encourage the direct or indirect participation of small and medium sized enterprises in PPP 
projects.447 
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The environmental goals of the national PPP policy are to protect and enhance the natural 
environment as well as to minimise greenhouse gas emissions and other pollutants.448  
 As it relates to value for money, the Government will opt for the PPP model of 
procurement if it is likely to result in better value and more affordable services.449 
 An important inclusion in the national PPP Policy is the declared resolve of the 
government of Nigeria to create an appropriate enabling environment for PPP that allows a fair 
return to private investors for the project risk they are willing to take. The government therefore 
undertook to put in place a legal, financial and institutional framework that would promote and 
facilitate the implementation of privately financed projects by enhancing the transparency as 
well as the long-term sustainability of the projects.450 
 The Policy document lists the following sectors as the PPP focus for the country:451 
power generation plants and/or transmission/distribution of power; roads and bridges; water 
supply, treatment and distribution systems; ports; airports; railways; inland container depots 
and logistics hubs; gas and petroleum storage depots and distribution pipelines; solid waste 
management; educational facilities; urban transport system; housing and healthcare facilities. 
It is the submission of this research that the government of Nigeria is obliged to follow through 
with the policy in line with the earmarking of the 13 sectors listed above, as most of the projects 
brokered thus far are in the transport sector. A holistic approach to bridging Nigeria’s 
infrastructure gap taking these key 13 areas into account will go a long way towards improving 
the standard of living of the Nigerian people. 
 More importantly, the Policy envisaged that that between 2008 and 2015, the sum of 
$100 billion would be invested in four key sectors, namely, power ($18-20 billion), railways 
($10 billion), roads ($14 billion) and oil and gas ($60 billion), to meet projected annual growth 
targets geared towards transforming the country into one of the 20 largest economies in the 
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4.4 Institutional Framework for Public-Private Partnership in Nigeria 
 
Institutional framework here refers to those organs or agencies of state structured or put in 
place by law to ensure that PPPs are successfully administered.453 These agencies are either 
established as entities created by legislation or as units within government departments.454 The 
institutional framework for PPP in Nigeria involves overlapping roles on the part of some 
government agencies, even though there is a primary body charged with responsibility for the 
administration and regulation of PPPs at the national level. The Infrastructure Concession 
Regulatory Commission (ICRC) is that body. It was established under the Infrastructure 
Concession Regulatory Commission (Establishment, etc.) Act 2005455 but came into existence 
three years later. Yet because of previous policies including privatisation, commercialisation, 
deregulation and national development planning, other agencies of government may be 
included in a PPP process involving the federal government of Nigeria. 
 Specific roles and responsibilities have been assigned to various MDAs dealing with 
‘project identification, planning, approval, procurement, and implementation.’456 The bodies 
charged with the responsibility for administering PPP at the national level are discussed below.  
 
4.4.1 The Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission (ICRC) 
 
The ICRC was established under s. 14(1) of the ICRC Act 2005. It is set up as a body corporate 
with perpetual succession and a common seal.457 The functions of the ICRC are to: take custody 
of every concession agreement made under the ICRC Act and monitor compliance with the 
terms and conditions of such agreements,458 ensure efficient execution of any concession 
agreement or contract entered into by the Government,459 ensure compliance with the 
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provisions of the ICRC Act 2005,460 and perform such duties as may be directed by the 
President, from time to time, and as are necessary or expedient to ensure the efficient 
performance of the functions of the Commission under the Act.461 
 The Contract Monitoring Unit within the ICRC is tasked with the responsibility of 
monitoring compliance with the terms of a PPP contract by the parties to the arrangement.462 
The ICRC also provides technical assistance to all ministries, departments and agencies in the 
development of PPP projects. 
 
4.4.2 The Federal Ministry of Finance (FMoF) 
 
The role of the FMoF in PPP at the national level is to ensure the effective public financial 
management of projects, especially as this relates to evaluating and managing fiscal risks that 
may result from the terms of the agreements. It is the duty of the FMoF to ensure that the 
forecast costs for the Government – including subsidies that may be necessary to make a project 
financially viable or to ease the transition for poor households to a full cost recovery tariff – 
are affordable over the life of the contract and within the medium-term expenditure 
framework.463 
 
4.4.3 The Debt Management Office (DMO) 
 
S. 4 of The Debt Management Office Establishment (Etc.) Act No. 18 of 2003 established the 
Debt Management Office to prepare and implement a plan for the efficient management of the 
country’s external and domestic debt obligations, and set guidelines for managing the country’s 
risk and currency exposure with respect to all loans. Since PPP arrangements will require the 
federal government of Nigeria to borrow both externally and locally and include the issue of 
guarantees, the DMO has a role to play in PPP procurement.  It is the responsibility of the 
DMO to be satisfied that any contingent liabilities are manageable within the federal 
government’s economic and fiscal forecast. It is also required that project teams consult the 
DMO in advance when an MDA considers involving multilateral agencies in providing 
                                                      
460 S. 20(c) ICRC Act 2005. 
461 S. 20(d) ICRC Act 2005. 
462 Ibid. 
463 The Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission op cit note 454 at 9. 
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guarantees or other financial instruments.464 It is pertinent to note, however, that the ICRC Act 
2005 does not include a role for the DMO in the arrangement or procurement of PPP. It is 
therefore obvious that the National Policy on PPP has served to fill this gap in the law. 
 
4.4.4 The Bureau of Public Procurement 
The function of the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) is to ensure due process in the 
procurement of public works and services. It does so by using a benchmarking technique to 
ensure that the prices paid for goods and services are fair and reasonable.465 
 
4.4.5 The Public-Private Partnership Resource Centre 
 
The role of the Resource Centre involves capacity building in the private sector, ‘through 
publicity, conferences and other meetings.’466 It acts as a bridge between the public and the 
private sectors to ensure that the PPP programme across the federation has sufficient scale and 
ambition to encourage international players to participate, through teaming up with smaller and 
medium-sized local contractors. The Centre advises the federal government on the 
development of policy for PPP; it issues guidance, in conjunction with the National Planning 
Commission (NPC), on the identification of PPP projects and programmes within the 
Government’s investment strategy, and it coordinates the PPP policies and programmes of the 
state and federal governments, working with similar units in the States or Ministries to ensure 
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4.4.6 The Contract Compliance Centre 
 
The Centre takes custody of every concession agreement and monitors compliance with the 
terms and conditions of the agreement while maintaining a database on concessions and other 
PPP contracts entered into by the government.468 
 
4.4.7 The Accountant General of the Federation 
 
The office of the Accountant General of the Federation ensures that the funds for payment 
obligations incurred through Federal PPP contracts are safeguarded to ensure prompt payment, 
subject to appropriate authorisation. 
 
4.4.8 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
 
The origin of Nigeria’s Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) dates to 1962 when an ad 
hoc Capital Issues Committee was established under the aegis of the country’s Central Bank. 
The Commission assumed its current form on 1 January 1980, but now derives its powers from 
the Investment and Securities Act 2007. Under that Act, the SEC is empowered to regulate 
investments in the country. As regards PPPs, the SEC has laid down a Rule for Infrastructure 
Funds in the country. The Rule sets out, inter alia, the conditions for establishing infrastructure 
funding, the issuance of units, permissible investments and the duties of the Fund Manager.469 
 
4.4.9 The National Planning Commission (NPC) 
 
The National Planning Commission (NPC) has the task of developing national development 
plans for all infrastructure services administered by the federation of Nigeria.470 The MDAs in 
the country are required to work with the NPC in identifying their long-term infrastructure 
development goals, to determine whether the proposed projects can be funded through the 
                                                      
468 Ibid at 66. 
469 See SEC Rules on Infrastructure Funds 2014. 
470 This is usually for a period of 15 years. 
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MDA’s budget or be structured as a PPP. Thus, MDAs with prospective projects must maintain 
a synergy with the NPC. 
 Over the years, numbers of laws have been passed to promote the economic 
development of Nigeria across various sectors. Many of these have created agencies or 
government departments with a range of functions. Since PPPs involve infrastructural 
development, a key sector of the national economy, it is not surprising that by now too many 
agencies or departments are required to play a part either in the initial or development phases 
of PPP arrangements. The involvement of several agencies in the regulation of PPP projects 
may result in unnecessary bickering as well as interference by other government agencies in a 
task which is primarily the responsibility of the ICRC. The current situation renders the whole 
PPP process in the country somewhat complex, which can be dismaying for prospective foreign 
investors who are not conversant with the Nigerian legal and business environment. 
 
4.5 Public-Private Partnership Laws at the Sub-National Level 
 
Interestingly, following the adoption of a PPP framework at the national level, a few Nigerian 
states have enacted their own PPP laws and set up PPP units. Thus, potential PPP investors 
must take cognisance of which tier of government they should be dealing with. Apart from 
noting the items on the exclusive legislative list, a prospective investor must be guided to 
ensure that any state government being dealt with has in place a framework for PPP before 
agreeing to transact any business.471 
 The Lagos State Government led the way for the other states in the adoption of the PPP 
model of procurement. The state signed into law the Lagos State Public-Private Partnership 
Law (LSPPPL) in June 2011.472 The law repealed the Lagos State Roads (Private Participation) 
Authority Law 2007 and established a PPP office in the State. Under the LSPPPL 2011, the 
State House of Assembly must ratify all concession agreements and must approve sums to be 
charged as tolls or user fees. 
 The Rivers State Government has made proactive commitment to a PPP regime by 
enacting the Public-Private Participation in Infrastructure Development Law in 2009. That law 
established the Bureau of Public-Private Partnership to administer PPP in the state. The Rivers 
                                                      
471 At the federal level government may be represented by any of its MDAs while at the sub-national level a 
state government may also be represented by any of its MDAs. 
472 See http://www.olaniwunajayi.net/clientalert/PPP%20Newsletter%20Final%2011%2008%202011.pdf 
accessed 11 April 2016. 
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State law has clearly marked out “no-go-areas” for PPP in the State. These areas include 
defence, the security of the state, urgent public need or emergency, and items under closed bid 
as provided for in section 21(4) of the Rivers State Public Procurement Law No. 4 of 2008. 
Unlike the Lagos State PPP Law that merely mirrors the ICRC Act 2005, the Rivers State Law 
established an Infrastructure Development Unit (IDU) under the state’s Ministry of Finance.473 
The main responsibility of the IDU is to ensure value for money for the state by applying 
commercial standards in evaluating risks and costs.474 It is significant that the Rivers State Law 
provides for Infrastructure Credit Guarantee (ICG). Under the law, the Rivers State 
Government may upon the recommendation of the IDFU guarantee the credit of a private party 
which intends to obtain a loan from a financial institution for the execution of a PPP project, 
thereby stimulating private sector participation and encouraging the involvement of companies 
and businesses indigenous to Rivers State.475 The Rivers State Law is an improvement on the 
ICRC Act 2005. However, a drawback of the Rivers State PPP Law is the limiting of PPPs to 
a 20-year term (Section 62 of the Law). There is a need to amend that section as PPPs are 
known to be long-tenured and could more appropriately extend to 30 years. 
 The Ekiti State Government enacted the Ekiti State Public Private Partnership Law on 
26 July 2011. The Law established the Office of Public Private Partnership for the state.476 The 
Law permits state MDAs to enter into PPP arrangements with qualified private project 
proponents. An important inclusion in the Ekiti Law is the provision for guarantees, letters of 
comfort or undertaking.477 The import of this inclusion – which is lacking in the ICRC Act of 
2005 – is the level of assurance that it provides for prospective investors. 
 The Cross River State Government enacted the Cross River Public Private Partnership 
Law in 2010.478 In addition, the state has enacted the Cross River State Process and Process 
Intelligence Bureau for Public Procurement Law No. 15 2011, to ensure that due process is 
followed in PPP arrangements. 479 
                                                      
473 S. 27 Public-Private Participation in Infrastructure Development Law 2009. 
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The other states that have set up a PPP framework for private sector participation in 
infrastructure delivery include Bayelsa, Delta, Akwa Ibom, Abia, Edo, Benue, Sokoto, 
Zamfara, Benue, Bauchi, Kaduna and Yobe.480 
 
4.6 The Practice of Public-Private Partnership in Nigeria 
 
With the passing of the ICRC Act 2005 and the adoption of a National PPP Policy in 2008, the 
country fulfilled its undertaking to engage the private sector in the procurement of public 
facilities. An important policy directive on the part of the federal government is the 
incorporation of the PPP Policy in the country’s Vision 20:2020 Plan, since infrastructure is 
key to national economic development. PPPs can undoubtedly benefit the development of the 
economy, but the government needs to do more than just develop a framework for the practice 
of PPP: it needs to make a strong commitment to the success of PPP projects.  
 In this section, accounts are given of the life cycle of PPP projects, focusing on funding 
for projects and case studies of a few projects, in order to give the reader some insight into how 
PPPs are structured and conducted in Nigeria. 
 
4.6.1 Public-Private Partnership Project Cycle in Nigeria 
 
There are basically four different phases in the life cycle of a PPP project in Nigeria.481 The 
first phase is the project development and appraisal phase. During this phase, the need for the 
project is identified. This is followed by a systematic appraisal of technical solutions to meet 
the need.482 Thereafter, an economic, social and environmental cost benefit analysis is carried 
out (as well as an environmental impact assessment if required).483 For the project to qualify 
as a PPP, a value for money assessment is done at this stage. After the assessment, a financial 
                                                      
480 Martin O Dada & Olukayode S Oyediran ‘The state of public private partnership in Nigeria’ in Akintola 
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5. 
481 Infrastructure Concession and Regulatory Commission ‘National public private partnership policy document’ 
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analysis is prepared, a budget allocation is structured, and the project is approved as an Outline 
Business Case (OBC).484 
The second phase in the life cycle of a PPP transaction in Nigeria is the project 
procurement phase.485 This phase involves the creation of a project team and a management 
structure. This leads to the preparation of an Information Memorandum and Bid 
Documentation (IMBD).486 If it is appropriate, market consultation is then carried out. 
Thereafter a competitive and transparent procurement process with a clear audit trail is 
followed to select bidders and to evaluate bids.487 This is then followed by the approval of a 
Full Business Case (FBC) before a decision is reached to award a contract.488 
The third phase is the implementation phase. This phase involves monitoring the design 
and construction of the project and the subsequent operation and maintenance of the facility to 
ensure that there is compliance with the required standards. This is in addition to the monitoring 
of payments against services delivered and any contingent liabilities.489 
The fourth phase in the PPP transaction cycle in Nigeria is the maturity phase. During 
this phase, the facility is inspected and prepared for handover in accordance with the specified 
requirements.490 If appropriate, an analysis of future service delivery options and further 
procurement is carried out. The contract is then closed, and lessons learnt are recorded for 
future purposes.491 
All through the phases of the life cycle of a PPP transaction in Nigeria, the federal 
government through the ICRC provides guidance for and effective management of each phase 
of the project.492 
Within the four stages adumbrated above, there are typically 12 steps to be adhered to 
in implementing PPPs. These steps constitute the National PPP process for the country.493 The 




487 Ibid at 14. 
488 Ibid. 
489 Ibid. 
490 Ibid at 15. 
491 Ibid. 
492 Ibid. 
493 Infrastructure Concession and Regulatory Commission ‘National PPP Process’ see 
http://www.icrc.gov.ng/ppp/ accessed 16 March 2017. 
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process for initiating a project usually begins with a ministry, department and/or agency 
(MDA) identifying the need for a project. This is followed by the MDA engaging the ICRC to 
ensure the bankability and viability of the proposed project. While doing so, the MDA is 
expected to consult the Federal Ministry of Finance to minimise the risk and contingent 
liabilities arising from such projects. Thereafter, a Transaction Adviser (TA) is engaged by the 
MDA through a competitive bidding process as required under the Public Procurement Act 
2007. The function of the TA is to produce a report which is known as the Outline Business 
Case (OBC). Upon the completion of the OBC, the MDA forwards it to the ICRC for review. 
If the review from the ICRC is positive, the ICRC issues an OBC Certificate of Compliance to 
the MDA concerned; if not, the ICRC will decline to issue a certificate and will advise the 
MDA accordingly. If an MDA obtains an OBC Certificate, the MDA will thereafter submit the 
document to the Federal Executive Council through the line Minister for approval. Upon the 
approval of the Federal Executive Council, the MDA’s TA will commence a procurement 
process leading to a competitive bidding stage, from which a preferred PPP Project Proponent 
(Investor) will emerge. Following this, negotiations will ensue, leading to the conclusion of a 
Full Business Case (FBC) for the review of the ICRC. The next step will be the MDA 
submitting the FBC alongside the Certificate of Compliance from the ICRC to the line Minister 
for approval by the Federal Executive Council. When this is approved by the Federal Executive 
Council, a contract is signed between the MDA and the preferred PPP Project Proponent 
(Investor). The ICRC then assumes custody of the contract.494 But before the project can take 
off, the PPP Project Proponent (Investor) must achieve Financial Close, i.e. conclude funding 
arrangements for the project. While the project is ongoing, the MDA is required to supervise it 
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4.6.2 Funding of Public-Private Partnership Projects in Nigeria 
 
One of the first steps a prospective bidder for a PPP project normally takes is to secure the 
finance required for the project as well as to engage a financial adviser.497 A prospective 
investor is then required to consider two main sources of private finance for infrastructure 
projects, commercial banks and bond investors. The other sources of funding for PPP projects 
include equity contributions, capital market financing, mezzanine contributions498 and inter-
creditor finance.499 
 The usual approach for arranging a project-finance loan is to appoint a lead arranger 
who is expected to underwrite the debt and place it in the market. Considering the huge finance 
involved, a consortium of banks may be involved in raising the debt.500 The sponsors may make 
their own equity contributions501 to the project, in addition to any budgetary contributions from 
the government. 
 The framework for a secured lending regime is still developing and cannot in its present 
form be relied upon solely for the funding of PPP projects in the country. As has been observed, 
whereas Nigeria’s legal and judicial system is relatively developed, the legal framework for 
the country’s financial sector ‘remains antiquated and unsophisticated.’502 Nigeria’s legal 
framework for the financial sector has not been updated for several years and does not provide 
an adequate foundation for a modern financial system. The key drawbacks are that the 
framework suffers from an absence of new laws for development, and from the non-
consolidation of laws and overlaps.503 It has already been noted under the sections dealing with 
                                                      
497 E R Yescombe op cit note 44 at 124. 
498 Mezzanine contributions are subordinated loads and preference shares. These are loads that involve a lender 
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499 The World Bank ‘Sources of financing and intercreditor agreement’ available at 
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Equity holds the lowest priority in terms of contributions to any project. Thus, equity shareholders will only 
receive payment after debt contributors have been paid. 
502 The World Bank ‘Making finance work for Nigeria’ available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRSUMAFTPS/Resources/Making_Finance_Work_for_Nigeria.pdf 
accessed 17 March 2017 at 192. 
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laws applicable to PPP in the country that the legal framework for PPP consists of a complex 
regime of overlapping legislation and multiple institutions created by law. 
 It is noteworthy, however, that the financial sector in the country has witnessed 
significant changes in recent years. Apart from a major consolidation which reduced the 
number of banks from 89 to 20, there has been an increase in the capitalisation of the banks.504 
This has strengthened the capacity of banks to provide lending facilities,505 although despite 
the declaration of profits in billions of naira, they still concentrate on short-term rather than 
long-term lending.506 It is imperative that reforms are undertaken to provide opportunities for 
large-scale investors to raise the funds needed to finance PPP projects.507  It is noteworthy that 
Nigerian banks have started participating in PPP financing, as will be discussed in the case 
studies on Nigerian PPP projects examined below. Yet there remains a need for improvement 
in the tenure of financing that the country’s banks can provide. Again, the banks mostly 
concentrate on and lend to the oil and gas sector due to the short-term nature of the credit 
involved.508 Since interest rates are high, the cost of obtaining credit in Nigeria is also very 
discouraging to a prospective borrower. This leaves the investor with the option of sourcing 
foreign loans, but these may turn out to be even costlier in the long-term in the absence of a 
stable foreign exchange regime.509 
 As it is, financing for PPP infrastructure in the country comes from project sponsors, 
commercial banks, international banks, local institutional investors, international investors and 
multilateral finance organisations.510 The need to encourage low- to middle-income investor 
participation in infrastructure funding in the country is yet to be explored. However, the setting 
up of private equity firms like the African Capital Alliance, ARM Infrastructure Fund, Africa 
Finance Corporation and ACTIS West Africa is an indication that there is a potentially 
                                                      
504 Making Finance Work for Africa ‘Nigeria: Financial sector profile’ available at 
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profitable infrastructure market in the country.511 However, all the funds listed above have high 
entry thresholds for prospective investors. The result is that the public may view PPP as a 
means of making the rich richer and impoverishing the poor. It is the submission of this 
research that for a developing country like Nigeria, opportunities should be created for the 
participation of low- to middle-income earners in infrastructure funding, to make PPP more 
attractive to the public as well as to get them a return on their investment. 
 
4.7 Case Studies of Public-Private Partnership Projects in Nigeria 
 
In this section, some PPP projects that have been arranged under the current framework are 
briefly discussed and the factors that gave rise to their success or failure are analysed. The 
projects cut across the transport, health and tourism sectors. The projects selected are both 
national as well as state PPP projects. 
 
4.7.1 The Lagos-Ibadan Expressway Project 
 
This road links the commercial city of Lagos with the ancient city of Ibadan. The road was 
initially constructed by the federal military government between 1974 and 1978. While the first 
section of the expressway512 was constructed by Julius Berger Nigeria, the second section513 
was constructed by Dumez (Nigeria) and the third section514 by Strabag Nigeria.515 Due to age, 
usage and poor maintenance, the state of the road had deteriorated considerably, and various 
sections of the road had become death traps for users. 
 In a bid to address the appalling state of the road, the Federal Ministry of Works 
awarded a 25-year concession516 for the rehabilitation of the expressway to Bi-Courtney 
Highway Services Limited (BCHSL).517 BCHSL engaged the services of local consultants to 
                                                      
511 Ibid at 14. 
512 That is the section between Sagamu and Lagos. 
513 From Sagamu Interchange to Alapako. 
514 Between Alapako and Ojoo including the Ibadan Bypass. 
515 The Punch Newspaper, Editorial 27 April 2016. 
516 BCHSL was commissioned under a BOT arrangement to reconstruct the 105-kilometre Expressway with 100 
percent funding from the concessionaire. 
517 The concession agreement entitled the concessionaire to revenue recoup rights through charging vendors on 
the road as well as collecting tolls. 
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commence the design for the rehabilitation of the expressway under the administration of 
President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua.518 Furthermore, Project Management International was 
commissioned to manage a multi-disciplinary team made up of members of BCHSL, Group 
Five and Rand Merchant Bank while Vela/VKE of South Africa was to provide technical 
support.519 Under the PPP arrangement, work on the expressway under consideration was to 
commence at the Ojota Interchange in Lagos and terminate at the Challenge Interchange in 
Ibadan, approximately 105 kilometres. 
 It has been argued that the federal government and the concessionaire failed to consider 
several factors that were necessary for the project to succeed and that resulted in the failure of 
the project to take off years after the concession agreement was signed. It has been pointed out 
that government officials did not have the requisite knowledge of PPP projects and failed to 
engage the services of experienced legal/transaction/technical consultants and advisers.520 
 In November 2012 the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan revoked the 
concession awarded to BCHSL in 2009, citing violation of the terms, in particular the failure 
on the part of BCHLS to secure the necessary funds for the project.521 Following the revocation 
of the contract, BCHSL wrote to the Minister of Works on January 29, 2013 expressing a desire 
for arbitration, a request to which the government did not respond.522 Subsequently, BHSL 
approached the Federal High Court for an order to restrain the federal government of Nigeria 
from re-awarding a concession of the Lagos-Ibadan expressway to any other construction 
company, arguing that this would amount to a breach of the contract between it and the Federal 
Ministry of Works.523 The defendants in the suit were the Federal Minister of Works, the 
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Attorney General of the federation and three companies. In a ruling on 25 April 2016, the 
Federal High Court, whilst not agreeing with the defendants that the suit was an abuse of court 
process, nevertheless held that the matter was brought outside the time limited by the Public 
Officers’ Protection Act524 and therefore dismissed the action in its entirety. This is because 
once a suit against a public officer is commenced more than three months after the cause of 
action arose, such a case should be held to be statute-barred and the court should decline 
jurisdiction.525 The court further set aside its earlier mandatory injunction setting aside the 
Concession Agreement entered between the FGN and Motorways Asset Ltd, which the same 
court had earlier made on 11 December 2015.526 
 The Lagos-Ibadan Expressway – Bi-Courtney Concession ended up a failure.527 The 
reasons for this include: poor understanding of how PPPs work on the part of the government 
and the concessionaire; the lack of guarantees on the part of the government which resulted in 
the reluctance of financial partners to identify with the project; the failure of the concessionaire 
to source the needed funds for the project; arbitration not being given a proper place in the 
agreement leading to litigation and poor project development. It is submitted that the public 
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4.7.2 The Lekki-Epe Concession Toll Road 
 
Although this project was arranged at the state level, it serves as a good example of how to go 
about arranging and structuring a PPP project. The project was conceived as a PPP scheme 
under the BOT model. It was initially arranged to last for a 30-year period, following which 
the assets would be transferred to the Lagos State Government. As the flagship road concession 
project in the country and for the manner in which it was professionally structured, the project 
received international awards including that of the Africa Investors’ Magazine for being the 
Transport Deal of the Year 2008; the Euromoney International 2007 Africa PPP of the Year; 
Reuters 2008 Africa Infrastructure Deal of the Year and the IFC/Infrastructure Journal Top 
40 Emerging Market Award in 2013.528 
 The project was necessitated by the fact that Lagos experiences a continuous influx of 
people, putting significant pressure on the road infrastructure in the state. The congestion on 
the road linking mainland Lagos to the central business district on the Islands is extremely 
problematic. This is made worse by an inadequate public transport system. Thus, the project 
was driven mainly by the desire to decongest the roads in the central business districts of 
Victoria Island and Ikoyi to make the areas more ‘business-friendly.’529 The project was to 
comprise ‘the upgrading of approximately 49.5 kilometres of the existing Epe Expressway 
linking Lekki to Epe on Victoria Island. Among others, street lighting would be provided, the 
four-lane dual carriageway would be expanded to six-lanes in some places, and toll plazas 
would be constructed, along with other administrative structures.’530 The project was to last for 
about 30 months with the early phase (Falomo Bridge to Mobil House) planned to last for the 
first nine months. 
 Despite the accolades that the project received both locally and internationally, there 
were allegations that the process leading to the award of the concession (bidding and selection) 
was shady, with allegations of complicity between government officials and the ownership of 
the Lekki Concession Company.531 Again, not involving community stakeholders in the period 
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leading up to the award of the concession proved costly.532 To underscore the relevance of 
community stakeholder involvement in PPPs, Yescombe notes that due to their public service 
nature, it is inevitable that PPPs will be the subject of political debate. He insists on the need 
for ‘political will on the public-sector side of the table, and the ability to communicate the case 
for pursuing PPP clearly and fairly.’533 
The LCC set up three toll gates even before executing a substantial part of the project. 
That action had the negative effect of reducing property values around the corridor by about 
30 percent.534 There was agitation on the part of the residents along the corridor, who contended 
that paying N250, N150 and N120 on each of the three tolls on a single journey was absurd. 
The argument on their part was that tolling should only commence upon the completion of the 
entire 49km stretch of the road. On the other hand, the concessionaire argued that under the 
concession agreement, they were empowered to commence the collection of tolls even though 
less than 10 percent of the road had been completed.535 
The question of whether an alternative road should be made available before tolls could 
be charged on the expressway was brought to bear by the Stakeholders’ Forum on Lekki-Epe 
Expansion Project.536 The group argued that there was a need for an alternative route in the 
first place for those who did not wish to ply the expressway and pay tolls.537 However, in 
addressing the question on whether or not there was an obligation on either the concessionaire 
or the public authority to provide an alternative road for users who were unable or unwilling to 
pay tolls, it was posited that Nigerian law makes no provision for such a thing.538 
  In terms of project funding, it is worth mentioning that the Lekki-Epe toll road was the 
first PPP deal to achieve financial closure in the roads sub-sector in the country. In addition, 
apart from attracting the sum of $290m of private investment from local and foreign investors, 
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September 2013. 
535 Ibid. 
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to aspects of the concession agreement between LCC and the Lagos State Government. 
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538 See Detail Solicitors ‘Nigeria PPP review’ (2012) at 3, available at 
http://www.detailsolicitors.com/media/archive2/articles/PPPreview.pdf accessed 21 August 2016. 
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the project obtained a 12-year loan from a consortium of local commercial banks. Before this, 
infrastructure projects had only been able to obtain a loan over a maximum seven-year 
period.539 Specifically, the finance source for the project included a mezzanine contribution of 
$42.5m from the Lagos State Government; a loan of $85m from the African Development 
Bank, and a loan540 of $109.7m from a consortium of Nigerian commercial banks.541 The equity 
contribution from the sponsors of the project was N6.93Bn, held by a consortium of Asset and 
Resource Management Company Limited, Africa Infrastructure Investment Fund, Laure 
Projects and Hi Tech Construction.542 
  Despite the accolades the project attained and the seamless way in which finance for 
the project was sourced, the project failed as a PPP first because the government did not involve 
members of the public resident in the Lekki-Epe corridor during the initiation phase of the 
project to get their buy-in. Secondly, the mystery surrounding the choice of the winner of the 
bid contributed to its failure. Thirdly, the fear that the People’s Democratic Party would gain 
an advantage in the 2015 gubernatorial polls due to the citizens’ outcry against the project led 
to buyback of the concession by the Lagos State Government.543 
  
                                                      
539 Cambridge Economic Policy Associates Ltd op cit note 71 at 88. 
540 12-year note issuance facility. 
541 Including Zenith Bank, First Inland Bank (now a part of FCMB), Diamond Bank, First Bank of Nigeria and 
United Bank for Africa. 
542 Cambridge Economic Policy Associates Ltd op cit note 71 at 88. 
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4.7.3 The Murtala Mohammed Airport Terminal 2 Concession 
 
This project was Nigeria’s first PPP in the aviation sector. The federal government of Nigeria 
through its agency the Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria (FAAN) entered into three 
different agreements with Bi-Courtney Aviation Services Limited (BCASL) within a time 
frame of four years. The first BOT agreement was signed in April 2003 for a period of 12 years. 
A second agreement was signed in June 2004 to allow for an increase in the construction period 
from 18 to 33 months because of the slow pace of work being carried out by BCASL.544 A 
third agreement extended the concession period from 12 to 36 years and was signed in February 
2007.545 
 Funding for the project was sourced from a consortium of six local banks – Zenith Bank 
International Plc, Oceanic International Bank Plc,546 Guaranty Trust Bank Plc, First City 
Monument Bank Plc, Access Bank Plc and First Bank Nigeria.547 The construction work for 
the terminal was completed on 7 April 2007 and flight operations commenced a month later.548 
Although the project was successfully completed, it was not without challenges. First, securing 
long-term finance in the absence of a framework or a model for long-term finance in the 
country was a herculean task for the concessionaire. Secondly, the unwillingness of the FAAN 
to compel airlines to use the terminal in line with the PPP agreement meant that the 
concessionaire would receive less revenue than what was projected.549 A third obstacle was the 
absence of a dispute resolution mechanism other than litigation, compounded by FAAN’s 
several refusals to obey court orders, and a fourth, the weakness on the part of the ICRC to 
defend PPP projects and protect private investors.550 
 The court cases so far affecting the MMA2 terminal concession ‘either directly question 
the legality of the concession, the duration of the concession or [concern an alleged] breach of 
the concession contract.’551 Suits have been filed by the FAAN and the BCASL against each 
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other as well as by airport users and the workers’ union, the latter two groups bringing action 
against BCASL.552 The public sector claimed that BCASL had not paid ground rent for the use 
of MMA 2553 and that the concession was for 12 years and not 36 years, as claimed by the 
concessionaire.554 On the other hand, the concessionaire claimed that the concession bars the 
FAAN from renovating or operating any other terminal within Lagos State and that this 
includes the General Aviation Terminal (GAT),555 which is the second terminal located a few 
metres from the MMA2 terminal under concession.556 On account of this, the concessionaire 
contends that the government owes it proceeds from the operation of the GAT.557 Court 
judgements confirming the owner of GAT as Bi-Courtney include the 2009 ruling made by 
Justice J. Chikere of the Abuja Federal High Court in the case of Federal Airports Authority of 
Nigeria v Bi-Courtney Aviation Services Limited.558 The same judgment was affirmed in a 
ruling on February 13, 2013 by Justice A R Mohammed of the same court, in a suit filed by 
FAAN and the Ministry of Aviation asking the court to declare that they were not bound by 
the ruling of Justice Chikere. Justice Mohammed in his ruling stated categorically that because 
it was aimed at the Attorney-General of the Federation, Bi-Courtney’s suit was binding on all 
                                                      
552 Ibid. 
553 The ground rent is set at 5% of the concessionaire’s turnover, as stipulated in the concession agreement. 
554 The government’s case is that the Addendum Agreement between FAAN and BCASL, which increased the 
duration of the concession from 12 to 36 years, was not approved by the Federal Executive Council (FEC) in line 
with the mandatory provisions of the Infrastructure Concession and Regulatory Commission  (Establishment Etc) 
Act 2005. 
555 FAAN awarded the construction of GAT to rival MMA2 and contravened parts of the BASL/FAAN 
Agreement, especially the monopoly clause. See Wole Oyebade, ‘How not to privatise Nigerian airports, by 
stakeholders,’ Daily Nigerian News 29 July 2016, available at 
http://www.dailynigerianews.com/2016/07/29/how-not-to-privatise-nigerian-airports-by-stakeholders/ accessed 
25 August 2016. 
556 Under Article 2.2 of the Concession Agreement, the Grantor guarantees and assures that it will not build any 
new domestic terminal in Lagos State and that no existing domestic terminal will be materially improved 
throughout the Concession period that would compete with the concessionaire for the same passenger tariff. 
Provided that the concessionaire shall have the right of first refusal if the passenger traffic during the concession 
period necessitates an expansion of the terminal and the first consideration if the Grantor elects to build a new 
domestic terminal in Lagos State. The grantor further guarantees and assures that all scheduled flights in and out 
of FAAN’s Airport in Lagos State shall during the concession period operate from the terminal. FAAN further 
assures and guarantees that it shall not during the concession period cause or authorise the erection or development 
of a shopping mall or any facility/ies within 200 metres from the perimeter of the site capable of impeding and or 
threatening the concessionaire’s revenue generation. 
557 Arik Air, one of the country’s leading airlines, currently operates from the old domestic local airport also 
referred to as the GAT. 
558 Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CJ/50/2009 (unreported). 
 119 
agencies of the federal government.559 It is noteworthy that FAAN’s appeals against court 
rulings against it have all been dismissed, yet FAAN maintains an ‘above-the-law’ posture.560 
 The reasons for the failure of the Murtala Mohammed Airport Terminal 2 Concession 
include the absence of a clear-cut arbitration route to follow in the resolution of conflicts, a 
weak regulatory body (the ICRC does not seem to have the requisite powers to intervene and 
enforce decisions), the flagrant violation of the terms of the concession by FAAN, a 
government agency, and the refusal of FAAN to obey court rulings. It remains worth noting, 
however, that although marred by controversies the project was successfully completed in 
terms of construction and being ready for operations. 
In the first place, a situation in which an agency of the government that is party to a 
concession violates the agreement and at the same time refuses to obey court rulings is inimical 
to the essence of PPP. Furthermore, considering that PPP is a new phenomenon in Nigeria, it 
is a given that both local and foreign investors will watch the performance of existing 
concessions before taking any decision on a future concession. Bearing in mind that PPPs are 
often long-term investments, a violation of the terms of such a contract after just a few years 
does not augur well for the government and ultimately for the citizens and end-users of the 
PPP. 
 
4.7.4 Tinapa Concession Project 
 
This project is a business and leisure resort located in Calabar, Cross Rivers State. It was 
conceived during the administration of Mr Donald Duke, who served as governor of the state 
between 1999 and 2007.561 The agreement for the project between the Government of Cross 
River State (Grantor) and Tinapa Business Resort Limited (Concessionaire) has been regarded 
as successful in terms of the arrangement and construction of the project.562 The first phase of 
the project gulped $350 million.563 
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The leisure resort was opened for business on April 2, 2007, barely a month before the 
expiration of the tenure of Mr Donald Duke. It is in Adiabo, by the River Calabar on the 
outskirts of the city of Calabar. The plan initially was to have four phases of development for 
the resort within the Calabar Free Trade Zone (FTZ). The resort occupies 80,000 square 
metres.564 However, since the commission of the resort by the then President Olusegun 
Obasanjo in 2007, business activities have remained extremely low.565 Nonetheless, the 
project’s financial viability is driven by expectations of import, export and trading activities, 
as well as services to be offered by the leisure and tourism components of the resort.566 
 Funding for the project is sourced from the Cross River State Government (CRSG), a 
consortium of local banks and the Federal Government of Nigeria (through the provision of 
permits and guarantees for the financing of the project). The Standard Trust Bank (now UBA 
Plc) provided N5 billion as a bridging financial facility to ensure the steady progress of 
construction work at the site.567 
Tinapa – which is modelled after similar resorts in Hong Kong, Singapore, Dubai and 
Bombay – has been granted FTZ status.568 Unfortunately, however, under its initial 
management the project turned out to be unprofitable. This led to the CRSG reaching an 
understanding with the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) for the takeover 
of management of the resort. The memorandum of understanding (MoU) stipulates that 
‘AMCON is to buy back Tinapa’s debts totalling N18, 509,744.797.05 and provide the sum of 
N26 billion for the revitalisation and resuscitation of the resort to reposition it as a private 
sector driven enterprise.’569 
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It is important to note that even though a project may be successful in terms of arrangement 
and construction, management of the project when it comes into the operation phase must be 
clearly thought out otherwise a project initially considered successful may also fail, raising the 
question of whether PPPs can be relied upon as an alternative to traditional procurement. 
Despite the expertise available at the conception of the Tinapa project, in the final analysis the 
choice of management for the project was wrong. The reason for this assertion is that despite 
the potential of the resort, the management did not make it profitable. There was no deliberate 
strategy, at least in the public eye, to catch the fancy of holiday-makers and tourists to consider 
Tinapa as an attraction. One cannot say that it is the absence of a market that has affected the 
project. The successful execution of a project is therefore not the only criterion to determine 
whether a PPP project is a success in its entirety. In this regard, this researcher does not consider 
the Tinapa project a success as the element of ‘good management,’ supposedly one of the 
advantages of PPP, has so far been lacking.570 However, it is worth noting that in this case there 
was commitment on the part of the government, an encouraging financial arrangement, 
provision of a financial guarantee by the federal government of Nigeria, the presence of a 
highly experienced team of professionals, and an assurance that the project would outlive the 
administration that initiated it.571 
 
4.7.5 Case Study 5: Nigeria Air Project 
 
In fulfilment of its 2015 campaign promise, the President Muhammadu Buhari-led Federal 
Government of Nigeria (FGN) proposed a new airline to serve as the national carrier, to be 
structured as a PPP, and which was expected to commence operations in December 2018.572 
Before the current experiment, the FGN transited from one form of national carrier to the other 
without recording success and hence their liquidation.573 The main reason for the project is to 
check the capital flight that the Nigerian economy has been grappling with because of the 
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absence of a national carrier, estimated  to be around $2 billion as at January 2018.574 The loss 
is occasioned by the dominance of foreign airlines and the fact that income generated by these 
airlines are repatriated to their countries of origin.  Thus, a national carrier for Nigeria is 
desirable because it can serve as a catalyst for the growth of other sectors of the nation’s 
economy.575 Furthermore, the creation of the Nigeria Air Project will encourage the 
establishment of maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) facilities in the country which will 
in turn re-create jobs which were lost when MRO facilities disappeared with the country’s 
erstwhile national carrier.576 A national carrier for Nigeria can potentially enhance the tourism 
industry in the country as air access is a vital component for success in that sector.577 
 Consequent upon the foregoing, the FGN envisions that it can revitalise the aviation 
sector by having a new national carrier that would be financed, owned  and managed by private 
partners.578 The government considers this important given that Nigeria has the largest market 
in Africa and the fact that the country has signed bilateral air service agreements with over 70 
countries but is disadvantaged because it cannot compete in the absence of a national carrier.579 
On 6 July 2018, the ICRC issued the Federal Ministry of Transportation (Aviation) (FMT) an 
Outline Business Case (OBC)580 compliance certificate to confirm that the project conforms 
with the ICRC Act 2005 and the National Policy on Public Private Partnership. The conditions 
laid out in the OBC are that, first, the FGN demonstrate ‘commitment to leverage private sector 
capital and expertise towards the establishment of the National Carrier through the provision 
of an upfront grant/Viability Gap Funding (VGF) to fund aircraft acquisition/start-up capital. 
The FGN also agrees to zero contribution to airline management decisions and zero 
management control by the government. Any attempt to impose government control over the 
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management of the Airline invalidates this certificate and the entire process.’581 The OBC 
certificate issued by the ICRC to the FMT is valid for 12 months from the date of issue582 ‘to 
enable the ministry to commence international open competitive bidding process to procure a 
world-class strategic investor to manage, operate, maintain and invest in the National 
Carrier.’583 
 In furtherance of the FGN’s objective to ensure that Nigeria’s third attempt to have a 
national carrier becomes a success, the country participated at the Farnborough Air Show in 
London on 18 July 2018.584 In the presentation delivered by the Minister for State for Aviation 
(FMT), the government estimates that the ‘initial capital for the airline will range between $150 
million and $300 million in the first few years of operation though the private sector partner 
has not been identified yet.’585 The plan shows that the new carrier, Nigeria Air is to be financed 
through a combination of government budgetary provision, private debt arrangement and 
finance syndication from a consortium of banks.586 Out of the estimated $300 million funding 
required for the airline start-up, the FGN is to contribute $55 million in form of a grant/viability 
gap funding (VGF).587 The sum of $8 million is to be spent for the acquisition of offices, take-
off operations, cash flow requirements, payment of commitment fees for aircraft to be leased 
for initial operations and deposit for new aircraft.588 The financial model shows that the sum 
of $100 million would be required for 2019 operations and a further $145 million for 2020, 
with the remaining finance contribution coming from strategic equity partners.589 After one 
year of operations, the government would be expected to divest its equity investment by issuing 
an initial public offer (IPO) for Nigerians to acquire shares in the airline with government only 
retaining 5 per cent equity.590 The African Export-Import Bank, the African Development Bank 
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(AfDB) and the Islamic Development Bank (ISDB) have shown interest in funding the 
initiative.591 
 Even though a PPP offers the opportunity for discerning private and institutional 
investors to fund projects and enjoy the reward of their investment in the form of return on 
investment, the arrangement for the Nigeria Air Project raises pertinent questions. One may 
ask, is the government thinking of a PPP or a privatisation? If indeed the arrangement is a PPP, 
the government appears to have gone a step too far by determining all the outcomes without 
any input from the would-be investors. Usually, in a PPP, the government spells out the need, 
undertakes the bidding process, select a preferred bidder who is then responsible for the design, 
financing, management and operations of the project. However, in the case of Nigeria Air, 
everything appears to have been laid out suggesting that all what is required from the private 
sector is finance and the running of the airline. Divesting of government shares from an 
enterprise is what privatisation is all about. In the case of Nigeria Air, it seems government is 
thinking of privatising a government enterprise that has not come into being in the first place. 
Furthermore, if the proposed project is a PPP, what sort of PPP is it? Will it be owned by a 
private company and later transferred to the public authority at the end of the concession? Or 
will it be perpetually private sector owned? It seems convenient to call the arrangement a PPP 
when in fact it has the colouration of a public enterprise with a plan to be privatised. The 
arrangement for Nigeria Air represents a case where the mere participation of the private sector 
in the running of a public infrastructure or service is termed a PPP.  
 Apart from the roadshow in London, there has not been, or any indication of a potential 
open competitive bidding for the project.592 Furthermore, will prospective investors consider 
investing in Nigeria Air a good investment opportunity? A good place to begin with is to find 
out why previous attempts at having a national carrier resulted in failures. For example, Nigeria 
attempted to re-establish a national carrier by partnering with Sir Richard Branson’s Virgin 
Atlantic that resulted in the creation of Virgin Nigeria.593 The airline shut down in September 
2012 after a struggle with institutionalised corruption. In the words of Sir Branson, ‘We fought 
                                                      
591 Ibid. 
592 Reuben Abati op cit note 591. 
593 Simon Calder ‘Nigeria Air: will Investors Get a Level Playing Field’ Independent 28 July 2018 available at 
www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-and-advice/nigeria-air-investors-airline-failure-africa-richard-branson-
virgin-a8467116.html accessed 13 August 2018. 
 125 
daily battles against government agents who wanted to make a fortune from us.’594 These 




This chapter has examined the legal, policy, regulatory and administrative framework for PPP 
in Nigeria, describing the practice of PPP under the current regime as well as some selected 
case studies. The discussion highlights the body of laws regulating the practice of PPP. Apart 
from the ICRC Act 2005 which is the primary PPP law for the country at the national level, a 
complex web of other laws exists, causing overlaps. Obvious gaps in the ICRC Act 2005 can 
be held accountable for the flaws that have cropped up in PPP practice so far. Obvious 
drawbacks include the failure to include provisions for the funding process for projects, or to 
empower the Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission to act with binding powers on 
parties to PPP projects rather than merely supervising the initiation of projects and taking 
contracts into their custody. The attempt to use the National Policy on Public Private 
Partnerships to fill gaps in the ICRC Act 2005 is less than desirable, as the National Policy 
does not carry the force of law. 
 It behoves prospective investors to be diligent enough to know what tier of Government 
is being dealt with in order not to enter into an agreement that is void ab initio. For example, 
aviation is an item under the Exclusive Legislative List in the Second Schedule to the 1999 
Constitution. As such, state governments lack the power to negotiate PPP contracts dealing 
with airports. Another sector where states do not have authority to engage in a PPP is inland 
waterways. It has been pointed out that the current position of the law is counter-productive as 
it prevents states with the capacity to do so from addressing the huge infrastructure deficits in 
their communities, which are more easily identifiable by state governments than by the federal 
government. 
 From the analysis of selected PPP projects, it can be seen that reasons for the failure of 
projects so far stem from a lack of experience on the part of the public authority and other 
players, a lack of political commitment on the part of government, and the refusal of 
government agencies to obey court orders. On the other hand, successful cases are attributable 
to commitment on the part of government, adequate funding arrangements, assurance that the 
project will outlive the administration that instituted it, and the availability of a dispute 
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resolution mechanism that is not costly to any of the parties. As Idornigie notes, the adoption 
of appropriate mechanisms can promote private investment in infrastructure.595 
 If government must transform to governance to meet with the aspirations of the people, 
it is imperative that the institutions of state, which are creations of the law, are not only efficient 
but also have regard for the law and for due process. The next chapter in this study examines 
the legal, policy, administrative, institutional and regulatory framework for PPP practice in 
South Africa.  
 
  
                                                      




PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP PRACTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA: LEGAL, 
POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
 
“This is what PPPs are about. The public gets better, more cost-effective services; the 
private sector gets new business opportunities. Both are in the interest of the nation.” 




The Republic of  South Africa operates a hybrid legal system.596  The legal system in the 
country  is a mix of a number of distinct legal traditions that  include a civil law system inherited 
from the Dutch, the English Common Law and African Customary Law.597 As a general rule 
however, South Africa follows the principles of the English Common Law in both criminal 
and civil procedure, company law, constitutional law as well as the law of evidence; while 
Roman-Dutch common law applies in the South African law of contract, tort and private law.598 
The sources of South African law include statutory law made by parliament,  the common law 
(this includes the Roman-Dutch old authorities and judicial precedents derived from case law, 
African Customary Law and international law.599 The  Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa is the supreme law of the Republic; any law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid.600 
South Africa is the only African member of the Group of Twenty (G20) countries.601 It is 
ranked fifth overall in the Mo Ibrahim Index 2014.602 This index measures the quality of 
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governance in African countries. Of note, Mauritius, Botswana, Cape Verde and Seychelles 
occupy the first four places out of 52, compared to Nigeria’s 37th position.603 The Republic of 
South Africa604 is believed to have the most comprehensive experience of public-private 
partnerships (PPP) in the whole of Africa.605 The country has developed a unique PPP 
programme that showcases how developing countries that have an enhanced investment and 
financial sector can achieve milestones with a PPP programme.606 PPPs started in the country 
around the mid-1990s on an ad hoc basis. The National Roads Agency, which had already 
tolled parts of the major national roads, developed a framework for concessions to cope with 
budgetary constraints on the rehabilitation of parts of the network.607 Due to its well-developed 
financial market, South Africa is well ahead of its benchmark peers because of the relative ease 
of access to private capital.608 
 The government of South Africa demonstrated its commitment to a PPP policy thrust 
in the delivery of quality infrastructure when the Cabinet commissioned the Minister of 
Finance to take steps to develop a comprehensive PPP framework for the country.609 In April 
1997, a team was set up to put together a legislative and institutional framework for PPP.610 
Several projects have since been completed, some of which will be reviewed later in this 
chapter.  
 South Africa’s first PPP project was organised in 1996. It was the R2.6 billion N4 toll 
road that connects South Africa and the Port of Maputo in Mozambique. The debt on the 
transaction was guaranteed by the governments of South Africa and Mozambique.611 This was 
followed by the rehabilitation and tolling of the N3 between Pretoria and Durban, for which 
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continent. It has a population of approximately 54 million people. It is considered a young and stable democracy. 
605 Peter Farlam Working Together: Assessing Public-Private Partnerships in Africa (2005) 1. 
606 E R Yescombe op cit note 44 at 47. 
607 Ibid at 63. 
608 Estian Calitz & Johan Fourie ‘Infrastructure in South Africa: Who is to finance and who is to pay?’ (2010) 
27.2 Development Southern Africa at 186. 
609 National Treasury PPP Unit Introducing Public Private Partnerships in South Africa (2007) at 7. 
610 Ibid at 7. 
611 E R Yescombe op cit note 44 at 47. 
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the private-sector investors and lenders bore the full traffic risk.612 Several other PPP projects 
have since followed, with many lessons learnt. 
 In this chapter the practice of PPP in South Africa is examined. The discussion focuses 
on the applicable legal framework, policy and institutional framework.  Given that the country 
has a better record of managing PPPs than anywhere else in Africa, lessons learned from the 
management of PPP projects in South Africa will be highlighted with a view to developing 
better PPP practice in other African countries, especially Nigeria.  It is pertinent to point out 
that, as was the case with the previous chapter on Nigeria, this chapter is descriptive and offers 
insight into the practice of PPP in South Africa. A critical analysis of the PPP framework, 
comparing it with the framework in Nigeria, is undertaken in Chapter Six of the study. 
 
5.2 Legislative Framework for Public-Private Partnerships in South Africa 
 
Following the mandate given to the Minister of Finance (noted in section 5.1, above), a holistic 
legislative and regulatory framework for PPP was put in place in the country at the national 
level. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa also contains some important 
provisions with respect to the management and regulation of public contracts. These provisions 
have implications for PPP management as well.  
 The body of laws regulating PPP in South Africa include the Constitution, the Public 
Finance Management Act 1999, Treasury Regulation 16, the Municipal Finance Management 
Act 2003 and the Municipal Systems Act 2003.613  These laws are examined in the sections 
that follow.  
 
5.2.1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
 
Although the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa does not specifically mention the 
term ‘public-private partnership,’ Section 217(1) of the Constitution stipulates that contracts 
involving the state of South Africa must be transparent. It provides as follows: 
 
When an organ of state contracts for goods or services, it must do so in 
accordance with a system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and 
cost-effective. 
 
                                                      
612 Ibid at 47. 
613 National Treasury PPP Unit op cit note 621 at 8. 
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Since PPPs are a form of procurement contract involving the state, it follows that the provision 
of Section 217(1) will apply in all such arrangements in the country.  
 Given South Africa’s long history of inequality, entrenched during the apartheid era,614 
the post-1994 government of South Africa sought to provide common ground for all and 
promote equality. This provision of the constitution represents one of the deliberate attempts 
to use the law to promote equality in the country. 
 The South African Constitution gives power to the South African Parliament to make 
laws on matters listed in Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution.615 The items listed include 
airports, housing, public transport and public works. Similarly, the Constitution grants powers 
to provinces with respect to certain matters upon which they can legislate. These matters 
include, among others, provincial roads, provincial parks, and facilities for accommodation and 
public transportation.616 It follows that there are limits on their powers to arrange PPPs, but 
where there are concurrent powers to legislate, both the national and provincial authorities may 
make PPP arrangements touching any item on the list. 
 It should be noted that the preamble to the South African Constitution emphasises that 
it is the responsibility of the state to improve the quality of life of all its citizens. The public 
authority is therefore mandated to seek avenues to provide access to amenities such as potable 
water, power, roads, ports and hospitals, to ensure the economic and social development of the 
people of South Africa. 
 
5.2.2 The Public Finance Management Act 1999 
 
The Public Finance Management Act 1999617 is one of South Africa’s main pieces of 
legislation governing PPP, the other being the Treasury Regulation 16. The Act was assented 
to on 2 March 1999 and came into operation on 1 April 2000.618 It established the National 
Treasury, consisting of the Minister, as head of the Treasury, and the national department or 
                                                      
614 During that period, it was not uncommon to see public procurement done in a manner that favoured the white 
minority to the detriment of others. There was discrimination against small and emerging firms. More details on 
this are provided in the section on South Africa’s PPP policy. 
615 Section 44 Constitution of South Africa. 
616 Section 104 Constitution of South Africa. 
617 Act No. 1 of 1999. 
618 See Government Gazette 33059 of 1 April 2010. 
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departments responsible for financial and fiscal matters.619 The focus of this piece of legislation 
is the improvement of financial management in the public sector.620 The Act makes the heads 
of departments (the accounting officers) of national and provincial departments, and the Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs) or boards of schedule 3 public entities (the accounting authorities), 
responsible for its implementation. These accounting officers or authorities are directly 
responsible to Parliament or the provincial legislature for the effective management of their 
budgets to achieve public mandates. 
 The National Treasury in South Africa may issue instructions to institutions to which 
the Public Finance Management Act applies to facilitate the application of the Act and the 
regulations made under it.621 It is on this basis that the National Treasury under the powers 
derived from the Act promulgated Treasury Regulation 16 on Public-Private Partnerships in 
2004.622 The Public Finance Management Act is not in itself a PPP law, and while it provides 
for financial accountability in government spending that includes PPP transactions, it largely 
delegates the power to regulate and administer PPPs to the National Treasury. The key 
legislation that sets out the procedure for the approval and management of PPPs is therefore 
Treasury Regulation 16. In addition to this, the National Treasury has issued PPP Practice 
Notes relying on powers derived from the Act.623 These and other PPP regulations are 
examined in the sections below. 
 
5.2.3 Treasury Regulation 16 (2004) to the Public Finance Management Act (Act 1 of 
1999) 
 
Treasury Regulation 16 is the central legislation governing PPPs for national and provincial 
government.624 It defines PPP and sets out the standards to be met for a project to be so 
described. Under the Regulation, a ‘public-private partnership means a commercial transaction 
between an institution and a private party in terms of which a private party – (a) performs an 
                                                      
619 Section 5(1) of the Public Finance Management Act 1999. 
620 National Treasury Public Private Partnership Module 1, 2. 
621 Section 76(4) (g) of the Public Finance Management Act 1999. 
622 H K Yong (ed.) Public-Private Partnerships Policy and Practice: A Reference Guide (2010) at 100. 
623 Ibid. 
624 PPPs for municipal government are governed by the Municipal Systems Act 2000, and the Municipal Finance 
Management Act, 2003. Municipalities are therefore not subject to the Public Finance Management Act or to 
Treasury Regulation 16. 
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institutional function on behalf of the institution; and/or (b) acquires the use of state property 
for its own commercial purposes; and (c) assumes substantial financial, technical and 
operational risks in connection with the performance of the institutional function and/or use of 
state property; and (d) receives a benefit for performing the institutional function or from 
utilising the state property.’625 For the sake of clarity, the Regulation defines an institution as 
‘a department, constitutional institution, a public entity listed, or acquired to be listed in 
schedules 3A, 3B, 3C and 3D to the Act, or any subsidiary of any such public entity.’626 Under 
the Regulation, a ‘private party’ in relation to a PPP agreement means ‘a party to a PPP 
agreement other than (a) an institution to which the Act applies; (b) a municipality or an 
enterprise or other entity controlled by one or more municipalities; or (c) the accounting officer, 
accounting authority or other person or body acting on behalf of an institution, municipality, 
enterprise or entity referred to in paragraph (a) or (b).’ It is submitted that this is a rather vague 
way to define a party to a PPP transaction.  
 The Treasury Regulation 16 provides precise and detailed instructions for PPPs and has 
been amended since it was first issued in May 2000.627 The Regulation envisages two types of 
PPPs, namely where the private party performs an institutional function and where the private 
party acquires the use of state property for its own commercial purposes. There is also the 
possibility of a hybrid of these types.628 By allowing for payments to involve a situation where 
the institution pays for the use of the facility or the private party collects tolls or fees from end-
users for the use of the facility or a combination of these,629 it can be inferred that both 
concessions and private finance initiative (PFI) PPP types can be contracted in South Africa, 
depending on the nature of the need for the project. 
 Under the Regulation, only an accounting officer or an accounting authority may enter 
into a PPP agreement on behalf of the institution.630 Furthermore, the accounting officer may 
not proceed with the procurement of a PPP agreement without the prior written approval of 
either the National Treasury or – if it is a provincial institution and the National Treasury has, 
in terms of section 10(1) (b) of the Act, delegated the appropriate powers to the provincial 
                                                      
625 National Treasury, Public Private Partnership Manual (2001). 
626 Ibid. 
627 Ibid. 
628 National Treasury Introducing Public Private Partnerships in South Africa (2007) at 8. 
629 Ibid. 
630 Treasury Regulation 16.2.1. 
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treasury631 – the relevant provincial treasury. These provisions stress the value placed on 
financial prudence and accountability in PPP transactions in South Africa. Thus, the relevant 
treasury may only give such approval if satisfied that the proposed PPP will provide value for 
money, is affordable for the institution and will offer appropriate technical, operational and 
financial risk to the private party.632 The above is considered the tripartite test for PPP in South 
Africa.633 
 Under the Regulations in South Africa, a PPP does not involve the outsourcing of 
functions where substantial financial, technical and operational risk is retained by the 
institution; it is not a donation by a private party for a public good; it is not the privatisation of 
state assets, and it does not constitute a borrowing by the state.634 
 
5.2.4 The Municipal Finance Management Act (Act No. 56 of 2003) 
 
This Act635 was enacted to ensure financial accountability and elimination of waste at the 
municipal level. The Act seeks to secure sound and sustainable management of the financial 
affairs of municipalities and other institutions in the local sphere of government, by 
establishing treasury norms and standards for the local sphere of government.636 Like the Public 
Finance Management Act, this Act lays down a tripartite test for PPP comprising affordability, 
value for money and risk transfer. The Act provides that a municipal authority can enter into a 
PPP agreement if these requirements are met.637 
 It is worth noting that like the Public Finance Management Act, the Municipal Finance 
Act is not an Act dedicated to PPP but one which provides general regulations on government 
spending that constitute a core element in PPP arrangements. 
 
 
                                                      
631 Treasury Regulation 16.3.1. 
632 Treasury Regulation 16.3.2. 
633 National Treasury op cit note 613 at 5. 
634 Ibid. 
635 Act No. 176 of 13 February 2004. 
636 See the Long Title to the Act. 
637 Section 120 Municipality Financial Management Act 2003. 
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5.2.5 Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2003) 
 
This Act applies when a municipality reviews the options and decides on an appropriate 
mechanism to provide a municipal service. The Act lists the criteria and procedure for deciding 
on municipal service provision, including cost-benefit analysis, a full assessment of the private 
party and the likely impact on municipal employment patterns.638 The Act establishes clear 
guidelines on the involvement of the community in the procurement process.639 
 
5.2.6 The Public-Private Partnership Manual and the Standardised Public-Private 
Partnership Provisions 
 
Pursuant to powers derived from the Public Finance Management Act, the National Treasury 
has issued nine different modules which make up the country’s PPP Manual.640 These modules 
are regarded as practice notes and apply to departments, constitutional institutions and public 
entities as well as their subsidiaries.641 The first module comprises the regulations for South 
African PPPs, the second module is the Code for Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) in 
PPPs, the third provides for PPP inception, the fourth highlights PPP feasibility study, the fifth 
discusses PPP procurement, the sixth is on managing PPP agreements, the seventh on auditing 
PPPs, the eighth regulates the accounting treatment of PPPs, while the ninth module is an 
introduction to project finance. 
 This Manual and the Standardised PPP Provisions developed after years of PPP practice 
in the country provide a standard structure for PPP in the country. Read together, the documents 
define a mechanism for the funding process for PPP transactions in the country.642 Specifically, 
the Standardised PPP Provisions describe key issues that are likely to arise in PPP projects as 
regulated by the provisions of Treasury Regulation 16, and how these key issues must be dealt 
                                                      
638 Dominic Mitchell & Fakisandla Consulting Capacity Development for Partnerships in South Africa: 
Increasing Service Delivery through Partnerships between Private and Public Sector (2007) at 12. 
639 Ibid. 
640 Section 76(4) (g) of the Public Finance Management Act 1999. 
641 National Treasury PPP Manual Module 1: South African Regulations for PPP Number 2 of 2004. 
642 National Treasury Introducing Public Private Partnerships in South Africa (2007) at 9. 
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with in a PPP agreement so as to meet the requirements of ‘substantial risk transfer,’ ‘value for 
money,’ and ‘affordability.’643 
 
5.3 South Africa’s Public-Private Partnership Policy 
 
Generally, PPP policies serve to define PPPs as distinct from other forms of procurement. The 
policies describe the reasons and/or goals for choosing PPP schemes, while also providing 
general guidance for the implementation of PPP in any given jurisdiction. These policies may 
not carry the force of law but they clearly indicate the intentions of the government.644 The 
South African government’s strategy in respect of PPP is thus laid out in various documents.645 
 The adoption of PPP by the Government of South Africa is based on the cardinal 
premise that it can deliver better value for money than traditional procurement.646 Other key 
factors include ensuring that project planning takes place within an enabling environment 
which includes political support and buy-in from key stakeholders. In South Africa, all PPPs 
governed under Treasury Regulation 16 are subjected to this strict three-point test:647 
i. Is substantial technical, operational and financial risk transferred to the private party? 
ii. Can the institution afford the envisaged fee? 
iii. Is it a value-for-money solution? 
Based on the foregoing, a private consortium bidding for a PPP project in the country must 
clearly demonstrate that it possesses the capacity, skills and capability to deliver the project, 
and to do so more efficiently than other parties. This is necessary to ensure that a project is not 
abandoned because a private sector consortium lacks the ability to continue with it. Secondly, 
the public entity sponsoring the project must have the budget required for that entity to fulfil 
its requirements under the agreement; and thirdly, it would not make any sense to adopt a PPP 
for a project if it would be cheaper to go the route of traditional procurement. 
                                                      
643 National Treasury Standardised PPP Provisions First Issue, 11 March 2004 at 1. 
644 European Investment Bank, Study on PPP Legal and Financial Frameworks in the Mediterranean Partner 
Countries: Volume 1- A Regional Approach (2002) 61 available at http://www.eib.org/attachments/med/ppp-
study-volume-1.pdf accessed 1 May 2017. 
645 Axis Consulting, PPP Country Paper: South Africa (2013) 11 available at http://www.sadcpppnetwork.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/south_africa_27012014.pdf  accessed 2 May 2017. 
646 National Treasury op cit note 655 at 10. 
647 Ibid at 13. 
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In South Africa, black economic empowerment (BEE) is a national policy objective and PPPs 
are regarded as a means of promoting it. This policy has been formalised in the Code of Good 
Practice for Black Economic Empowerment in Public-Private Partnerships, which was issued 
pursuant to the Public Finance Management Act.648 The guiding purpose of the Code as stated 
in the Preamble is ‘to redress the stifling economic effects of apartheid.’649  
 BEE is a key constituent of South African PPP projects, each of which is structured on 
a careful combination of financial, technical and BEE components to achieve value-for-money 
in the state’s delivery of infrastructure.650 Based on the Code, in the entire PPP process from 
the appointment of the transaction advisor to the final procurement of the private party, certain 
BEE targets must be met. A scorecard for BEE has been formulated with targets that a private 
sector consortium must meet for any PPP transaction.651 These four targets are, first, that 
substantial direct ownership must be held by black people, black women and black enterprises. 
Secondly, black people must be involved in the management and employment of the private 
partner and its subcontractors. Thirdly, a significant proportion of the subcontracting to be done 
by the private party must involve black people, black women and black enterprises; and 
fourthly, the project must benefit the lives of the people within the area where the project is 
located, including small and medium enterprises, the disabled, the youth, and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) within the target area.652 
 It is worthy of note that because of the commitment to BEE in PPP procurement, the 
National Treasury of South Africa has worked with the Development Bank of Southern Africa 
(DBSA) to create a PPP BEE equity facility to fund BEE equity in PPP transactions.653 
 Furthermore, South Africa has taken a bold initiative to curb corrupt practices in PPP 
procurement by the adoption of a Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy, launched to fight 
bribery, embezzlement, fraud, extortion, the abuse of power, conflict of interest, insider 
trading, favouritism and nepotism in the public service. This culminated in the passing of the 
                                                      
648 Ibid at 15. 
649 See Preamble to the Code of Good Practice for Black Economic Empowerment in Public Private Partnerships 
issued in 2004 by the National Treasury. 
650 See Part 1: Policy on BEEE in PPPs of the Code of Good Practice for BEE. 
651 National Treasury op cit note 655 at 15. 
652 Ibid. 
653 Ibid at 17. 
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Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 2004.654 The Act provides, among other things, for the 
establishment of a register of persons and companies convicted for corruption, thereby 
preventing them from taking part in public sector procurement. It follows therefore that any 
person or entity whose name is included in the registered list of corrupt persons is disqualified 
from engaging in any PPP activity. 
 
5.4 Institutional Framework for Public-Private Partnership in South Africa 
 
South Africa’s institutional framework for PPP is made up of the agencies of the government 
that are tasked with the responsibility of monitoring and regulating the award of PPP projects 
in the country.655 It is significant that there are only a few such institutions in the country, 
which means that a prospective PPP investor in South Africa is assured of having a minimum 
of bureaucracy to deal with. The institutions that regulate PPP in the country are discussed 
below. 
 
5.4.1 The National Treasury’s Public-Private Partnership Unit (PPP Unit) 
 
Generally speaking, a PPP unit is responsible for policy-making, project identification, 
programme planning and general guidance, serving as a central repository of knowledge in any 
given jurisdiction. Based on these fundamentals, the National Treasury’s PPP Unit was set up 
in the mid-2000s with technical assistance funding from USAID, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), GmbH (GTZ) and the Department for International 
Development (DFID),656 and was initially made up of five professional staff drawn from both 
public and private sectors.657 It is the lead government agency for PPPs in South Africa. The 
main functions of the Unit are to ensure affordability, value-for-money and sufficient risk 
                                                      
654 Act No. 12 of 2004, vide the Government Gazette 26311, 28 April 2004. 
655 The Institute for Public-Private Partnerships Development of Policy, Legal, and Institutional Framework for 
the Public-Private Partnership Programme in Malawi: Final Report (2007) 38.  
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Kingdom (DFID). See Ryo Sasaki ‘An in-depth international comparison of major donor agencies: How do they 
systematically conduct country program evaluation?’ (2011) 8.18 Journal of MultiDisciplinary Evaluation 29–
45. 
657 National Treasury, ‘Public Private Partnership’ available at http://www.ppp.gov.za/Pages/About.aspx accessed 
30 April 2017. 
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transfer in line with international best practice.658 In doing so, the PPP Unit is assumes 
responsibility for two broad tasks: providing technical assistance to government, departments, 
provinces and municipalities, and providing treasury approvals during the pre-contract 
phases.659  
 The National Treasury is required by law to ensure accountability, transparency and 
sound financial control in the management of public finances in the country.660 The National 
Treasury is also mandated to make regulations for issues pertaining to the effective 
management and efficient use of public finance. It is pursuant to this that the National Treasury 
issued Treasury Regulation 16.661  
 In fulfilling its mandate through its PPP Unit, the National Treasury develops, 
formulates and promotes the country’s PPP policy; develops systems and documentation to 
formalise and standardise the PPP process in the country; provides direct technical assistance 
to national and provincial departments and municipalities, in preparing and procuring value-
for-money PPPs; provides quarterly PPP training for both public and private sectors; produces 
and distributes the PPP Quarterly and is the PPP knowledge management centre for the 
country; is in touch with  international PPP bodies; ensures that international best practice for 
PPPs is followed in the South African context, and works with  provincial treasuries to oversee 
provincial PPPs.662 To promote an enabling environment for PPPs, the PPP unit seeks to 
facilitate certainty in the regulatory framework as well as driving black economic 
empowerment.663 
 The National Treasury PPP Unit supports the procurement process for PPP at the three 
Treasury Approval stages. The aims are to ensure that affordability is demonstrated, and to 
achieve financial closure.664 
 As at 30 April 2017, the National Treasury’s PPP Unit in South Africa is made up of 
seventeen professionals who are allocated projects depending on individual sector expertise 
                                                      
658 Philippe Burger ‘The Dedicated PPP Unit of the South African National Treasury’ available at 
https://www.oecd.org/mena/governance/37146964.pdf accessed 30 April 2017. 
659 Ibid. 
660 Section 215 of the South African Constitution.  
661 Section 76 of the Public Finance Management Act. 
662 National Treasury Unit op cit note 559 at 20. 
663 National Treasury ‘Public Private Partnership’ available at http://www.ppp.gov.za/Pages/About.aspx accessed 
30 April 2017. 
664 Axis Consulting op cit note 657 at 14. 
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and interest. The list of sectors665 includes health, accommodation, energy, education, water, 
budget support, transport, contract management, information and communication technology 
(ICT), project development facilities, tourism, business development, waste, and international 
relations.666 
 
5.4.2 Institutions of Government 
 
Treasury Regulation 16 defines institution as ‘a department, a constitutional institution, a 
public entity listed or required to be listed in Schedules 3A, 3B, 3C and 3D to the Act, or any 
subsidiary of any such public entity.’667 It follows that all line departments, provincial entities, 
public sector-owned bodies and other government enterprises listed in Schedules 3A, 3B, 3C 
and 3D of the Public Finance Management Act form a part of the institutional framework for 
PPP in the country, having statutory powers to engage in PPP negotiations and arrangements. 
 Apart from government institutions, there are other role players involved in PPPs in 
South Africa. They include environmental organisations, trade unions and community-based 
organisations. It is usual to consult these stakeholders to provide input at various stages in the 
PPP cycle to promote transparency and community buy-in.668 
 
5.5 Public Private Partnership Practice in South Africa 
 
The National Treasury’s PPP Unit has formulated a generic PPP project cycle for the country 
to ensure uniformity and consistency in PPP practice in South Africa.669 Thus, by issuing the 
PPP manual and standardised process for PPP, the Unit has designed a comprehensive PPP 
programme for the country. But because of the complex nature of PPPs, the Unit makes 
provision for a reasonable degree of flexibility where appropriate.670 
                                                      
665 This reflects current government priorities, which may change from time to time. However, overarching 
considerations include BEE and the essential elements of a PPP: affordability, value-for-money and transfer of 
significant financial, design, technical and operational risks to the private sector. See 
http://www.ppp.gov.za/Pages/About.aspx accessed 30 April 2017. 
666 Ibid. 
667 Act in this definition refers to the Public Finance Management Act. 
668 National Treasury op cit note 657 at 21. 
669 Ibid at 18. 
670 Ibid. 
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The National Treasury’s PPP manual methodically guides both public and private bodies 
through the various phases of the regulated PPP project cycle for national and provincial 
governments. The manual draws particularly on PPP experience in the country as well as 
international best practice to provide clarity.671 
 The initiative to identify and set up a PPP project rests with the relevant state or 
provincial institution and not with the PPP unit.672 The PPP unit recommends a project it deems 
suitable, but only the National Treasury can grant approval. The initiative for and daily 
management of the PPP project remains with the relevant institutions, government departments 
and provinces.673 The National Treasury’s PPP manual describes the project preparation phase, 
during which Treasury Approvals I, IIA, IIB and III are granted. The manual indicates which 
module is relevant for each of these stages of approval.674 Furthermore, the manual gives 
guidance on the management of PPP agreements, the audit and accounting treatment of PPPs, 
as well as project finance.675 Thus, Treasury Approval I or (TA I), marks Treasury’s approval 
of the feasibility study, preparing the way for the actual tendering/procurement process for 
private party consortia to deliver on the project. TA II A, TA II B and TA III, are the three 
further steps put in place to ensure that the project is properly designed, tendered and awarded. 
When TA III is granted by the Treasury, the project is considered ‘closed.’676 
 The PPP project cycle677 in South Africa consists of four phases: the inception phase; 
the feasibility study phase; the procurement phase; and the implementation phase.678 These 
phases are discussed in detail below. 
  
                                                      
671 National Treasury Unit, Public Private Partnership Manual available at 
https://www.gtac.gov.za/Publications/PPP%20Manual.pdf accessed 1 May 2017. 
672 Treasury Regulation 16. 
673 Philip Burger The Dedicated PPP Unit of South African National Treasury (2006) 1. 
674 Axis Consulting, ‘PPP Country Paper: South Africa’ (2013) 16 available at 
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675 Ibid at 16. 
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677 This refers to the processes, procedures, procurement methods and approvals that a PPP project must go 
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678 Treasury Regulation 16 in terms of the Public Finance Management Act 1999. 
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5.5.1 Inception Phase 
 
All PPP projects in South Africa start off with an inception phase in accordance with the 
provisions of Regulation 16.3, pursuant to the Public Finance Management Act 1999. A project 
is registered with National Treasury PPP Unit when the accounting officer of the procuring 
institution applies for its approval. The Treasury Unit will then give approval if satisfied that 
the proposed PPP arrangement will provide value for money, is affordable and transfers 
appropriate technical, operational and financial risk to the private party. If the institution lacks 
the expertise to proceed with the procurement of a PPP agreement, the accounting officer of 
the institution is required by the Regulation to inform the relevant treasury and, where 
necessary, a specialist consultant will be appointed for the purpose.  
 
5.5.2 Feasibility Studies 
 
The second phase in the PPP cycle in South Africa is the Feasibility Studies Phase. During this 
phase, the procuring institution appoints private sector advisors to conduct a feasibility study 
on the most appropriate mechanism for procuring the project.679 The purpose of the feasibility 
study is to determine whether a proposed PPP agreement is in the best interests of an 
institution.680 Thus, first, the feasibility study must be undertaken to explain the strategic and 
operational benefits of the PPP agreement in terms of the institution’s objectives and 
government policy. Secondly, the study must specify the nature of the institutional function 
concerned, the form of PPP agreement contemplated and the basis for the selection of that 
form. Thirdly, the study must show whether the agreement will provide value for money, is 
affordable for the institution and will transfer appropriate technical, operational and financial 
risk to the private party. Fourthly, the study must include any relevant information, figures and 
economic criteria used to justify the assessment. Finally, the study must explain the capacity 
of the institution to effectively enforce the agreement, including monitoring and regulating 
implementation and performance in terms of the agreement.  
  The feasibility study for a project is required to contain three parts in the 
following format:681 
                                                      
679 National Treasury, op cit note 683 at 19. 
680 Treasury Regulation 16.4. 
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a. Sector needs analysis; 
b. Affordability, risk transfer and how value for money can be realised; and 
c. Institutional arrangements for monitoring the implementation of the PPP agreement. 
 
The Report of the study is to be submitted to the Treasury for approval in line with clause 16.3 
of the Treasury Regulation. 
 
5.5.3 The Procurement Phase 
 
When a PPP option has been approved by the Treasury and a feasibility study shows that it is  
viable, the procuring institution invites the market to submit bids for the infrastructure and/or 
service provision project.682 The procurement procedure must be open, transparent and 
competitive, and allow for the evaluation of the bids to determine which represents best value 
for money. It is submitted that the Regulation ought to indicate the importance of the 
experience and competence of the private consortia bidding. This is because the party offering 
the cheapest cost of procurement may not have the requisite competence or experience.  
 During procurement, there are five stages that must be complied with: pre-qualification; 
request for proposals; best and final offer, where appropriate; negotiations and final closure. 
The process begins with the preparation of bid documents and a draft PPP agreement in 
accordance with the provisions of the Public Finance Management Act. The accounting officer 
is responsible for designing and managing the procurement process to ensure that it conforms 
with Regulation 16. 
 The aim of pre-qualification is to reduce the total number of consortia in the PPP 
procurement process, by selecting a limited number of bidders who are qualified financially 
and technically, possessing the skills and commitment required to execute the project. As 
already noted, there is an obligation to meet the BEE policy of the South African government.  
Prequalification affords the bidders the opportunity to ascertain the rules in place for the 
procurement process, and at this stage, all vital information about the project cycle is made 
available. Finally, prequalification enables the PPP unit to gather information from the private 
consortia which can be used in the future. 
 After pre-qualification, successful bidders may enter the Request for Proposal (RFP) 
stage. The RFP must provide information about the project’s background, expected outcome 
                                                      
682 National Treasury op cit note 683 at 19. 
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and projected time frame. Other relevant information to be contained in the RFP includes the 
laws, rules and regulations governing the procurement of PPPs683as well as the procedure for 
securing approval from the National Treasury. 
   
5.5.4 Implementation Phase 
  
The project is deemed implemented once a suitable bidder has been chosen.684 Upon 
submission, the bids are evaluated to select a preferred and reserve bidder. The evaluation 
procedure must comply with laid-down regulations that involve the appointment of an 
evaluation team as well as committees who must ensure that all declarations and codes are 
signed.  It is instructive to note that the provisions of the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act and the BEE Code must be complied with to determine the Best and Final Offer (BFO). 
 Subsequently, with the preferred bidder and reserve bidder already chosen, negotiation 
commences. Negotiation helps to eliminate gaps and provide clarity for the contract. It affords 
the parties an opportunity to structure a sound and durable agreement. When negotiation is 
successful, the result is the award of a PPP contract. As noted in Chapter Three, since PPPs 
involve a main contract and several ancillary agreements, negotiation should also provide 
clarity about other contracts that will follow from the main PPP agreement.  
 In summary, during the inception phase, the procuring institution registers the project 
with the Treasury PPP Unit. A feasibility study is then carried out by the procuring institution 
to determine the appropriate mechanism for procuring the project. The next phase is to invite 
the market to submit bids for the project, and this is followed by implementation, i.e. when a 
suitable bidder is chosen to execute the project. 
 
5.5.5 Dispute Resolution   
 
South Africa’s Arbitration Act No 42 of 1965, Module 6 of the National Treasury PPP Manual, 
and the Standardised Provisions for PPP, set out the procedure for dealing with disputes arising 
from PPP agreements.685 A vital component of the PPP agreement is provision for dispute 
resolution during the tenure of the PPP contract. The first step is for all disputes to be referred 
                                                      
683 The term ‘procurement’ here is used in a general sense and does not refer to traditional public procurement. 
684 National Treasury op cit  note  683 at 19.  
685 Part 86 of the Standardised Provisions for PPP. 
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to the respective liaison or project officers to reach an amicable resolution. When this fails, the 
dispute should be referred to both the accounting officer of the institution and the chief 
executive officer of the private consortium. If the dispute is not resolved at this stage, an 
independent mediator is to be appointed by the parties.686 Where the dispute is still not 
amicably resolved, it is then referred to the courts for settlement. 
5.5.6 Funding of Public-Private Partnerships in South Africa 
 
Compared to those of its peers687 in sub-Saharan Africa, the financial market in South Africa 
is relatively well developed.688 Most PPP funding comes from within the country and from 
institutional investors (banks, pension funds etc.).689  It is important to note that when foreign 
money is involved, a hedge is generally used to protect the investors against currency 
fluctuations.690 The financial market in South Africa contributes nearly 25 percent of private 
equity funds to the entire continent, second only to about 50 percent contribution from investors 
in the United States.691 Furthermore, South Africa’s private equity market compares favourably 
with those in developed economies.692 The country also dominates the African equity market 
with a share of 80 percent of sub-Saharan African private capital compared with Nigeria’s 10 
percent.693 It has been asserted that in the entire continent, ‘only South Africa has domestic 
banks and a local capital market capable of consistently providing local currency financing for 
its infrastructure projects  on suitable terms and in significant amounts.’694 The other economies 
                                                      
686 Section 11(1) of the Arbitration Act as amended by Act No. 49 of 1996. 
687 Other big emerging economies like Nigeria and Kenya. 
688 The World Bank Establishing Public Private Partnerships: Lessons Learned from the Global South (2015) 
12 available at 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/21309/936290WP0Box380ion000for0disclosure.
pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y accessed 17 February 2018.   
689 Ibid. 
690 Ibid. 
691 Mihasonirina Andrianaivo and Charles Amo Yartey ‘Understanding the growth of African financial markets’ 
(2009) IMF Working Paper WP/09/182 9 available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09182.pdf accessed 6 May 2017. 
692 Ibid at 9. 
693 Ibid. 
694 Robert Sheppard, Stephen Von Klaudy & Geeta Kumar ‘Financing infrastructure in Africa: How the region 
can attract more project finance’ (2006) Gridlines Note 13 at 2 available at 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/10724/375490AFR0Grid1rastructure01PUBLIC
1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y accessed 6 May 2017. 
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in Africa have under-developed financial markets that oblige them to rely on short-term 
financial instruments. Given that foreign currency fluctuations (especially where there is 
devaluation) can negatively impact on debt funding, South Africa presents a good case study 
for other emerging economies on the continent on how an emerging economy can develop its 
market to suit its needs.  
 It is worthy of note that Treasury Regulation 16 is not prescriptive about the funding 
structure for PPPs in the country.695 As a result, funding for any deal is dependent on the project 
and its sponsors. It is possible to have projects that do not involve any debt finance at all, as 
they can be funded directly and in their entirety by the sponsors through private equity and a 
contribution from the government’s budget.696  However, a generic project finance structure is 




Bond financing for PPP projects has been in use in private infrastructure financing in South 
Africa.698 In a bond-financed deal, bond investors usually provide funds via an arrangement 
made by a bond arranger who is responsible for selling the bonds into the capital markets. The 
risk posed by the uncertainty of sufficient purchase of the bond is undertaken by a bond 
underwriter. In simple terms, bonds are loans made to large organisations which include 
corporations, cities and national governments. The size of these entities requires them to 
borrow the money from more than one source.699 Bonds are usually interest-bearing loans that 
pay a coupon during the term of the loan and the principal at the maturity of the bond. The 
capital and interest payments on these bonds have been benchmarked by an inflation index, for 
                                                      
695 National Treasury, PPP Manual at 5. 
696 Ibid. 
697 National Treasury PPP Unit ‘South African Public Private Partnership Unit’ (2009), a Presentation at the 
OECD Conference held in Paris 5 and 6 March 2009 available at 
https://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/42344511.pdf accessed 9 May 2017. 
698 Ibid. 
699 Kinberly Amadeo ‘What are bonds, and how do they work?’ (2016) available at 
https://www.thebalance.com/what-are-bonds-and-how-do-they-work-3306235 accessed 6 May 2017. 
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example the Consumer Price Index (CPI).700 CPI-linked bonds have been used in toll road 
financing in South Africa.701 
 Interestingly, despite a recent downgrading of South Africa’s credit rating to a below-
average rating by a major credit agency,702 the bond market continues to thrive with foreign 
investors participating.703 This may be attributed to the fact that the country’s financial market 
is well developed, with investors continuing to evince confidence in the South African market. 
This writer believes that much more gain in terms of the performance of the market will be 
recorded following the swearing in of Mr Cyril Ramaphosa as president of South Africa in the 




Equity refers to the funds contributed by the sponsors of the project and the other 
shareholders.705 It represents the risk capital for the project and gives the shareholders of the 
special purpose vehicle rights, including the right to returns subject to the performance of the 
project.706 This usually occurs after the debt funders have been paid. Investors are attracted by 
the upside potential of the investment in relation to the risk involved. This aspect of the funding 
of a PPP project is very important as it relates to the capacity of the initiators of the project. In 
South Africa, as pointed out in 5.5.3, above, one of the factors in determining the best bid is 





                                                      
700 Ibid. 
701 Helge Switala ‘Project finance and obtaining sufficient funding for the successful completion of your project,’ 
a Presentation by the Project Manager, Development Bank of South Africa, available at 
http://www.dbsa.org/EN/About-
Us/Publications/Documents/Project%20finance%20and%20obtaining%20sufficient%20funding%20for%20the
%20successful%20completion%20of%20your%20project.pdf accessed 9 May 2017. 
702 Fitch cut South Africa’s foreign and local currency ratings to junk status. 
703 Nicholas Megaw ‘Foreign investors pile into South African Bonds despite fears’ (2017) Financial Times 
available at https://www.ft.com/content/dc920b6e-064d-3bef-b374-352c52d29367 accessed 6 May 2017. 
704 The financial market is often influenced by political outcomes in the economy, especially when a new 
government is rated to outperform the previous one. 
705 Helge Switala op cit note 713 at 3. 




A large share of the financing of PPP projects is usually raised through debt.707 As will be 
discussed in the case studies of PPP projects in South Africa, debt holders are concerned about 
the cash flow of the project to ensure consistent debt service, i.e. the payment of the principal 
amount/capital sum and the interest accruing.708 Project debts are usually sourced as loans from 
commercial banks,709 multilateral agencies (MAs), development finance institutions (DFIs) 
and export credit agencies (ECAs). 
 
5.5.7 Protecting Funds Invested in Public-Private Partnership Projects 
 
A commitment to protecting investors’ and lenders’ funds is at the core of South Africa’s PPP 
framework. A watertight project preparation process is therefore required to prove the merits 
of the project to potential funders.710 Other critical components of the feasibility study under 
Module 4 of the PPP Manual include project due diligence, value assessment, economic 
valuation and a procurement plan. The procedure involves the engagement of advisors on 
behalf of the sponsors and the lenders to provide advice on technical, market, financial, legal 
and incidental matters.711 This is fundamental to achieving financial closure712 for the project.  
It should be noted that South Africa is globally ranked 10th out of 189 countries  for good 
practice in protecting investors in business.713 
 The funding of specific projects in the South African currency offers protection against 
currency fluctuation risk. For example, the Sasol Natural Gas Project is an R8.6 billion project 
aimed at developing the gas fields and processing facility in Mozambique, and operating a gas 
                                                      
707 The term debt is preferred to the use of the word ‘credit.’ The reason is because the investments in a PPP are 
treated as assets. What the SPV incurs for sourcing finance is a debt. Replacing the term debt with credit will 
mean the lender is an investor in the project, which is not usually the case. 
708 Helge Switala op cit note 713 at 3. 
709 Webber Wentzel ‘Investing in South Africa: Charting the legal landscape with Webber Wentzel’ (2015) 
available at 
http://www.investinginsouthafrica.co.za/downloads/en/Webber_Wentzel_Investing_in_South_Africa_complete. 
pdf accessed 11 May 2017. 
710 See National Treasury PPP Unit, ‘PPP project cycle: Reflecting Treasury Regulation 16 to the Public Finance 
Management Act, 1999’ National Treasury PPP Manual: Module 1. 
711 Helge Switala op cit note 713 at 3.  
712 Financial closure refers to the milestone in the project cycle that is reached when funds are secured. 
713 World Bank, Doing Business Report (2014). 
 148 
pipeline from the processing plant to facilities in South Africa.714 Even though the project will 
produce both rand and dollar revenues, the bulk of the debt is ZAR denominated.715 
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 states that when an organ of 
state in the national, provincial or local sphere of government or other institution identified in 
the national legislation contracts for goods or services, it must do so in accordance with a 
system that is fair, equitable, transparent and cost-effective.716 It follows that South African 
law emphasises transparency and accountability, which are key to ensuring that funds are 
protected and not wasted. This philosophy is the driving force behind the Public Finance 
Management Act as well as the Municipal Finance Management Act. 
 Examples abound in South Africa of projects structured in such a way as to ensure that 
there are sufficient revenue streams accruing in the short to long-term. The aim is to optimise 
the performance of the PPP and encourage private participation. Two examples are worth 
mentioning here. The City of Johannesburg contracted with a consortium of international 
operators led by Suez. The project was structured in such a way that Johannesburg Water 
purchased some of biogas-fuelled generators and the contractor invested in other required 
capital infrastructure. The contract recovered its cost from the sale of bio-gas generated from 
the operations.717 A second example is the City of Tshwane PPP with Magalies Water Board, 
ABSA Bank and Bigen Africa. The arrangement was structured to ensure sustainable revenue 
flows to the City of Tshwane as the City was the main beneficiary of the R500 million 
project.718 
 The protection of investments is vital to the sustainability of PPP arrangements in any 
economy. This is the spirit behind the passing into law of the Protection of Investment Act 22 
of 2015.719 The Act was passed to replace the bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with 
European countries and to make direct investment in the country attractive to foreign 
                                                      
714 Helge Switala op cit note 713 at 3. 
715 Ibid at 3. 
716 Section 217(1). 
717 Cornelius Ruiters & Maselaganye P Matji ‘Public private partnership conceptual framework and models for 
the funding and financing of water services infrastructure in municipalities from selected provinces in South 
Africa’ (2016) 42.2 Water SA.  
718 Ibid. 
719 Gazette No. 39514 of 15 December 2015. 
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investors.720 Historically, developing economies entered BITs to provide comfort to investors 
that their investments would be safe and protected. However, BITs have been criticised for 
creating unequal rights and obligations between developed and developing economies and for 
interfering with the developing countries’ sovereignty.721  Key provisions of the Protection of 
Investment Act are discussed below. 
 
5.5.8 The Protection of Investment Act No. 22 of 2015 
 
The Act defines an ‘investor’ to mean ‘an enterprise making an investment in the Republic 
regardless of nationality.’722 It follows that the protection afforded indigenous investors applies 
to foreign investors as well. The purpose of the Act is threefold: First, to protect investment in 
accordance with and subject to the Constitution; secondly, to affirm the Republic’s sovereign 
right to regulate investments in the public interest; and thirdly, to confirm the Bill of Rights in 
the Constitution and the laws that apply to all investors and their investments in the Republic.723 
The Act applies to all investments in the Republic that are made in accordance with section 2 
of the Act.724 
 The Act stipulates that foreign investors must not be discriminated against.725 The 
Republic must accord foreign investors and their investments a level of physical security 
equivalent to that enjoyed by domestic investors, in accordance with minimum standards of 
                                                      
720 In 2012, South Africa terminated its bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with European countries such as 
Denmark, Spain, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland and Holland. It maintained the BITs with Russia 
and China. 
721 Dentons ‘South Africa’s Protection of Investment Act’ (2017) available at 
https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/newsletters/2017/january/26/south-africa-newsletter/south-africa-
newsletter-january-edition/south-africas-protection-of-investment-act accessed 9 May 2017. 
722 Section 1 Protection of Investment Act 2015. 
723Section 4 Protection of Investment Act 2015. 
724Section 5 Protection of Investment Act 2015. Section 2 of the Act defines ‘investment’ in the following terms: 
‘an enterprise may possess assets such as shares, stocks, debentures, securities as defined in the Financial Markets 
Act, 2012; a debt; loans to an enterprise; moveable or immovable property or other property rights such as 
mortgages, liens or pledges; claims to money or to any performance under contract having a financial value; 
copyrights, knowhow, goodwill, or intellectual property rights such as patents, trademarks, industrial designs and 
trade names to the extent that they are recognised under the law of South Africa; returns such as profits, dividends, 
royalties or income yielded by an investment; or rights or concessions conferred by law or under contract including 
licenses to cultivate, extract or exploit natural resources.’ 
725Section 8 Protection of Investment Act 2015. 
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customary international law.726 Investors have the right to property in consonance with section 
25 of the Constitution of South Africa.727 Furthermore, the Act provides that a foreign investor 
may, in respect of an investment, repatriate funds subject to taxation and other applicable 
legislation.728 
 As regards disputes, when an investor has a dispute in respect of action taken by the 
government, the action having affected an investment of the investor, the investor may within 
six months of becoming aware of the dispute request the Department to facilitate its resolution 
by appointing a mediator.729 A foreign investor is not precluded from approaching any 
competent court, independent tribunal or statutory body within South Africa for the resolution 
of the dispute.730 When all domestic remedies have been exhausted and the dispute persists, 
the South African government may consent to international arbitration, with such arbitration 
conducted between South Africa and the home state of the foreign investor.731 Thus an investor 
who feels wronged by an action of the South African government or any of its agencies is 
clearly empowered by the law to seek redress. It is submitted, however, that what the South 
African government is giving with the right hand, it seeks to take away with the left, through 
the provision that the state must only consent to arbitration when domestic remedies have been 
exhausted and international arbitration becomes the option. 
 On 30 December 2016, the South African Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
issued Draft Regulations on Mediation Rules which would apply to investment disputes 
between the government and investors.732 Under the Rules, among others, an aggrieved 
investor must declare a dispute within six months of becoming aware of the dispute; the 
investor and the DTI must agree on the name of the mediator; and the rules of the DTI must be 
complied with in the mediation.733 It is submitted that only a foreign investor with confidence 
                                                      
726Section 9 Protection of Investment Act 2015. 
727Section 10 Protection of Investment Act 2015. 
728Section 11 Protection of Investment Act 2015. 
729Section 13 Protection of Investment Act 2015. 
730 Dentons op cit note 655. 
731 Ibid. 
732 Annet van Hooft ‘South Africa: Draft regulations on mediation rules for investor-state disputes’ (2017) 
available at https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2017/global/africa-newsletter-feb/south-africa-draft-
regulations-on-mediation-rules-for-investor-state-disputes accessed 11 May 2017. 
733 Ibid. 
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in the South African market will be satisfied with the Rules as couched, especially as the 
remedies available to the investor are not clearly specified. 
  
5.6 Case Studies of Public-Private Partnership Projects in South Africa 
 
The choice of projects selected as case studies is motivated by their status as flagship projects 
in their respective sectors of the economy. Furthermore, given the long-term nature of PPP 
contracts, these projects remain relevant as they are currently in operation, and the lessons 
learned from them can serve as an eye opener for prospective investors in South African PPPs. 
 
5.6.1 Case Study 1: The N4 from South Africa to Mozambique 
 
The governments of South Africa and Mozambique in 1996 jointly signed a R3 billion734 30-
year concession with a private consortium, Trans African Concessions, to build and operate 
the N4 Toll Road from Witbank (in South Africa) to Maputo (in Mozambique).735 Even though 
the project was privately financed, the debt on the transaction was guaranteed by both the South 
African and Mozambican governments.736 The concession was awarded to Trans African 
Concessions (TRAC) Consortium. TRAC became responsible for the financing, design, 
construction, rehabilitation, operation and maintenance of the toll road. The contract was 
signed with the South African National Roads Agency (SANRAL) and the Mozambique Roads 
Agency (ANE), and ends in 2027. The Concessionaire now manages 630km of toll road, most 
of which is in South Africa, with only about 50km in Mozambique.737 
 
                                                      
734 Estimated as at 1996. 
735 Peter Farlam ‘Working together: Assessing public-private partnerships in Africa’ (2005) Nepad Policy Focus 
Report No. 2 at 9. 
736 E R Yescombe op cit note 44 at 47. 
737 PPIAF, ‘N4 toll road from South Africa to Mozambique’ (2009) Toolkit for Public-Private Partnerships in 
Roads and Highways 92. 
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The N4 financing was structured according to a 20:80 ratio.738 The three construction 
companies involved in the project739 contributed R331 million worth of equity,740 with the rest 
of the capital coming from the SA Infrastructure Fund, Rand Merchant Bank Asset 
Management and five other investors. The debt investors include a consortium of four South 
African banks – ABSA, Nedcor, Standard Bank and First National Bank. Other investors 
include the Development Bank of Southern Africa and the Mine Employees and Officials 
Pension Funds. 
 One of the challenges faced by the N4 project at inception was its demand risk, given 
the volume of finance required for the construction work. The main question posed to the 
sponsors of the project was whether there would be enough traffic using and paying for the 
road to generate sufficient income, given that there were other well-maintained free alternative 
routes?741 Similarly, the project faced considerable payment risk along the Mozambican axis 
as the poor communities there were unable and unwilling to pay high toll fees. As a result, 
Trans African Concessions (TRAC) cross-subsidised the Mozambican portion of the road with 
higher revenues from the South African axis.  There are currently eight toll points on the road 
with significant adjustments for the Maputo corridor.742 Four types of vehicles were considered 
for toll purposes (light, medium heavy, large heavy and extra heavy). Tolls are collected at six 
main line toll plazas and at two ramp plazas.  Only two toll plazas are in Mozambique.743 The 
road is partly 4-lane separated carriageways and partly 2-lanes with widening to accommodate 
large hauling vehicles, with a one-stop border facility developed at Komatiport/Ressano Garcia 
to reduce cross-border bottlenecks between the countries.744  
 The significant lessons to be learned from the N4 Toll Road are first, that cross-
subsidisation from more affluent South African users and substantial discounts for the regular 
Mozambican users helped to reduce the user payment risk.745 Secondly, the road has shortened 
                                                      
738 Financing of the project was split between 20% equity and 80% debt. 
739 Stocks and Stocks, Bouygues, and Basil Road. 
740 Which formed 20% of the financing of the project. 
741 Peter Farlam op cit note 747 at 10. 
742 See current toll fees at http://www.tracn4.co.za/toll-fees.html accessed 24 May 2017. 
743 PPIAF op cit note 749 at 92. 
744 Ibid at 92. 
745 Peter Farlam op cit note 747 at 11. 
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the travel time from Pretoria to Maputo by at least three hours,746 which makes it attractive to 
road users. Thirdly, the road facilitated further private sector investment in Mozambique, 
resulting in raised traffic volumes.747 Fourthly, the risk associated with the financing of the 
project was borne entirely by the TRAC consortium without government subsidies, although 
the governments of South Africa and Mozambique guaranteed the debt.748 
 The success of the N4 toll road is an indicator of the viability of PPPs in the road sector 
when users are willing to pay.749 It is important to mention that initial traffic volumes were less 
than the financers of the project had envisaged. However, they regard the traffic growth as 
acceptable, at rates of between 5% and 7% annually.750 
 Despite the success of the N4 toll road, some of the problems encountered during its 
implementation include complaints by users and commuters that a road that was used free of 
charge had become a toll road; and higher-than-expected damage to the road caused by the 
overloading of trucks. These issues have been addressed by introducing much lower toll fees 
for commuters and locals, as well as implementing an efficient axle load control system along 
the corridor.751 
  
5.6.2 Case Study 2: The Pelonomi and Universitas Hospital Co-Location, Bloemfontein 
 
This project is structured as a co-location PPP. This type of PPP occurs when the public and 
private sectors operate a similar service and collaborate rather than compete, which results in 
the public sector receiving revenue while the private sector generates profits.752 
The project was arranged in the year 2000 at the provincial level, with the aim of 
providing a better level of healthcare for South Africans, especially those living in the Free 
State. An agreement was eventually signed as a 16-and-a-half-year contract on 25 November 
                                                      
746 TRAC, ‘Toll Fees’ http://www.tracn4.co.za/ accessed 24 May 2017. 
747 Peter Farlam op cit note 747 at 11. 
748 PPIAF op cit note 749 at 94. 
749 Ibid. 
750 PPIAF op cit note 749 at 93. 
751 Ibid at 95. 
752 Shadrack Shuping & Sipho Kabane ‘Public-Private Partnerships: A case study of the Pelonomi and Universitas 
hospital co-location project’ available at http://www.hst.org.za/uploads/files/chap10_07.pdf accessed 24 May 
2017.  
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2002.753 The PPP for the hospital co-location project is made up of three partners. The public 
agency in the partnership is the Free State Health Department (FSHD).754 The FSHD selected 
its partner after conducting a competitive tendering process: having obtained the requisite 
permission from the Treasury to proceed, it invited interested parties to submit Registrations 
of Capability (ROC) and held informational meetings with 30 private parties indicating 
interest.755 After studying a blueprint from Australia, the FSHD accepted three of the ROC bids 
but only two responded to the Request for Proposals (RFP). A consortium of two healthcare 
companies was selected, the first a South African black empowerment company756 and the 
other a healthcare company757 with branches in South Africa and the United Kingdom.758 The 
consortium held a 65 percent stake in the concession and the remaining 35 percent was offered 
to investors, doctors and, later, the State.759 
Under the arrangement, the FSHD receives monthly concession fees from the private 
partner for the bed and operating theatre space that it uses in both hospitals. In addition, the 
private partner pays variable fees representing 2 percent of patient turn-over.760 The inclusion 
of variable payments in the arrangement means that some operational risk is transferred to the 
FSHD because a portion of the revenue received is dependent on the success of the private 
partner.761 However, the private partner retains the risk associated with construction as it is 
responsible for all construction, renovations and upgrades.762 
  
                                                      
753 The United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation ‘Hospital co-location, Bloemfontein, South Africa’ 
available at http://academy.ssc.undp.org/GSSDAcademy/SIE/VOL15.aspx accessed 24 May 2017. 
754 The FSHD is the branch of the provincial government of the Free State in South Africa that oversees health-
related issues and all the public health facilities, which include hospitals. 
755 The United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation op cit note 765. 
756 With a 40% stake in the consortium. 
757 With a 25% stake.  
758 The United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation op cit note 765. 
759 Ibid. 
760 According to the contract the private partners are expected to pay a fixed monthly rental fee of R40,000 per 
month for the use of the co-located facilities within the first five years and R60,000 per month subsequently. In 
addition, 1.32% of the annual turnover before profit is to be paid back to the public sector. 
761 The United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation op cit note 765. 
762 Ibid. 
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While the FSHD’s role is to provide patient care in both hospitals, the private partner is 
responsible for all renovations and upgrades.763 The upgrades at Pelonomi and Universitas 
Hospitals were completed on shared facilities and facilities for the use of the public hospital.764 
Apart from this, the private partner upgraded the facilities that were for its own private patients 
and in doing so, the private partner hired local construction companies. At one point, 26 
Bloemfontein companies were subcontracted for a period of eight months. The result was an 
injection of over R10 million into the local economy.765 
 The PPP for Pelonomi and Universitas Hospitals is ‘considered extremely 
successful.’766 Both hospitals have facilities that are presently functional, with the healthcare 
needs of the population (whether insured or uninsured) being met daily. Running costs have 
been reduced and the quality of care has been increased because of the PPP arrangement. 
Furthermore, the PPP has ensured reduced costs for both the FSHD and the private partner, 
especially as there was no need to build a new hospital.767  Again, commitment on the part of 
the stakeholders contributed immensely to the success of this PPP arrangement.768 
 
5.6.3 Case Study 3:  The Prison Contracts 
 
Because of a significant shortage of prison space, the Departments of Correctional Services 
(DCS) and Public Works introduced a concept for the operation of private prisons in the 
country modelled after the UK private prisons.769 The government of South Africa 
subsequently signed two 25-year PPP contracts for maximum security prisons in Bloemfontein 
                                                      
763 Shadrack Shuping & Sipho Kabane op cit note 764. 
764 The United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation op cit note 765. 
765 Ibid. 
766 Ibid. 
767 It is significant that both hospitals can attend to all citizens without any form of discrimination based on race. 
768 National Treasury PPP Unit ‘Case studies on the public private partnerships at Humansdorp District 
Hospital, Universitas and Pelonomi Hospitals and Inkosi Albert Luthuli Central Hospital: Overall findings and 
recommendations’ (2007) available at 
http://www.ppp.gov.za/Legal%20Aspects/Case%20Studies/Humansdorp%20Overall%20findings.pdf accessed 
29 May 2017. 
769 Peter Farlam op cit note 747 at 15. 
 156 
and Louis Trichardt as part of its Department of Public Works’ Asset Procurement and 
Operating Partnership Systems (APOPS) in the year 2000.770 
 Initially the DCS called for bids from the private sector for the design and construction 
of 11 maximum security prisons. This was later reduced to four, then again to two, after it was 
realised that costs had been vastly underestimated.771 The two winning consortia, both of whom 
had more than 50 percent black shareholding and included foreign-based prison management 
companies among their shareholders, acquired responsibility for designing, building, 
financing, operating and transferring the prisons.772 The facilities hold an estimated 3,000 
inmates each and became fully operational in less than two years after the close of the contract 
in 2002, at a cost of about R1.7 billion for the Bloemfontein prison and R1.8 billion for the one 
in Louis Trichardt.773 
 A review undertaken jointly by the DCS, National Treasury and the Department of 
Public Works (DPW) found that the Bloemfontein and Louis Trichardt PPP Prisons achieved 
lofty goals, including but not limited to competitive first construction costs (R270m for 
Bloemfontein’s 2,928 inmates, and R303m for Louis Trichardt’s 3,024 inmates); secondly, 
construction completed on time and on budget; thirdly, fast track delivery: less than two years 
from contract close to full operating capacity accommodating some 6,000 maximum security 
prisoners; fourthly, operating costs per inmate per day were broadly comparable with the public 
sector’s operating costs; fifthly, there were significantly higher quality facilities and levels of 
service than in public prisons; a sixth objective achieved was a high level of black equity in the 
contractors (60 percent Bloemfontein; 50 percent Louis Trichardt) and significant black sub-
contracting in both construction and operation of both prisons; and finally, the appropriate 
assumption of financial, technical and operational risk by the parties.774 
 
                                                      
770 South African Institute of International Affairs ‘Case study: Private prisons’ (2005) available at 
http://www.saiia.org.za/newsletters/case-study-private-prisons accessed 29 May 2017. 
771 Linda Mti ‘Review of public private partnership prison contracts,’ a summary of a hearing before the 
Correctional Services Portfolio Committee, South African Parliament, 12 November 2002. Available at 
https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/2259/ accessed 29 May 2017. 
772 Peter Farlam op cit note 747 at 15. 
773 Ibid. 
774 National Treasury PPP Unit ‘PPP prisons are good deals’ (2002) 9.2 PPP Quarterly. 
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The above notwithstanding, the review also identified some low points in both projects. These 
were:775 first, the Department for Correctional Services’ (DCS) design and operating 
specifications were too high, based on ideal prison conditions, though the prisons remain driven 
by high DCS input specs; secondly, suitable feasibility work by government should have 
established DCS’ affordability limits prior to procurement; thirdly, the relatively high cost of 
debt due to high base interest rates prevailing at the time of the deals (14.58% Bloemfontein; 
15% Louis Trichardt); fourthly, higher than normal margins charged by lenders, reflecting the 
perceived risk of early deals; fifthly, higher than normal returns on equities, again reflecting 
perceived risk of early deals; and finally, the inability to increase populations in the PPP 
prisons, despite severe overcrowding in the DCS system. 
 Farlam776 argues that ‘a thorough feasibility study would have clarified the affordability 
limits of the Department of Correctional Services at the start of the process.’ He also notes that 
‘experienced private sector operators can provide a better-quality service at comparable rates 
to the public sector.’777 
 
5.6.4 South Africa’s Gautrain 
 
This modern rapid train link was conceived to provide a solution to South Africa’s 
infrastructure problems in the rail sector.778 The rail links the nation’s capital, commercial 
centre and main airport. It is considered central to South Africa’s national transport strategy. 
Consequently, from the 1998 feasibility study to the year 2012 when it came into operation, it 
has offered a huge learning process to PPP stakeholders in South Africa. 
 The project was initiated in February 2000 by Mr Mghazima Shilowa, the premier of 
Gauteng Province, as one of the 10 Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs) of the government 
of Gauteng to promote tourism, move towards integrated transport system and help alleviate 
congestion on the roads, particularly along the Pretoria to Johannesburg International Airport 
(JIA) corridor. The project was also intended to stimulate economic growth, development and 
job creation. 
 
                                                      
775 Ibid at 17. 
776 Peter Farlam op cit note 747 at 17. 
777 Ibid at 17. 
778 Centre for Public Impact ‘South Africa’s Gautrain: Rail travel from Pretoria to Johannesburg’ (2015) available 
at https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case-study/gautrain-in-south-africa/ accessed 19 February 2018. 
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Notably, being a PPP, the Gautrain involved relations with the private investors involved in 
the funding and external stakeholders engaged in the construction.779 The Bombela Concession 
Company (Pty) Ltd won the bid for the construction, operation and maintenance of the Gautrain 
until 2020.780 Funding for the project was sourced from federal and provincial institutions, 
institutional investors (especially pension funds), the World Bank, the African Development 
Bank (AfDB); infrastructure funds; and banks via the capital markets and debt markets. The 
project is a classic example of a PPP in the sense that it showcases the use of various 
instruments available in the financial market for the funding of PPPs. Significantly, the project 
received strong political support from the national government, which committed as much as 
R7.1 billion to it.  
 Despite initial public scepticism about the project,781 its clear policy objectives and 
strong management on the part of the concessionaire and other public-sector agencies were 
factors that made a strong contribution towards its success.  
 
5.7 Challenges in the Implementation of Public-Private Partnerships in South Africa 
 
Despite South Africa’s leading position in the commissioning of PPP projects in Africa, the 
implementation of PPP policy in the country has not been without challenges and criticism. In 
2007, the Office of the Presidency of South Africa and the Business Trust commissioned the 
Castalia Consortium782 to identify challenges facing PPPs in infrastructure in South Africa.783 
After conducting a series of interviews, the Castalia Consortium in their report identified the 
following as potential bottlenecks in the successful implementation of PPP policy in the 
country:784 
i. A lack of policy direction from the highest level of government, or at least a lack 
of clarity in the minds of implementing agencies and the private sector, on why 




782 Comprising Castalia Ltd and Ukhamba Advisory Services. 
783 Castalia Strategic Advisors & Ukhamba Advisory Services ‘Key challenges to public private partnerships in 
South Africa: Summary of interview findings’ (2007) available at http://www.castalia-
advisors.com/files/12345.pdf accessed 29 May 2017. 
784 Ibid at 35. 
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South Africa should enter PPPs, what PPPs are, and what is or should be the role of 
the PPP unit; 
ii. Inconsistent commitment to PPPs in different parts of government and at different 
levels of government; 
iii. A general mistrust among the implementing agencies of private sector involvement 
in the provision of infrastructure services; 
iv. A lack of time, resources, know-how and authority among the staff of the agencies 
developing and implementing PPPs; 
v. A policy bias toward traditional procurement and against PPPs; 
vi. A lack of fiscal imperative to use PPPs; 
vii. A completely different market and legal environment for PPPs in the municipalities, 
where all the above problems are much more severe and infrastructure needs are 
much greater. 
 
In a recent study, poor stakeholder consultation has been identified as one of the issues 
that need to be addressed in South Africa.785 On a similar note, Fombad786 identifies 
accountability generally as a serious challenge for PPPs in South Africa and claims that 
accountability issues involve a lack of public consultation on the part of the public sector; a 
lack of transparency; corruption; a lack of competition; ineffective contract management and a 
failure to monitor performance. To my mind, where there is a lack of accountability, a project 
no matter how well designed and structured is doomed to fail from the start. The reason is that 
members of the public are very sceptical about PPP arrangements. If one considers that the 
procurement of infrastructure has been the sole responsibility of the public sector, a transaction 
with the private sector that lacks accountability will always be regarded as dubious.  
Sanni and Hashim also note that inconsistency in the commitment of government 
agencies in South Africa affects PPP projects, and since PPP projects require a longer time for 
delivery, frequent changes in plans or policies may hamper the success of the projects.787 
 
                                                      
785 E R Yescombe Public-Private Partnerships in Sub-Saharan Africa (2017) 96. 
786 Madeleine C Fombad ‘Accountability challenges in public-private partnerships from a South African 
perspective’ (2013) 7.1 African Journal of Business Ethics at 11–25. 
787 Afeez Olalekan Sanni & Maizon Hashim ‘Building infrastructure through public private partnerships in Sub-
Saharan Africa: Lessons from South Africa’ (2014) 143 Procedia: Social and Behavioural Sciences at 133–38. 
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Seeletse has argued that the deployment of unqualified personnel to handle PPP transactions 
has been a drawback for PPP in South Africa.788 Yet I do not agree with his submission that 
there is a need for the establishment of a regulatory body for PPP in South Africa, if what he 
means by that is a body separate from the PPP Unit.789 My view is that multiple bodies 
regulating PPP will only end up causing confusion, and result in the unnecessary flexing of 




In this chapter, the legal, policy, institutional and administrative framework for PPP in South 
Africa has been analysed. The practice of PPP in the country in relation to this framework has 
formed part of the discussion; and to examine the law and policy in action, a few brief case 
studies of projects have been presented. 
 It seems that despite the relatively slow development of PPPs in sub-Saharan Africa, 
when compared to other benchmark (middle-income) countries, South Africa has outperformed 
the others in using the PPP model for infrastructure procurement. Two reasons for this easily 
come to mind. The first is that compared to other sub-Saharan African countries like Nigeria, 
institutions in South Africa are better structured. Institutional actors in PPP regulation must be 
guided by the need to respect contractual agreements and to abide by the rule of law in the 
discharge of their responsibilities. Secondly, the local financial market in South Africa is 
arguably the only developed one in sub-Saharan Africa.  
This is not to say that the framework and practice of PPP in South Africa is perfect. 
Indeed, as is the case with other strong PPP countries like the UK, Canada, Australia and Hong 
Kong, PPP is evolving in South Africa and there is always room for improvement.  
The next chapter of the study compares the laws, policies and practice of PPP in Nigeria 
and South Africa. Aspects for reform in South Africa are discussed and suggestions offered. 
The chapter concludes with findings and suggestions for the future study and practice of PPP, 
especially in the Nigerian context. 
 
 
                                                      
788 Solly Matshonisa Seeletse ‘Performance of South African public-private partnerships’ (2016) 14.2 Problems 
and Perspectives in Management at 19. 
789 Ibid at 24. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
A COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION OF THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 




The frameworks for the regulation and administration of PPP in Nigeria and South Africa have 
been discussed in some detail in Chapters Four and Five, respectively. In those chapters, the 
writer provided a descriptive analysis of the law and practice of PPP. This chapter focuses on 
a comparative analysis of the regulatory and administrative framework for PPPs in the two 
countries. The approach here is analytical, critical and prescriptive. 
In the preceding chapters it was established that the introduction of the PPP model of 
infrastructure delivery in Nigeria and South Africa has created an opportunity for the private 
sector to participate not just in the funding of projects but also in the design, building, 
rehabilitating, management and operation of public facilities. This is not unconnected to the 
recognition that utilising the PPP model as a means of delivering various types of asset-based 
public services and infrastructure has become a global public management reform trend.790 For 
the sake of emphasis and as already noted in Chapter Three, even though the distinction appears 
to be marginal, service contracts entered into by the private sector and the government pre-
dates PPP and must be clearly distinguished from the latter form of infrastructure procurement. 
PPP provides the option of the private sector taking charge and playing the lead role in a 
function that was traditionally undertaken by the government. 
Since Nigeria and South Africa are two of the largest economies in sub-Saharan 
Africa,791 a study of the impact of their introduction of the PPP model of infrastructure 
procurement is important, possible serving as a guide for other economies on the continent. 
The success and advantages of adopting PPP in both countries could be beneficial in structuring 
PPP programmes in other sub-Saharan African countries. This is not to say that there have not 
been challenges or even outright project failures in both countries. However, South Africa has 
achieved more success in PPP arrangement, execution and delivery than Nigeria. Apart from 
                                                      
790 Ole Helby Petersen ‘Public-private partnerships as converging or diverging trends in public management? A 
comparative analysis of PPP Policy and regulation in Denmark and Ireland’ (2011) 12.2 International 
Management Review at 1. 
791 J Peter Pham ‘Africa’s economic prospects in 2017’ Atlantic Council 9 January 2017 available at 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/africa-s-economic-prospects-in-2017-ten-countries-to-watch 
accessed on 5 October 2017. 
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having a better experience in the management of PPPs,792 South Africa’s financial market is 
much more developed than that of Nigeria. This means that promoters and investors in South 
Africa have a larger pool of funds that can be accessed for the funding of infrastructure than 
their counterparts in Nigeria. In that country the financial market is still at a developing stage, 
burdened by a lack of access to long-term funding, as the commercial banks and other lenders 
prefer tenures not exceeding 15 years at any given time. 
In this chapter, indicators and drivers of success for PPP arrangement and execution are 
examined in both jurisdictions. These indicators are also referred to as Critical Success Factors 
(CSFs) for PPPs. Since these parameters determine whether PPPs will succeed, it is important 
to analyse the structures both in Nigeria and South Africa to determine how policy makers can 
best design a successful PPP regime. As a corollary, this chapter examines the two jurisdictions 
for areas of similarity and divergence. 
 
6.2 The Establishment of an Adequate Legal Framework 
 
According to the National Treasury PPP Unit in South Africa,793 an independent, fair and 
efficient legal framework is a key factor for successful PPP project implementation. Due to the 
very complicated nature of PPP, it is important that the branch of the law that regulates it is 
clear to investors and practitioners.794 Both Nigeria and South Africa operate with three 
different levels of governance, with different set of laws, in many cases, operating at the 
national and sub-national levels. It is therefore important to know which laws apply at each 
level.  
In this section, the legal frameworks for the implementation of a PPP regime in Nigeria 
and South Africa are examined. Also highlighted are the similarities and differences between 
the two countries in relation to the establishment and administration of a PPP regime.  
To begin with, this writer believes that the best way to implement a PPP regime in any 
jurisdiction is to take into consideration the administrative and legal traditions of that 
jurisdiction as well as the policy maker’s objective(s). There is thus no single best way of 
                                                      
792 Peter Farlam, op cit note 747 at 1. 
793 National Treasury PPP Unit of South Africa (2007), Public Private Partnership Manual, available at 
http://www.ppp.gov.za/Legal%20Aspects/PPP%20Manual/Module%2001.pdf  accessed on 5 October 2017. 
794 Anthony Smith ‘Policy, legal and regulatory frameworks for successful PPPs’ (2012) available at 
http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/4a-Policy-legal-regulatory-frameworks.pdf accessed on 5 October 
2017. 
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giving force to a PPP framework. This notwithstanding, countries with greater levels of PPP 
success can serve as examples for others. Conversely, even those with good results have lessons 
to be learned from their peers with less impressive records. 
While it is clear that the enabling of fair and transparent PPP legislation is a 
fundamental requirement for PPP success, common law countries like the United Kingdom 
and Australia have established their PPP regimes through policy statements and administrative 
documents without enacting a PPP law.795 Yet in other common law countries PPP laws have 
been passed, especially where these were required to override existing laws that would have 
restricted the implementation of PPP projects.796 This writer agrees with the position that in 
developing or emerging common law economies like Nigeria, a PPP law is important to 
provide ‘greater force, stability, transparency, and accountability.’797 
 
6.2.1 Establishment of Nigeria’s Public-Private Partnership Legal Framework 
 
Before discussing the framework for PPP in Nigeria, it is important to describe its legislative 
structure. While the federal legislators make laws at the national level, state law makers 
exercise a similar function at the state level. The Federal Republic of Nigeria consists of a 
central federal government, a federal capital territory, 36 states and 768 local governments.798 
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) assigns responsibility 
(with certain restrictions) to each tier of government for infrastructural development within the 
territory over which it exercises control.799 Following from this, there could be as many PPP 
laws and frameworks as there are different units of government. Indeed, some states – including 
Lagos, Rivers, Cross Rivers, Niger, Ekiti and Ogun – have established PPP frameworks with 
PPP units to oversee the administration of PPP projects in those states. 
                                                      
795 APMG International ‘Establishing a PPP framework’ available at  https://ppp-certification.com/ppp-




798 It is important to note that under the Infrastructure Concession and Regulatory Commission (Establishment 
Etc.) Act 2005, any arm of the government with the exclusion of local government can initiate and manage PPPs. 
Each state exercises relative autonomy in the implementation of PPP projects and as such, each makes and 
enforces its own laws and regulations. 
799 Sections 4, 5 and 8 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). Also, Schedules 
2 and 4 of the Constitution. 
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The basis for the establishment of a PPP framework in Nigeria was the policy of the Nigerian 
government to shed some of its responsibility for infrastructure development by increasing 
private sector participation in critical sectors of the Nigerian economy. This was to be done 
through the privatisation and commercialisation of previously state-owned monopolies, 
especially in the telecommunications and power sectors.800 Prior to the passing of the 
Infrastructure Concession and Regulatory Commission (Establishment Etc.) Act 2005, the 
federal government of Nigeria pursued a privatisation programme through which some state-
owned enterprises were privatised. This process, which involved numerous transactions, 
including concessions, was conducted through the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE) under 
the Public Enterprises (Privatisation and Commercialisation) Act No. 28 of 1999. It is 
important to note that public enterprises were privatised by the Nigerian government in order 
to advance development and consumer access in those sectors:  the mismanagement and under-
utilisation that had characterised those establishments had resulted in a huge waste of material 
and human resources.801 Regrettably, however, the privatisation programme in Nigeria left 
much to be desired.  The programme was marred by a number of things, including the limited 
technical and financial capacity of some of the private companies, and allegations of corrupt 
practices.802 Furthermore, some of the enterprises sold to the private sector have performed 
more poorly in the hands of the new managers than they did when they operated as government-
owned enterprises.803 For example, the Nigerian Telecommunications Ltd (NITEL) performed 
poorly under new management before it became moribund. Onuoha, Okoro and Mimiko 
observe that the late 1990s and beyond witnessed the federal government of Nigeria allocating 
some of its responsibilities for infrastructural development to the private sector,804 but point 
out that in more recent years there has been a shift towards PPPs.805 It is pertinent to note that 
a number of concessions were put in place under the Privatisation Act even after the ICRC Act 
had been passed.806 Indeed, for a long time, it appeared as if the federal government of Nigeria 
                                                      
800 Fred Onuobia, Okechukwu J Okoro & Bibitayo Mimiko ‘Nigeria’ in Bruno Werneck and Mário Saadi (eds.) 
The Public-Private Partnership Law Review (2017) at 157. 
801 D E Arowolo & C S Ologunowa op cit note 25 at 792. 
802 Ibid at 792. 
803 Ibid. 
804 Fred Onuoha, Okechukwu J Okoro & Bibitayo Mimiko op cit note 812 at 157. 
805 Ibid at 157. 
806 George Nwangwu, Public Private Partnership in Nigeria: Managing Risk and Identifying Opportunities (2016) 
at 28. 
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‘could choose randomly between either of the two laws setting up PPP transactions as public 
authorities vacillated between either of the laws for different transactions.’807 
 With endemic budget deficits, the inefficient management of large infrastructure 
projects and services by the public sector, and the apparent failure of the privatisation 
programme, the Nigerian government’s desire for a dynamic partnership with the private sector 
necessitated a policy shift towards a PPP regime for the procurement of infrastructure.808 In 
sum, the establishment of a legal framework for the administration of PPP in Nigeria is first, 
not unconnected with the failure of the privatisation initiative. Secondly, it is driven by the 
need to make the process for PPP procurement uniform and clear; and thirdly, it is occasioned 
by the necessity of providing some form of assurance to private sector investors that PPP 
contracts are binding. 
 
6.2.2 Establishment of South Africa’s Public-Private Partnership Legal Framework 
 
Unlike Nigeria, where the failure of the privatisation agenda of government was the harbinger 
of PPP, the involvement of the private sector in the procurement of public infrastructure in 
South Africa was based on the recognition that the private sector is better suited to provide 
effective services as well as the opportunity to introduce private capital and expertise into state 
enterprises.809 The introduction of a PPP legal framework hinged on the need to create an 
environment in the country conducive to PPP success. 
Having established the feasibility of the PPP model of procurement, in April 1997 the 
South African cabinet approved the appointment of an inter-departmental task team to advance 
both legislation and policy to facilitate the adoption of a PPP framework. Subsequently, a PPP 
Unit was set up under the National Treasury. Following from this, a strategic framework for 
PPPs was endorsed in December 1999, while the National Treasury issued regulations for PPPs 
in April 2000.810 
Given South Africa’s history and the importance of public procurement to the economic 
well-being of its citizens, all forms of procurement in the Republic, including PPP, are required 
                                                      
807 Ibid at 28. 
808 Fred Onuoha, Okechukwu J Okoro & Bibitayo Mimiko op cit note 812 at 157. 
809 Axis Consulting, ‘PPP country paper: South Africa’ (2013) 11 available at 
http://www.sadcpppnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/south_africa_27012014.pdf  accessed on 13 
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810 Ibid.  
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to conform with accepted principles of fairness.811 This principle of fairness is boldly 
encapsulated in the preamble to the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. While 
there is undoubtedly a need to heal the injustices of the past, it is the respectful opinion of this 
writer that the procurement of infrastructure by the private sector should not be considered an 
area where there should be questions as to whether certain groups in the community are 
represented. Such considerations must only apply when they relate to traditional public 
procurement. The reason for this submission is that the requirement to be fair to all 
communities has the tendency to stifle private sector competition. Again, private sector 
consortia who feel obliged to meet such targets often resort to malpractices to conform to their 
burdensome requirements.   
   
6.2.3 Similarities between the Legal Frameworks for Public-Private Partnership in 
Nigeria and South Africa 
 
In this sub-section of the study, the focus is on similarities between the frameworks in Nigerian 
and South Africa. The key points for discussion are the tiers of government, the establishment 
of regulatory units for PPP, the standards required for PPP procurement, the emphasis on value 
for money as a key driver for PPP, as well as advancing PPP as a tool to ensure balanced 
regional development. 
 Similarly to the situation in Nigeria,812 the government of the Republic of South Africa 
is constituted at national, provincial and local spheres, which are distinctive yet interdependent 
and interrelated.813 While the Republic is made up of nine provinces,814 the local sphere of 
government in South Africa is the municipal government.815 Remarkably, there are distinct 
frameworks for the regulation of PPP at the national and sub-national level in both countries. 
To ensure the efficient regulation and monitoring of PPP projects, the Nigerian 
Infrastructure Concession and Regulatory Commission (Establishment Etc.) Act 2005 set up 
the Infrastructure Regulatory Commission (ICRC) as the regulatory institution for federal PPP 
                                                      
811 S. 217(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa states that ‘When an organ of state contracts for 
goods or services, it must do so in accordance with a system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and 
cost-effective.’ 
812 As stated under Section 6.2.1, above, Nigeria is a federation consisting of 36 states. 
813 S. 40(1) 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (as amended). 
814 S. 103(1) 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (as amended). The provinces are Eastern Cape 
Free State, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo, Mpumalanga, Northern Cape, North West; and Western Cape. 
815 S. 151(1) 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (as amended). 
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in the country. In the Republic of South Africa, a PPP unit established in the year 2000 under 
the National Treasury is charged with this responsibility. Notably, both Nigeria’s ICRC and 
South Africa’s National Treasury PPP Unit play a vital role in the creation of PPPs. However, 
in both Nigeria and South Africa the initiative to start up a PPP project lies with the ministry, 
department or agency (MDA) of government that is responsible for the project. In both 
jurisdictions, it is safe to say that the rationale for having dedicated PPP units is based on the 
reasoning that the MDA may not fully appreciate the budgetary implications of PPPs due to 
their off-budget nature.816  
Furthermore, while under section 20 of Nigeria’s Infrastructure Concession and 
Regulatory Commission (Establishment Etc.) Act 2005, the ICRC takes custody of every 
concession agreement and monitors compliance, the function of the South African PPP unit is 
to ensure that all agreements comply with the legal requirements of affordability, value for 
money and risk transfer.817 It needs to be observed that merely stating that the ICRC is to ensure 
compliance fails to specify what standards should be complied with. The function of ensuring 
compliance is clearly defined in South Africa but not in Nigeria, even though the ICRC 
maintains that it is driven by certain key principles.818 Consequently, this writer argues that in 
future amendments of the 2005 Act in Nigeria, the parameters with which all contracts should 
comply must be clearly defined for the sake of uniformity and to make the job of the ICRC 
easier. Furthermore, the technicalities involved in a PPP arrangement require a specialist unit 
in government to oversee any such transaction. Again, while the World Bank rates the South 
African PPP environment as strong, with a solid track record in delivering major projects 
because of an active and efficient dedicated PPP unit,819 Nigeria’s equivalent, the ICRC, is still 
learning the ropes. Fundamentally, the ICRC appears to lack the powers of a regulator in the 
event of failure by ministries, department or agencies (MDAs) to adhere to contractual terms, 
as can be seen in some of the case studies in Chapter Four of this research. It is the submission 
                                                      
816 Philippe Burger, ‘The dedicated PPP Unit of the South African National Treasury’ (2006), a presentation 
delivered at the Symposium on Agencies and Public-Private Partnerships, organised by the OECD and the 
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Africa (National Treasury PPP Unit, 2007) at 5. 
819 The World Bank, ‘South Africa’ available at https://pppknowledgelab.org/countries/south-africa accessed on 
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of this writer that the ICRC must not only claim to but must also be able to exercise the powers 
of a regulator, especially when the matter relates to public sector compliance. 
The standards required for PPP procurement in both jurisdictions are quite similar. Both 
Nigeria820 and South Africa, in line with international best practice, regard the best value for 
money outcome as a key consideration for PPP projects. In other words, for a project to be 
procured by way of a PPP, it must be evident that it is cheaper to do so that via the traditional 
public procurement procedure.821 Other considerations include appropriate risk transfer, risk 
allocation and affordability. It is a fundamental requirement in both jurisdictions that risks 
should be transferred to the party who is better suited to manage them. Again, it makes no 
business sense to embark on a project that is not financially viable. Consequently, it is evident 
that both jurisdictions must allow for exceptions, especially for projects where the concession 
type of PPP may not be appropriate but for which partnership with the private sector may be 
beneficial. The building of new prisons or public libraries would fit into this category.  
In South Africa, PPPs are considered a tool for Black Economic Empowerment 
(BEE),822 requiring the formation of private consortia in the form of special purpose vehicles 
(SPVs) for PPPs.  This is intended to facilitate long-term beneficial partnerships between new 
black-enterprises and experienced, resourced companies, both as equity partners and in project 
management, and both at the private party SPV and subcontracting levels.823 Invoking a similar 
rationale, Nigeria considers PPP a tool to ensure balanced regional development.824 Taking into 
consideration South Africa’s history of apartheid and Nigeria’s highly nuanced history of the 
ethnic and regional marginalisation of various sections of the country at different times, it is 
not surprising that government in both countries consider PPP as a ‘political tool’ to right 
societal wrongs. Thus, in South Africa, it is expected that the previously marginalised African 
population will be given opportunities in the procurement of PPP projects. In Nigeria, since an 
equitable distribution of government facilities across the geo-political zones in the country is 
deemed ideal, there is an assumption that in PPP procurement, as much as possible, all sections 
of the community must be catered to. It is submitted that for PPPs to be attractive to the private 
                                                      
820 See the National Policy on Public-Private Partnership at 12. 
821 Axis Consulting, op cit note 821 at 12. 
822 See Module 2: Code of Good Practice for BEEE in PPPs in South Africa. 
823 National Treasury ‘Public Private Partnership’ available at http://www.ppp.gov.za/Pages/whatisppp.aspx 
accessed on 19 October 2017. 
824 See National Policy on Public-Private Partnership at 2. 
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sector, there must be a distinction between PPP and traditional procurement in terms of the 
equitable spread of public facilities. The reason is that while the public sector must be fair and 
willing to ensure equity in terms of the distribution of public facilities and the empowerment 
of its citizens, the private sector is ultimately driven by the prospect of making profits. For 
example, the equitable distribution of airports in Nigeria may require the construction of new 
airports in Lagos as well as in smaller towns.  But while a new airport in Lagos may be 
attractive to investors, a similar project by way of a PPP in a small town with low business 
activity will likely hold no attraction for private investors.  Similarly, a foreign investor with 
an interest in PPP in South Africa may be challenged by the BEE requirements in the country. 
The requirements add avoidable complexity to the ease of doing business in the country in so 
far as foreign direct investment is concerned. 
 
6.2.4 Areas of Divergence in the Legal Framework for Nigeria and South Africa 
 
In this sub-section the main areas of divergence between the frameworks are discussed. The 
areas with notable differences include the origin of the main legislation for PPP, the scope of 
application of the PPP laws in both jurisdictions, and the key stages in the PPP life cycle in 
Nigeria and South Africa. 
 While Nigeria has a principal law passed in 2005 to regulate PPP transactions, South 
Africa does not have one. Instead, the National Treasury issued Regulation 16 in 2004 pursuant 
to the Public Finance Management Act. It seems a paradox that the main law for PPP is a 
product of the legislature in Nigeria whereas the regulation for PPP in South Africa is the 
product of a public agency. But while an investor or anyone with an interest in PPP in Nigeria 
must consult a web of laws including the main PPP law to get a grasp of the regulatory 
environment for PPP, a similar exercise in South Africa is less cumbersome. It is therefore safe 
to say that, in the opinion of this writer, PPP is over-regulated in Nigeria.  
 Another point of divergence is that at the national and sub-national levels in Nigeria, 
different PPP laws apply. The Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission 
(Establishment Etc.) Act 2005, which is an Act of the National Assembly, is the applicable law 
for PPP where there is a partnership involving any federal ministries, departments or agencies 
(MDA) and the private sector. At the sub-national level, states that wish to introduce the PPP 
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model of procurement must establish their own local PPP framework.825 The case in South 
Africa is quite different, as the same laws and regulations apply to both the national and 
provincial governments. Municipal authorities are an exception, since they are guided by the 
Municipal Finance Management Act No. 56 of 2003. It is submitted that the Nigerian structure 
best suits a federation since it affords each state the opportunity to tailor its PPP framework to 
its needs. A clear case is that the federal law for PPP in Nigeria does not allow for the private 
finance initiative (PFI) type of PPP, thus restricting PPPs at the national level to concessions. 
However, the PPP law in Rivers State does not restrict PPPs to the concession type only. The 
current South African framework, on the other hand, appears not to allow the various provinces 
to cater to their unique needs.  
Furthermore, the framework in Nigeria requires that apart from the Infrastructure 
Concession and Regulatory Commission (ICRC), every state in the federation that sets up a 
local framework must also establish a local PPP unit for that state.826 As suggested earlier, PPP 
units at state level should be more effective. However, in the short term, because of the 
technical nature of PPP transactions, there could be a dearth of available expertise at this stage 
of PPP development in the country.  It might not be efficient to burden the federal PPP unit 
with PPP transactions and arrangements in all the federated units of the country, as this could 
require huge resources to achieve: officials would be expected to travel and be required to be 
conversant with the different frameworks in all the different states. If all 36 states in Nigeria 
were to have their own frameworks, it would be difficult for the ICRC to effectively manage 
and administer all transactions. Even though South Africa has only nine provinces and a 
national government, the single PPP unit confers a sense of uniformity, even though it does not 
allow for the development of PPP expertise at the second tier of government. 
Finally, there is a key difference in the number of stages of the PPP project cycle.  In 
Nigeria the ICRC, in consonance with international best practice, has identified four phases: 
project development and appraisal; project procurement; project implementation; and project 
maturity.827 In practice, though, in the case of a solicited PPP procurement the process unfolds 
over 12 stages. It is submitted that the current arrangement is cumbersome and not good for 
                                                      
825 For example, states like Lagos, Rivers, Cross Rivers, Niger and Ekiti have established their own PPP 
frameworks. 
826 This position has been emphasised in Chapter Four of this research. 
827 Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission, ‘PPP Lifecycle’ available at http://www.icrc.gov.ng/ppp/ 
accessed on 20 October 2017. 
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business. Streamlining the process into six stages would be appropriate. The PPP project cycle 
– as provided for in Modules 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Public Private Partnership Manual issued by 
the South African National Treasury PPP Unit in terms of the Public Finance Management Act 
– is more attractive to an investor as it merely restates the four phases in a PPP life cycle in 
clearer terms. Placed side by side, a prospective investor is more likely to choose to invest in a 
PPP project in South Africa than in Nigeria because of the clarity and straightforwardness of 
the PPP process in South Africa.  
 
6.3 The Institutional Framework 
 
Apart from entrenching a legal framework for the administration and regulation of PPP in any 
given jurisdiction, it is imperative that an institutional framework be in place to ensure that the 
processes of initiation, administration, control and accountability regarding PPP projects match 
international best practice. Thus, the better to implement PPPs, many countries have introduced 
PPP institutional frameworks to provide a description of the roles required of different public 
institutions that contribute to the development of PPP policy, while at the same time supporting 
project delivery.828 The institutional arrangements in most countries include primarily the PPP 
unit and the MDAs that are relevant to the procurement and execution of the PPP project. 
A strong and effective regulatory regime is a necessity in order to attract large-scale 
private sector investment.829 When investors have the perception that the institutions charged 
with responsibility for initiating or superintending the project and its outcome are not strong 
enough or are inconsistent, the chances of the private sector participating in PPP execution and 
delivery are very slim. It is important that the criteria for appointing the heads or members of 
the MDAs directly responsible for PPP delivery should be based strictly upon expertise, 
experience and ability to deliver. This is a major challenge for a country like Nigeria, burdened 
by a ‘federal character’ principle which requires that:  
 
The composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its 
agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a 
manner to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to 
promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty and 
thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a 
                                                      
828 European PPP Expertise Centre PPP legal and institutional frameworks in the Western Balkans (2014) at 19. 
829 The Institute for Public Private Partnerships Development of Policy, Legal, and Institutional Framework for 
the Public-Private Partnership Programme in Malawi (2007), a report submitted to the World Bank  
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few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that 
government or any of its agencies.830 
 
 
The implication of this federal character requirement is that some of those who are responsible 
for managing PPPs or making key decisions regarding them may lack expertise or experience, 
and are in their position by virtue of an employment quota. Their lack of expertise and 
experience renders them prone to error, and over time weakens the institutions concerned. It is 
submitted that, in order to spur economic growth, the federal character principle should be 
relaxed for key institutions in the country that are critical to the economy.  
 
6.3.1 Nigeria’s Institutional Framework for Public-Private Partnership 
 
The National Policy on Public-Private Partnership states as follows: 
 
The Government will create an institutional framework that will reinforce the 
accountability of Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) of the 
Federal Government for the delivery of public services within their areas of 
responsibility, whilst ensuring that they have access to appropriate guidance, 
training, expertise and resources to plan, procure and manage investment 
projects and public services efficiently and effectively taking into account 
value for money and long-term affordability. It will issue guidance for the 
benefit of those states that propose to develop their own PPP policies and 
programmes, and will set up mechanisms to coordinate these and encourage 
the development of standardised documents where appropriate. It will 
coordinate communication between the public authorities across the 
Federation and private sector contractors.831 
 
 
In the light of some of the cases studied in Chapter Four of this research, it does appear that 
the goals stated above have hardly been achieved. This is because of the lack of synergy 
between government agencies and the ICRC. It is the view of this writer that the ICRC as 
constituted has not shown itself to be a strong regulator when compared to other regulatory 
bodies in the country, like the Nigerian Broadcasting Commission (NBC) or the Nigerian 
Communications Commission (NCC), who are capable of imposing sanctions even on public 
establishments. While the NBC can take action against a public TV or radio station for an 
offensive broadcast, the ICRC is like the proverbial dog that does not bark, let alone bite. This 
weakness explains why the Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria (FAAN), for instance, is 
                                                      
830 Section 14(3) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). 
831 National Policy on Public Private Partnership (2008) at 5. 
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reneging on its contractual obligation to its PPP partner, Bi-Courtney Aviation Services Ltd, 
to enforce the use of the Murtala Mohammed Airport Terminal II by local flights landing in 
Lagos. As a regulator mandated to take PPP contracts into its custody and monitor 
performance, it is the duty of the ICRC to prevail on the FAAN to fulfil its obligation, to avoid 
the ugly situation in which Bi-Courtney Aviation Services Limited (the concessionaire) had to 
go to court to enforce that clause in the PPP contract.  
As presently constituted, the institutional framework for PPP in Nigeria is, in the 
opinion of this writer, akin to having too many cooks preparing one pot of broth. Apart from 
the ICRC, the primary institution for the administration and control of PPP at the national level 
in the country, there are several other MDAs including the National Planning Commission 
(NPC), the MDA initiating the project, the Federal Ministry of Finance, the Debt Management 
Office (DMO), the office of the Accountant General of the Federation, the Bureau of Public 
Procurement (BPP) and the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), all charged with different and 
sometimes overlapping functions. For example, while the Federal Ministry of Finance is 
responsible for evaluating and managing fiscal risk that may result from the terms of the 
agreements, the DMO is expected to be satisfied that any contingent liabilities are manageable 
within the Government’s economic and fiscal forecast. This clearly introduces multiple 
bureaucratic bottlenecks. As earlier observed, PPP is not traditional public procurement that 
requires government borrowing directly for the procurement of infrastructure. The unique 
nature of PPP in most cases requires private investors to seek funds to execute a project that 
will in the long run be paid for through tolls or charges from users of the facility. It is therefore 
submitted that a role for the DMO in the regulation and administration of PPP in the country 
is unnecessary, especially when government borrowing is not part of the funds earmarked for 
the project. In such a case, the process must not involve the DMO. 
Furthermore, how the institutions dealing with PPP in the country are to handle unsolicited 
proposals is not clearly defined. In line with international practice, a prospective investor may 
offer to partner with the public sector to execute and deliver a facility, even though such a 
project has not been initiated by the government or any of its agencies. The National Policy on 
Public-Private Partnership, merely states that some unsolicited proposals may be incorporated 
into an MDA’s investment programme where:  
 
i. The proposal concerns a sector with an established regulator and where there is an 
existing framework then the promoter may apply to the regulator for the relevant 
licences;  
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ii. Where the proposal confers rights, which could create a monopoly in the sector 
without an established regulator, the authority will consider the project in the 
context of its existing policies and project priorities and may adopt its investment 
programme; and 
iii. The project proponent would be able to compete for the project in the normal way 
and may be able to benefit from its prior knowledge and analysis.832 
Regrettably, the above is not a proper and clear-cut mechanism for receiving and examining 
unsolicited proposals from prospective private investors. It is submitted that the ICRC be 
empowered to receive unsolicited proposals, to examine and analyse them, and if they make 
good business sense, to present them to the MDA concerned to arrange for a competitive 
bidding process. 
 
6.3.1 South Africa’s Institutional Framework for Public-Private Partnership 
 
Compared to Nigeria’s, South Africa’s institutional framework for PPP is much more compact. 
Consequently, the process for the approval and execution of PPP projects in South Africa is 
less complex than in Nigeria. The same National Treasury provides the various treasury 
approvals for both the national and provincial PPP projects.833 Where there is a need to offer 
guarantees or indemnities, the Ministry of Finance is required to authorise any such 
transaction.834 By implication, if there is no need for the issue of guarantee or indemnity by the 
public authority there is no need for any such approval by the Ministry of Finance. This 
arrangement helps to expedite projects, unlike the Nigerian case where all national PPP projects 
must at one point or another have the approval of the Federal Ministry of Finance. 
A unique arrangement in South Africa is the location of the PPP Unit within the 
National Treasury. The same PPP Unit assists National Departments and Provincial 
Governments with PPPs. The unit is made up of seventeen professional staff who are allocated 
projects depending on individual sector expertise and interest. Even though the current 
structure is designed to enable efficiency and speed, the South African PPP Unit can be very 
easily overstretched and over-burdened. And while the institutional leanness is less 
cumbersome, the centralisation of the PPP unit in a large country like South Africa could stifle 
                                                      
832 Nigerian National Policy on Public Private Partnership. 
833 Axis Consulting op cit note 821 at 14. 
834 S.66 Public Finance Management Act 1999. 
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the development of PPP expertise. It seems reasonable to conclude that the creation of 
provincial and municipal units for PPP across the country would provide room for the 
development of experts and help strengthen the PPP regime in South Africa. 
  
6.4 Ease of Doing Business 
 
A favourable economic environment is an important requirement for a successful PPP regime. 
Since PPPs involve the participation of the private sector, the ease with which business can be 
initiated and carried on in any given jurisdiction is often a key consideration for prospective 
foreign investors wanting to determine whether it makes business sense to embark on a venture, 
especially with the public sector.  For about 15 years now, the World Bank has been publishing 
an annual report on the Ease of Doing Business in various countries of the world.835 The World 
Bank Survey on the Ease of Doing Business covers 11 areas of business regulation – starting 
a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting 
credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, 
resolving insolvency and some aspects of the labour laws.836 The Ease of Doing Business 
Report is a guide for investors and, as such, is one of the documents prospective PPP investors 
consider before making investments in any country. 
There is no doubt that enhanced ease of doing business in any country creates the 
needed stimulus for economic recovery and sustainable growth. In the light of the economic 
recession in Nigeria and South Africa’s current economic challenges, respectively, improving 
the ease of doing business in both countries is bound to be impactful. It follows therefore that 
governments in both countries should take a holistic approach to introducing reforms geared 
towards removing the barriers to trade. 
 
6.4.1 Ease of Doing Business in Nigeria in relation to Public-Private Partnership 
 
Nigeria is ranked by the World Bank as a lower-middle-income country and is positioned 169th 
of 189 countries in the Bank’s ease of doing business report as at 2017, which is one spot above 
                                                      
835 Africapedia ‘Africa in the doing of business 2017 rankings: Getting a good score is serious ‘do or die’ state 




its previous position in 2016.837 In Sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria occupies the 36th position.838 
Considering that the country climbed to the top spot as the largest economy in Africa in 2014,839 
its ranking in the ease of doing business report is poor. It is worthy of note that the 
administration of President Muhammadu Buhari in July 2016 established the Presidential 
Enabling Business Environment Council (PEBEC), with a mandate to remove bureaucratic and 
regulatory constraints to doing business in Nigeria.840 In the opinion of this writer, even though 
the PEBEC is chaired by the Vice President of the country, the chances are that it will remain 
business as usual without the commitment of public servants who are usually in charge of the 
day-to-day administration of the institutions with the mandate to ensure that specific targets 
are met. It appears that in their bid to improve Nigeria’s ease of business ranking, policy makers 
believe that simplifying the regulatory frameworks would work automatically, but in fact more 
is needed. In addition to simplifying the regulatory framework, steps must be taken to introduce 
market-friendly policies and, importantly, a re-orientation of the civil service. Indeed, even a 
simplified regulatory framework with the same public servants would be akin to putting new 
wine in old wine bottles, as civil servants in Nigeria are known to have the knack of making 
simple processes complex. 
It is further submitted that the incentives provided by the federal government of Nigeria 
in the agricultural,841 energy842 and power sectors,843 as well as the incentives available for 
foreign capital contribution, are very useful and must be maintained. However, the federal 
government must make the repatriation of profits and capital by foreign investors easier, as this 
is one area that has been challenging for businesses with foreign participants in the country. 
The situation has not been helped by lower crude oil earnings that have led to a scarcity of 
                                                      
837 The World Bank Doing Business 2017: Economy Profile Nigeria (2017) at 6. See also Tendai Dube ‘How 
Nigeria is improving its ease of doing business’ (2016) CNBC Africa available at 
https://www.cnbcafrica.com/news/western-africa/2016/04/25/nigeria-improvement-of-ease-of-doing-business/ 
accessed on 26 October 2017. 
838 The World Bank, ‘Economy rankings’ available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings accessed on 26 
October 2017. 
839 Price Waterhouse Coopers A Guide to Doing Business in Nigeria (2015) at 2. 
840 ‘Ease of doing business: FG moves to improve ranking’ The Vanguard 24 August 2017. 
841 VAT exemption on tractors, zero restriction on capital allowance claimable for companies in the agro-allied 
business. 
842 Tax free period of three years which may be renewed for a further two years, or 35% investment allowance. 
843 Exemption from VAT on plant and equipment acquired to generate electricity; exemption from import duties 
on plant and equipment imported to generate electricity through the utilisation of Nigerian gas. 
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foreign exchange. For example, about USD$175 million accruing as ticket sales for foreign 
airlines operating the Nigerian route is still trapped in the coffers of the federal government of 
Nigeria.844  Similarly, Nigeria’s unstable foreign exchange regime must be addressed. Apart 
from the foreign exchange risk that must be considered by prospective PPP investors, foreign 
lenders find it very unattractive to lend money to a country with an unstable forex regime. This 
is especially so because repayment of the monies advanced is usually in the local currency of 
the debtor. For example, if a lender in the United Kingdom lent out the sum of £1 billion to a 
PPP consortium in Nigeria in September 2014 at an exchange rate of N264/£1, the principal 
amount as at December 2017 would have almost doubled to N470/£1. The repayment of such 
a facility would be difficult, as tolls or charges to be paid by users may not have increased by 
over a hundred percent within the same period to enable the consortium to meet loan repayment 
demands. 
 
6.4.2 Ease of Doing Business in South Africa in relation to Public-Private Partnership 
 
The World Bank ranks South Africa as an upper-middle-income country. It is an African 
economic powerhouse with rich cultural diversity. In the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business 
Report for 2017, the country moved two places downwards from its previous 72nd out of 189 
countries to 74th position.845 In Sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa is ranked number four. An 
analysis of the report for South Africa reveals that while the country is highly ranked for the 
protection of investors, for getting credit 846 and for the ease with which construction permits 
can be obtained, it needs to improve in the areas of registration of properties and accessibility 
to electricity. It takes about 226 days to get electricity in South Africa. It is worrisome that it 
may take Eskom, the public utility company, about 60 days to provide an estimate after an 
application has been received, and another 165 days to complete external connection works.847 
The administration of President Zuma launched the ‘One Stop Shop’ to improve ease 
of doing business in South Africa, signalling the country’s intention to improve its efforts to 
                                                      
844 ‘As foreign airlines contend with trapped funds’ This Day 1 September 2017, available at 
https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/09/01/as-foreign-airlines-contend-with-trapped-funds/  accessed on 
20 November 2017. 
845 World Bank, Doing Business 2017: Economy Profile South Africa (2017) 6. 
846 South Africa is ranked first in the world in terms of the ease of getting credit. 
847 The World Bank, op cit note 857 at 6. 
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attract more foreign direct investment and new business.848 It is expected that this initiative 
will impact on South Africa’s attractiveness to foreign investors, especially those with a bias 
toward investments in infrastructure as an alternative to traditional investment instruments. 
It is worth pointing out that South Africa presents some challenges for the foreign 
investor. To the complex business culture in the country one must add the ripple effects of 
xenophobia. This could scare off expatriates since investors often have compatriots in 
communities where they have their investments. It is therefore submitted that the South African 
government must proactively seek a solution to the problem of xenophobia and address it. The 
delay in accessing electricity also needs to be addressed to help improve on the country’s 
performance in terms of the ease of doing business. 
 
6.5 Access to Credit for Public-Private Partnerships 
 
Without finance, there cannot be a PPP in the first place.  Infrastructure investment is usually 
characterised by large up-front capital outlay during the construction phase, with relatively 
smaller operational costs.849 As a corollary, investors approach lenders to help finance PPP 
projects. Over time, PPPs have developed a distinctive form of credit financing referred to as 
project finance.850 Credit risk is therefore a key element in PPP contracts, and indeed is 
significant in the structuring of PPP finance. This is in line with the basic investment tenet of 
a positive correlation between risk and the cost of finance, such that the more risk a lender is 
expected to take, the higher the required rate of return on the investment. In this regard, the 
public sector must ensure that a project is best tackled as a PPP before selecting that option. 
This is because a government may obtain funds more cheaply than a private sector concern 
because it is considered a low risk borrower.851 Due to the huge capital outlay involved, funding 
                                                      
848 CGTN Africa ‘One stop shop to improve doing business launched in South Africa’ available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VV1GJsI9cKU accessed on 26 October 2017. 
849 Laura Turley & Abby Semple ‘Financing sustainable public-private partnerships’ (2013) International Institute 
for Sustainable Development Briefing Note 3. 
850 ‘Project Finance’ is defined as ‘a method of funding in which the lender looks primarily to the money generated 
by a single project as security for the loan. This type of financing is usually used for large, complex and expensive 
single-purpose projects such as power plants, chemical processing plants, mines and toll roads.’ See Black’s Law 
Dictionary 9th ed at 663. 
851 Ibid. 
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for a PPP project is typically acquired from various sources, which may be a combination of 
equity and debt.852 
The project sponsors are the investors in the project company or consortium. They 
provide the expertise and some of the services rendered by the project company such as 
construction or operations. The kind of funding that sponsors provide is usually referred to as 
equity. These are contributions in the form of shares. In practice, equity funding is the lowest 
in the order of priority of funding contributions to a project. Thus other contributors, especially 
lenders, have the right to project assets and revenues before equity contributors receive any 
return or, on termination or insolvency, any repayment. Hence, equity contributors are the 
highest risk takers.853 
Debt for the project may be obtained from a diversity of sources, including commercial 
lenders, institutional investors, export credit agencies, bilateral or multilateral organisations, 
bondholders and sometimes the grantor.  In contemporary times, some countries have also been 
exploring Shari’a financing for infrastructure. In Islamic financing, however, the Islamic 
financing institution must own the underlying assets, which would therefore not be available 
as security to other lenders.854 
 
6.5.1 Access to Credit for Public-Private Partnership in Nigeria 
 
Globally Nigeria stands at 44 in a ranking of 190 economies in terms of the ease of getting 
credit.855 But since PPPs are long-term investments usually spanning 20 to 30 years, and 
because the financial market in Nigeria is still evolving, obtaining credit for PPP projects is 
extremely challenging for promoters. It is therefore important to highlight the options for 
financing PPP projects in Nigeria. 
A primary channel of finance for PPP projects is equity. Promoters of the project – the 
consortium – usually set aside their equity for the project company. This type of funding is not 
difficult to raise within the country, given the experience described in case studies examined 
in Chapter Four. For example, the Bi-Courtney Aviation Services Ltd Murtala Mohammed 
                                                      
852 The World Bank ‘Source of financing and inter-creditor agreement’ available at 
https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/financing/sources accessed on 26 October 2017. 
853 Ibid. 
854 Jason West ‘Islamic finance and the resources sector: A natural fit for project finance’ (2013) 9.2 Journal of 
Islamic Economics, Banking and Finance at 14. 
855 The World Bank op cit note 864 at 81. 
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Terminal 2 PPP Project and the Lekki Concession Project are good illustrations of a PPP 
arranged by the federal government in conjunction with a state government. These projects 
were successfully executed, and although subsequently marred by challenges, they evidence 
the fact that Nigerian promoters can arrange equity contributions to the project company with 
relative ease.  
As a mono-economy, Nigeria is burdened by a weak financial sector, with lenders 
preferring the attractions of the oil industry. Even though the World Bank views Nigeria as one 
of the most promising pipelines for PPP projects in Africa, given the support for the use of PPP 
in the development of infrastructure in Nigeria’s 2016 budget,856 local financing from the 
country’s commercial banks for long-term infrastructure is hard to come by.857 The argument 
is that few projects in the country are bankable, and that the preparation process for PPP in the 
country is not yet sophisticated enough to address bankability issues, making it difficult to 
obtain credit.858 However, this writer’s view is that since PPP is a new phenomenon in the 
country, the waters are still being tested, with lenders preferring lending to sectors that have 
gained their trust over the years. Naturally, as success is achieved in the arrangement, execution 
and operation of PPP projects in the country, this trust will in due course be earned. Typically, 
the need for debt financing for infrastructure projects is substantially greater than equity.  Debt 
financing in Nigeria is customarily provided by commercial banks with relatively short tenure. 
A second funding option being explored for PPPs in Nigeria is tailor-made 
infrastructure funds. Infrastructure funds are considered alternative investment instruments to 
traditional investments in equities and the money market. A period of economic depression 
followed the global financial crisis, resulting in foreign investors recalling their investments in 
the Nigerian capital market in the late 2000s. Coupled with the volatile nature of the stock 
market, this crisis led investors to show more interest in alternative, less unpredictable 
investments like Infrastructure Funds. In recognition of the massive opportunities for 
Infrastructure Funds, the country’s Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued the 
Rules on Infrastructure Funds to provide guidance to fund managers and Infrastructure Capital 
                                                      
856 The World Bank ‘PPP knowledge lab: Nigeria’ available at https://pppknowledgelab.org/countries/nigeria 
accessed on 26 October 2017. 
857 Obinna Chima ‘Nigeria: Adopting the public private partnership model’ This Day 11 May 2016. 
858 Detail Solicitors ‘Securing finance for infrastructure development (public private partnership) projects in 
Nigeria’ (2009) available at 
http://www.detailsolicitors.com/index.php?section=news&cmd=details&newsid=2&printview=1&pdfview=1 
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Companies. The Rules define ‘infrastructure fund’ to be a specialised fund or scheme that 
invests primarily (minimum 90% of the scheme’s net assets) in the securities or securitised 
debt instrument of a specified range of companies, namely: infrastructure companies, 
infrastructure capital companies, infrastructure projects, special purpose vehicles which are 
created for facilitating or promoting investment in infrastructure, and other permissible assets, 
including the revenue-generating projects of infrastructure companies or the projects of special 
purpose vehicles (SPVs).859 
Under the Rules, an infrastructure fund may only be registered with the SEC when the 
fund manager has a minimum of two key personnel having experience in the infrastructure 
sector.860  Clearly, merely having experience in the infrastructure sector is too wide a definition. 
The Rules should provide that the two personnel must be experienced in infrastructure finance 
in terms that define their level of experience.  
The Fund may be an open or a close-ended scheme with a minimum tenure of seven 
years, or an interval scheme with a lock-in period of five years and an interval period not longer 
than one month, as may be specified in the scheme information document. Furthermore, the 
indicative portfolio of the fund must be disclosed to its potential investors stating the type of 
assets the fund would invest in.861 It is pertinent to note that the introduction of infrastructure 
funds has helped to widen the scope of opportunities for investment in Nigeria. Regrettably, 
however, fund managers in Nigeria who offer investment in infrastructure funds target only 
high net-worth (HNI) clients. The entry threshold to subscribe to any of the funds makes it 
impracticable for most of the population, bearing in mind that Nigeria is a lower-middle-
income country. Two prominent infrastructure funds are the Chapel Hill Nigeria Infrastructure 
Debt Fund denominated in Naira and managed by Chapel Hill Denham Management Ltd, and 
the ARM Harith Fund, which was incorporated in 2013 with total commitments of 
approximately US$91 million. The Fund is an investor in the US$876 million 450MW Azura-
Edo independent power plant currently under construction in the country.862 Infrastructure 
funds provide investment opportunities to investors as well as funding for PPP projects. In the 
view of this writer, the SEC should require fund managers to set an investment threshold that 
makes it feasible for low-middle income earners in the country to invest in infrastructure funds. 
                                                      
859 Rule 1 SEC Rules on Infrastructure Funds. 
860 Rule 3 SEC Rules on Infrastructure Funds. 
861 Rule 4 SEC Rules on Infrastructure Funds. 
862 ARM-Harith ‘Who we are’ available at http://armharith.com.ng/about/ accessed on 27 October 2017. 
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That is, the minimum threshold for infrastructure funds should be reduced so as to target the 
lower end of the market. In this way investors with modest means will also be able to benefit 
from the returns on investment in infrastructure, leading to a more broad-based economic 
growth pattern. 
In 2017, the federal government of Nigeria introduced a third PPP financing option, the 
sukuk bond. The sukuk bond is an instrument in Islamic finance meant to fund large-scale 
infrastructure projects. Unlike conventional bonds, the proceeds of which can be used for a 
variety of purposes including recurrent expenditure, funds realised from the sukuk instrument 
can only be used for infrastructure assets. The investors in the sukuk receive income based on 
those assets rather than interest on conventional bonds.863 Importantly, sukuk financing 
necessitates full disclosure of the project that the fund would invest in. The N100 billion sukuk 
bond will pay out a rental income of as much as 16.47% per annum every six months to 
investors in the bond.864 This notwithstanding, the federal government needs to educate non-
Muslims about the benefits of the sukuk bond. This is because Nigeria is a multi-religious 
country in which the different religious groups tend to be suspicious of one another. The 
introduction of the sukuk bond has already been the subject of criticism by the Christian 
Association of Nigeria (CAN), who have expressed the opinion that floating an Islamic bond 
is tantamount to Islamising the country.865 It is therefore submitted that the obvious advantages 
of the sukuk – its being considered a liquid asset, the rental income being tax-exempt and its 
listing on the Nigerian Stock Exchange – should be effectively communicated to all interest 
groups in the country. Worthy of note is that despite the criticism of CAN, Nigeria’s initial 
sukuk bond was over-subscribed.866 
A fourth channel of finance for PPP projects consists of pension funds.  Pension funds 
managed by Pension Fund Administrators (PFAs) may be deployed to raise finance for PPP 
projects in the country. Although the Pension Reform Act 2014 does not specifically name 
infrastructure as an area for the investment of pension funds, it is sufficiently broadly worded 
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864 The Islamic religion forbids the paying out of interest, and hence the income derived from the Sukuk is referred 
to as rental income. 
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to include infrastructure financing.867 Further, the Guidelines for investing pension funds 
prescribed by the National Pension Commission (PENCOM) include specialist investment 
funds and other financial instruments as the Commission may from time to time approve. Based 
on the foregoing, it is accepted that pension assets may be invested in the provision of 
infrastructure. As at August 2017 about 0.08% of pension fund assets were invested in 
infrastructure funds in Nigeria.868 This ratio of investment appears meagre. Considering that 
about N6 trillion ($16.6 billion) is held in pension assets, an increase in the ratio allocated to 
infrastructure would not only benefit the over 7 million retirement savings account (RSA) 
holders869 in terms of return on investments, but would also boost the economy of the country 
in the long run. It is worthy of note that, according to Rule 2.1 of the Regulation of Investment 
of Pension Fund Assets 2017, PFAs shall invest pension fund assets with the objectives of 
ensuring safety and maintenance of fair returns. Under Rule 4.7 of the Guidelines, PFAs may 
invest pension assets in specialist investment funds whose underlying assets are tangible 
physical assets, including real estate investment trusts (REITs) registered by SEC; private 
equity funds registered with SEC; and infrastructure funds registered with SEC. The above 
express provision notwithstanding, there is a reluctance in the country to invest pension assets 
in infrastructure because of anxiety over asset preservation. Even though infrastructure funds 
offer the potential for pension fund members to reap higher and consistent returns on 
investment, the huge dearth of alternative asset products in the financial markets in Nigeria, 
liquidity risk, political risk in PPP projects, and the competitive yields offered by the risk-free 
federal government fixed income instruments, make infrastructure funds less attractive to 
PFAs.870 It is submitted that a number of steps must be taken by policy makers to ensure a 
healthy environment for the investment of pension assets in infrastructure. First, the viability 
and bankability of a project must be established before a PPP option is chosen for that project. 
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This implies that PPP projects must not be pursued simply on the basis of the federal character 
principle. Secondly, a full repayment guarantee on the part of government will provide PFAs 
with the necessary confidence; and thirdly, the government must address the fears of pension 
fund contributors and the labour unions about the safety of pension fund assets invested in 
infrastructure funds. 
 
6.5.2 Access to Credit for Public-Private Partnership in South Africa and Lessons for 
Nigeria 
 
As noted above, South Africa’s financial market is much more developed than Nigeria’s. For 
example, Treasury Regulation 16 is not prescriptive about the financing of a PPP in South 
Africa.871 Hence, the assumption is that the method of financing a project varies from project 
to project and sector to sector.872 Furthermore, the South African market has a wider range of 
products and instruments available for investors interested in funding infrastructure. 
The options available for funding infrastructure, such as equity provided by the 
promoters of the project, and debt financing such as bonds and credit from commercial banks, 
are similar to those in Nigeria, discussed above. In this section the focus rests rather upon South 
African pension funds and infrastructure funds in the provision of credit to PPP. This focus 
should be seen in the light of a template that might be followed by policy makers in Nigeria, 
since this is one area where the financial market is still evolving in that country. 
Pension funds in South Africa873 clearly demonstrate the huge potential of pension 
funds to drive economic growth. They serve as anchor investors for infrastructure and social 
development projects. 874 The Bright Africa report by consultancy firm RisCura indicates that 
at the end of 2014 out of the US$334 billion pension funds under management across 16 major 
African markets, South Africa accounted for US$258 billion.875 In 2014, South Africa’s Eskom 
Pension and Provident Fund (EPPF) invested $30 million in infrastructure projects through 
private-equity house Abraaj, based in Dubai, as well as in mobile phone infrastructure through 
                                                      
871 National Treasury PPP Unit op cit note 835 at 9. 
872 Ibid at 9. 
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London’s Helios.876 The diversification of pension fund assets demonstrated in these South 
African investments should be explored by the pension industry in Nigeria. There must be a 
balance between being too cautious and not generating enough returns for pension fund 
members and taking moderate risk to generate greater returns, considering that returns are often 
proportionate to risk. The current cautious approach by PFAs, as dictated by Nigeria’s 
PENCOM, is clearly influenced by the need to ensure the safety of RSA holders’ funds but 
may not be ideal if fund growth is considered important. It is therefore submitted that a middle 
ground approach be adopted, with the right risk assessment measures put in place to ensure 
that pension fund members receive better returns on their investments. This will involve the 
use of funds and investment management experts with experience in producing competitive 
returns while ensuring fund safety. 
Because of its well-developed financial market, compared to its peers in Africa South 
Africa has a wide range of infrastructure funds that investors may choose from. It seems worth 
analysing one such fund, the South Africa Infrastructure Fund (SAIF). The fund size is $1,855 
million. The first 20-year infrastructure fund in South Africa, it matured in June 2016. The 
Fund invested in a number of projects within and beyond South Africa, as follows: the 
Bakwena Platinum Corridor Concession, with a 62% indirect interest in the 385km toll road; 
the N3 Toll Concession (38%); ICO Global Communications Holdings (1%); Ucingo Trust 
(38% in the 415km toll road); Trans African Concessions, South Africa and Mozambique (50% 
interest in 570km toll road); and the African Portland Holdings Mozambique and Namibia 
(34% interest in port and logistics terminals), among others.877 Upon the maturation of the 
Fund, the managers, African Infrastructure Investment Managers (AIIM), announced the 
successful sale of investments in three privately-concessioned toll roads in South Africa. The 
transactions were successfully concluded on 4 July 2016. The sale is the largest private equity 
realisation for toll road infrastructure in Africa.878 According to Jurie Swart, the CEO of AIIM, 
the sale transaction demonstrates the increasing development of the African infrastructure 
sector and addresses the concern investors may have around the ability to dispose of 
infrastructure assets.879 The success of the liquidation of the SAIF fund is a lesson for Nigeria’s 
                                                      
876 Tom Minney op cit note 808. 
877 Africa Infrastructure Investment Managers, ‘South Africa Infrastructure Fund’ available at 
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policy makers, fund managers as well as private and institutional investors, in the sense that it 
provides a workable template for similar funds in South Africa, Nigeria and elsewhere on the 
continent. With the involvement of experts and other fundamentals in place, infrastructure 
funds can help to grow the economy as well as ensure that funds are safely invested and paid 
back to investors at maturity. It is also submitted that more infrastructure funds should be 
established, considering that the infrastructure funding gap in Africa creates investment 
opportunities. Since Africa still requires at least US$93 billion in infrastructure investment per 
annum,880 and given the shortage or even absence of such facilities in many countries in sub-
Saharan Africa, there is room for the provision of more infrastructure funds like SAIF. It is 
also suggested that South African infrastructure funds consider investing in other countries, 
especially where the environment is healthy for such investments and the right risk assessment 
measures are in place.  
The successes of high investment finance notwithstanding, there is still room for the 
involvement of prospective investors at the lower end of the market where the majority of the 
South African population is located. In this regard, this writer believes that South African 
infrastructure funds should create mirror funds specifically targeted at the lower end of the 
market in the country, in line with the recommendation made in the section on Nigeria, above. 
 
6.6 Stable Political and Social Environment 
 
A key obstacle to success for PPPs is the lack of political will to ensure that they indeed 
succeed. An unstable political and social environment is clearly detrimental to PPPs. Policy 
makers should also address the frequent changes in administration in ministries, departments 
and agencies (MDAs).881 The private sector and other key players in PPP require strong support 
from the government and where this is lacking, the terrain becomes very difficult for private 
investors to navigate. It is essential that political issues beyond the remit of the private sector 
should be responsibly handled by the government. For example, it is the prerogative of the 
government to ensure that adequate compensation is paid for land taken over from private 
individuals or the community for any given PPP project. When this is not done, it is not 
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uncommon for members of the community to disrupt workers on site or vandalise equipment. 
It is incumbent on the public sector to provide a strong, mature and stable environment for 
PPPs to flourish. Because PPPs are vulnerable to political pressures, it is imperative that 
political office holders and public officials are committed to PPP success. 
 
6.6.1 The Political Climate and Public-Private Partnership in Nigeria 
 
Militating against the success of PPPs in Nigeria is political instability. There is a general 
inconsistency and lack of clarity with policies. For example, even though the administration of 
the immediate past President Goodluck Jonathan considered PPP a tool for the realisation of 
Nigeria’s Goal 20:2020 objective,882 that administration did not provide the necessary support 
that Bi-Courtney Highway Services Ltd critically needed to succeed in the Lagos-Ibadan 
Expressway Project (as discussed above). The government declined to provide the guarantees 
that the concessionaire required to secure funding for the project. Furthermore, the MDA 
responsible for the project refused to refer the dispute arising from the concession to arbitration. 
In the end, the contract was revoked and awarded to another concessionaire with government 
funding as a PPP. The concessionaire was blamed for failing to secure a facility for the project, 
but the refusal of the government to provide the needed assistance was what ultimately 
frustrated the project, thus adding to the number of failed projects in the country.883 While the 
failure of the original concessionaire to fully comprehend the terms of the contract it signed is 
not justifiable, the attitude of government officials in the whole saga is a huge let down as far 
as attracting the interest of the private sector to PPP in Nigeria is concerned. 
 It is important that politicians refrain from playing politics with PPP projects. The case 
of the failed Lekki Concession Road Toll Project is a good example. Despite the accolades and 
awards received for the successful arrangement of that concession, the opposition political 
party in Lagos State on the lookout for votes made it seem as if it was wrong for the state 
government to partner with the private sector in the provision of infrastructure. To appeal to 
voters in the state, the gubernatorial candidate of the opposition party, ahead of the 2015 
elections, campaigned against the Lekki PPP, asserting that the provision of roads was a 
traditional prerogative of the public sector and promising that his government would ensure 
that the citizens would not be burdened by the payment of tolls on public roads. Sensing that 
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this strategy would result in the loss of the gubernatorial seat in the state, the ruling party 
cancelled an already successfully arranged PPP project and bought back the concession. This 
was a bad signal to prospective investors. 
Interference by government officials in the affairs of public institutions is also a minus 
as far as a healthy investment environment for PPP in Nigeria is concerned. It is submitted that 
public institutions must be strengthened and enabled to do their work. The minister of works 
under the President Jonathan administration meddled with the Lagos-Ibadan Expressway 
Concession Project, virtually usurping the role of the Infrastructure Concession and Regulatory 
Commission (ICRC). 
Furthermore, a situation in which government is not perceived as a continuum is not 
healthy for PPP investments. It is common for succeeding governments in Nigeria to flout 
continuity and jettison the policies of the previous government, even when the new leadership 
is from the same political party as the government it has succeeded. There appears to be little 
interest in continuing with a project not initiated by the new administration. The perception is 
that if a new administration does not initiate its own projects, it has failed to fulfil its electoral 
promises. The result is that existing projects are abandoned and fresh ones are started. It is 
submitted that the completion of existing projects must become a yardstick for assessing the 
performance of political office holders. Furthermore, the abandonment of projects or policies 
that are geared towards the development of the economy by political office holders must be 
considered grave enough to attract legal and political consequences, including impeachment 
from office. 
Disrespect for court orders when they are not in favour of the government must be 
severely penalised as it fundamentally undermines the rule of law. This writer submits that the 
National Assembly (as well as state houses of assembly) in Nigeria must, in the exercise of 
their powers to check the executive, develop sanctions for erring MDAs such as the Federal 
Airport Aviation Authority of Nigeria, which has persistently refused to abide by court orders 
in its case with Bi-Courtney Aviation Services Ltd. 
 
6.6.2 The Political Climate and Public-Private Partnership in South Africa 
 
There is no doubt that, comparatively speaking, the political environment in South Africa is 
committed to the success of PPPs. While it is true that there is room to achieve more via a 
greater level of commitment, results are often the best measure for determining whether PPPs 
are successful in any given jurisdiction. As far as setting up the structures for PPPs is 
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concerned, South Africa is one of the leading countries in the world.884  A 2007 report on the 
performance of PPPs in South Africa found that, as of that date, there was poor communication 
of policies as well as a lack of policy direction.885  It appears that this is no longer the case, 
however, given the PPP successes that have since been recorded in SA. It was inevitable that 
there would be a challenging teething phase in the country’s PPP policy regime. The African 
Development Bank (AfDB) has identified key risks in South African PPP as including the 
inability of the government to address land acquisition issues, tariff setting and the need to 
further encourage PPP investments.886 Moreover, the potential of PPP is not being utilised 
much at subnational levels. In this regard, this writer submits that there should be PPP units at 
the provincial and municipal levels to assist small-scale PPPs. Such units would be much closer 
to regional and community infrastructural needs and projects than the National Treasury PPP 
unit. 
 
6.7 Judicial Review of Decisions of the Public Sector in Commercial Transactions 
 
The need to check the arbitrary powers of governments when they deal with the private sector 
parties is vital to the argument in this thesis. This is because in a contract between a public 
authority and private sector parties, the former is always the dominant party. It goes without 
saying that since the public sector is in a position of authority, it could abuse its powers. Judicial 
review is therefore, an effective deterrent to cases of excesses and abuse of power by the public 
authority.887 Put simply, it is ‘…the power of the court in appropriate proceedings before it to 
declare a governmental measure either contrary or in accordance with the Constitution or other 
governing law, with the effect of rendering the measure invalid or void or vindicating its 
validity..’888 The vexed issue here is whether the public authority is exempt from the principles 
of private law i.e. pacta sunt servanda when it contracts with a private entity for the execution 
of a public contract.889 To this end, Quinot states as follows: 
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If one accepts that state commercial  activity may amount to administrative 
action judicial review should in principle be available…However, there are 
legitimate concerns about efficient and effective state administration, 
particularly in a resource-challenged country like South Africa, which supports 
limits to judicial review of commercial decisions.890 
 
Where however, it is clear that the public authority has acted beyond its powers or has abused 
any such powers, for instance the unilateral cancellation of  a PPP arrangement by a  succeeding 
administration because the project is not considered as a priority for the new government, the 
need to resort to a judicial review of the action of the public authority becomes necessary.891 
In the sub-sections below, the attitude of the courts in relation to whether the public authority 
has abused its powers while dealing with the private sector in a commercial transaction in both 
Nigerian and South Africa are examined. 
 
6.7.1 Judicial Review of Public Sector Actions in  Commercial Transactions Nigeria 
 
For commerce to thrive, people  must abide by their agreements. In the same way, the public 
sector is duty bound to respect agreements entered into with the private sector. The courts have 
a role to play in this regard. In Abdulkarim v In Car Nigeria Limited,892 the Supreme Court of 
Nigeria per Nnaemeka-Agu JSC (as he then was)  described the functions of the court as far as 
judicial review is concerned. These include the need to ensure that every arm of government 
plays its role in the true spirit of the principle of the separation of powers; secondly that every 
public functionary performs his functions according to the law, including the Constitution; and 
thirdly, the Supreme Court reviews its own decisions to ensure that the country does not suffer 
under the same regime of obsolete or wrong decisions. It is settled law that the public authority 
must act within enabling instruments893 and is subject to judicial review.894 
 As it relates to commercial transactions, Ezeike notes that commercial and economic 
life of people in society is woven around agreements  and as such, where the public authority 
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is a party to a commercial transaction, the obligation to respect contractual terms  is 
sacrosanct.895 Thus, even in their sovereign might, the public authority has a duty to honour 
binding agreements.896 The courts in Nigeria have been firm on the need for the public authority 
to respect contractual decisions.  For example, in Golden Construction Company Ltd v Stateco 
Nigeria Ltd  & Nasarawa State Government,897 the Court of Appeal, sitting in the Makurdi 
Division reiterated the need for governmental parties to at all levels to respect agreements. The 
Court, per Omoleye JCA held as follows: 
 
The parties to any contract and the court are bound by the terms or conditions 
in a contract, whether parol or written, between contracting parties…This has 
acquired the sobriquet and mantra of sanctity of contract which is expressed in 
the maxim, pacta sunt servanda, which means the non-fraudulent agreement 
of parties must be observed.898 
 
The court further held that it is incumbent on governments at any level to keep faith with 
agreements freely made with non-governmental parties, particularly when it comes to 
payments for work duly executed by the latter.899 This decision shows that when called upon, 
the courts in the country will rise to the occasion to enforce contractual agreements between 
the public sector and private entities. Similarly, in Sino-Afric Agricultural & Ind. Co. Ltd & 2 
Others v Ministry of Finance Inc & Attorney General, Kano State,900 the Court of Appeal, 
Kaduna Division determined inter alia whether the parties (in this case private entities and the 
public authority in Kano State) where bound to honour an arbitration agreement. The facts of 
the case are as follows: The Kano State Government  entered into an agreement with the first 
appellant for the supply of 100,000 tones of Urea Fertilizer at the cost of N4 billion. The second 
appellant  was surety for advancement and full performance of the whole contract. A dispute 
arose out of the contract between the first appellant and the Kano State Government. However, 
instead of referring the dispute to arbitration as stipulated in Clause 12 of the contract 
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agreement, the respondents instituted an action against the appellants at the High Court in Kano 
State. The Court of Appeal held that  the law is generally keen to uphold the validity of 
arbitration clauses  even when they lack the formal language of associated with legal contracts. 
Having established that the courts would insist that the public authority honours contractual 
obligations with the private sector901 and that arbitration clauses should be respected.902 
Furthermore, the courts in Nigeria should rise to prevent abuse of power by an administrative 
decision-maker. It may be the case that decision-maker maybe doing the right thing but 
influenced by ulterior motives or have failed to take relevant considerations into reckoning. In 
such a case, the courts should hold that the public authority has acted unreasonably and has 
abused its power. The challenge however, lies with the public authority respecting the decision 
of the courts and the hurdle that the private sector party may need to go through in getting 
enforcement of judgements against a public ministry, department or agency in Nigeria. 
Therefore, the government (at all levels) must show commitment not only in honouring 
contractual agreements but also in respecting court decisions.  These two requirements are 
fundamental drivers for economic growth and are necessary to attract investors. 
 
6.7.2 Judicial Review of Public Sector Action in  Commercial Transactions South Africa 
 
In South Africa, there is a clear Constitutional provision in favour of good governance in 
administration and this includes where the public authority enters into contractual agreements 
with the private sector. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa provides as follows: 
 
When an organ of state in the national, provincial or local sphere of 
government, or any other institution identified in national legislation, contracts 
for goods or services, it must do so in accordance with a system which is fair, 
equitable, transparent, competitive and cost effective.903 
 
It follows that public sector contracts in South Africa falls within the ambits of constitutional 
law. In South African jurisprudence, it is considered that in  a constitutional democracy under 
the rule of law, every sphere of activity falls within the purview of constitutional law and as 
such constitutional principles are applied without exception.904 It is also imperative to note that 
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under South African law, when the public sector enters into a contract, the contract is not 
governed by the norms of contract law alone. The state is required to, and must comply with 
the principles of administrative law  in order for a contract entered with a private partner not 
to be considered as invalid.905 Thus, in South Africa, apart from the principles of contract 
applying in public sector contracts, it is fundamental that the state’s capacity to contract is 
without doubt not exclusively founded on the common law rules of contract but also comply 
with constitutionally stipulated or other statutory requirements.906 
Furthermore, the passing into  law of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act No. 
3 of 2000 underscores the willingness of the South African Government to ensure that the 
actions of the executive branch are lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. In section 3 of the 
Act, there is a requirement that administrative action which materially and adversely affects 
the rights or legitimate  expectations of any person must be procedurally fair. Where a person’s 
rights have been materially and adversely affected by administrative action and who has not 
been given reasons for the action, may request for the reasons from the administrator 
concerned.907 
 Importantly, the law provides for any person to institute proceedings in a court or a 
tribunal for the judicial review of administrative action.908 There is thus, a backing by law for 
any citizen to seek a judicial review of administrative action in South Africa. This is in 
contradistinction with the position in Nigeria where the concept of locus standi (the legal 
capacity to institute proceedings in court or the right to sue) holds sway and where a plaintiff 
in Nigeria has no locus standi, the courts lack jurisdiction to entertain the action.909 
 As it relates to challenging the legality of a commercial transaction undertaken by the 
public authority in South Africa, Quinot argues as follows: 
 
Two types of challenges to state commercial activity should be distinguished 
in this context. Firstly, there are challenges on strict legality grounds, which 
may indicate that the particular public authority acted beyond its power or 
grossly abused its power in taking the commercial decision under scrutiny. In 
this type of case  invalidity should in principle be a competent remedy, because 
here the function of judicial review as a constitutional control over the exercise 
of state power outweighs efficiency and certainty concerns. A party should 
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thus be able to pursue judicial review to invalidate state commercial decisions 
in such cases. Secondly, there are challenges that may indicate that while the 
authority was objectively authorised to take the decision at issue it adopted as 
an irregular process. In this second type of case, however, review should not 
be able to result in invalidity. It is submitted that in these cases efficiency and 
certainty  generally favour  the continued factual validity of the commercial 
conduct. Such an approach will not offend against the basic rule of law 
justification for judicial review.910 
 
From the foregoing, it is clear that judicial review is not limited to an aggrieved party seeking 
remedy for the failure of the public authority to perform its obligations, it also includes cases 
where the validity of such contracts are challenged. 
 The remedies available in proceedings for judicial review under the Act of 2000911 in 
South Africa include directing the administrator to give reasons or act in the manner directed 
by the court; an order prohibiting the administrator from acting in a particular manner; setting 
aside of the administrative action;912 a declaration that the rights of the parties in respect of any 
matter to which the administrative action relates; the granting of a temporary interdict or other 
temporary relief; or as to costs. 
 
6.8 Principles of Fairness and Inclusivity 
 
In order to address the concerns of the diverse groups in heterogenous societies, it is not 
uncommon for the government to introduce measures to ensure that the various people groups 
benefit from government plans and actions. In this sub-section, the thesis addresses how the 
Federal Character  (FC) policy in Nigeria and the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policy 
can impact on PPP. 
 
6.8.1 Nigeria’s Federal Character Policy 
 
The principle of Federal Character (FC) is well entrenched in the Nigerian Constitution. 
Section 3 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) upholds 
this principle and states that the conduct of the affairs of the nation would reflect FC in order 
to promote national unity. The origin of the FC policy in Nigeria can be traced to the agitation 
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for even and fair distribution of the national resources. This also led to the passing into law of 
the Federal Character Act 1995.  The Act established the Federal Character Commission and 
also divided the country into six geopolitical zones. This policy is reflected in the National 
Policy on Public Private Partnership 2009. Section 3 which deals with the Policy Objectives 
for PPP in Nigeria states inter alia that the Nigerian government aims to ensure balanced 
regional development. The import of this provision as it relates to PPP is that the government 
at all levels have a duty to ensure that there is even spread of public infrastructure facilities. 
However, it is the view of this writer that applying the FC principle to PPP especially as  there 
is no provision for the PFI913 type of PPP in Nigeria will be counterproductive. An investor 
may not want to consider a project in a region of the country where there is the risk of non-
patronage of the facility is high. For example, an investor may be more interested in a new 
airport in the Lekki Free Trade Zone than a new airport in the North East Zone of the country. 
It is therefore difficult to see how PPP can be used as a tool for achieving the government’s FC 
objective. 
 A similar policy, but one which is directly related to the oil sector is the Nigerian local 
content policy which is now reflected in the Local Content Act 2010. The Act specifies that 
Nigerian independent operators should be accorded first consideration in the award of oil and 
gas related contracts and services.914 The Act provides for exclusive consideration to Nigerian 
indigenous service companies which demonstrate ownership of equipment, Nigerian personnel 
and capacity to execute work on land and swamp operating areas.915 Again, for the local content 
to apply, and be beneficial to PPP, the project must relate to the oil sector. There is a great 
possibility of partnership between the private sector and the Nigerian government for the 
development of oil facilities. This should make a case for the ICRC Act 2005 to be amended 
to include the award of PFI contracts. 
 
6.8.1 South Africa’s Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) Policy 
 
 
In South Africa, PPP is considered as a good vehicle for promoting and developing the BEE 
national policy objective. This policy has been formalised in the Code of Good Practice for 
                                                      
913 In the Privately Financed Initiative type of PPP, government pays the project company for the use of the 
facility by citizens. 
914 Section 3(1) Nigerian Local Content Act 2010. 
915 Section 3(2) Nigerian Local Content Act 2010. 
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BEE in PPPs and was issued in 2004.916 There is a scorecard with targets that must be met in 
order to comply with BEE provisions. Thus, for example, in each PPP project specific targets 
relating to equity, management and employment, subcontracting, local and socio-economic 
impact have to be met to ensure that the project is BEE compliant.917 
The commitment to BEE through PPP in South Africa has led to the creation of a PPP BEE 
equity facility by the Development Bank of South Africa to fund BEE equity in PPP deals.918 
The aim is to empower black South Africans to acquire shareholding in PPP project companies. 
The impact of the BEE policy is that it opens up job opportunities for black South Africans, 
creates subcontracting opportunities for black small enterprises and has opened up 
opportunities for the local finance in the form of support by financial institutions to enable BEE 
partners participate in PPP. While the BEE policy benefits South Africans, the extra burden 
this would bring upon foreign investors should also be considered as well. This is because apart 
from the complex nature of PPP arrangements in the first place, a foreign investor in South 





In this chapter, the regulatory and administrative environments for the success of PPP projects 
in Nigeria and South Africa have been discussed and compared. A key finding is that Nigeria 
is still going through a discovery phase as far as PPP is concerned, while the environment in 
South Africa is comparatively advanced. Drawing on the descriptive analysis of the 
frameworks for PPP in Nigeria and South Africa as presented in Chapters Four and Five of this 
research, and based on the parameters referred to as critical success factors (CSFs), the 
suitability of both jurisdictions for successful PPP regulation and administration was examined. 
Furthermore, judicial review of government actions with regards to commercial transactions in 
both Nigeria and South Africa was discussed. It is noted that South African law considers that 
public sector contracts not only as an aspect of common law but also a subject under 
constitutional law. In both Nigeria and South Africa, the measures adopted to address issues of 
inequality and how this relates to PPP was also addressed in the chapter. 
                                                      




The findings suggest that it is imperative that Nigeria further develops its financial market, 
strengthens its public institutions (especially the ICRC), and puts measures in place for 
enforcing public-sector compliance with contractual agreements and court orders. Ignoring 
court orders is contrary to the rule of law and portends a great danger to property rights in the 
country. Furthermore, Nigeria must address issues regarding the difficulty in the repatriation 
of profits by foreign firms and investors. The current situation where investors’ funds are 
trapped in the country because of changing financial policies hinders foreign direct investment. 
Investors are unsure of being able to repatriate funds following the liquidation of their 
investments, due to a scarcity of foreign exchange. There is a need to provide directions for the 
future that will assure lenders, investors, the public sector and consumers of the stability and 
continuity of the economic environment. In the case of South Africa, the key finding is that 
there is a need to strengthen PPPs at the provincial and municipal level. 
For both countries, transparency in the award of PPP contracts, adherence to contractual 
terms by both the public sector and private sector partners as well as efficient regulatory 












This research examines the legal framework for public-private partnerships in Nigeria and 
South Africa. At the heart of the study is the question of the safety of assets invested in PPP, 
especially in Nigeria. The main question that the research addresses is: does the legal and policy 
framework for PPP in Nigeria protect private investors’ funds? If yes, how might the 
framework be enhanced to stimulate more local and foreign interest? and if not, what measures 
must be put in place to protect funds and assure investors of their safety?  Funds protection and 
investor confidence are key, considering that funds invested in PPPs are generally secured 
against the projects. The theoretical framework explores theories of law and development, the 
sanctity of contract and the rule of law, and relates them to the research question.  
A clear point emerging from the literature is that the law is an instrument for economic 
development and can be made to strengthen government policies, particularly when those 
policies are geared towards specific goals, as is the case with Nigeria’s long-term Vision 2020 
objective. The law can thus be employed to define an effective role for PPPs in achieving that 
goal. Based on the sanctity of contract doctrine, governments are bound, as are individuals, to 
honour contractual obligations. Furthermore, the rule of law operates to hold government as 
well as private actors accountable under the law, and to ensure that the processes by which the 
laws are enacted, administered and enforced are accessible, fair and efficient.  
In Chapter Three of the study, the theory and practice of PPP was examined, starting 
with an introduction to the PPP construct, followed by a discussion of PPP theories, and of the 
concept’s advantages and disadvantages. Differences between PPP and other forms of 
procurement of infrastructure were described, and various models of practice for PPP were 
discussed. 
Chapters Four and Five examine the framework for the regulation of PPP in Nigeria 
and South Africa, respectively. Both chapters discuss the laws regulating PPP, the institutional 
and administrative structures, the practice of PPP, and project finance, while illustrating these 
aspects with selected case studies.  
In Chapter Six, the regulatory and administrative environment for PPP in both 
jurisdictions is analysed and compared. Based on the analysis in Chapters Four and Five, 
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Chapter Six offers both a critical and prescriptive anatomy of issues in the law and practice of 
PPP in Nigeria and South Africa. 
 This concluding chapter defines the contributions of this thesis to the existing body of 
knowledge and recommends some solutions to the myriad challenges encountered by 
practitioners in the field of PPP, especially in Nigeria but in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. 
 
7.2 Summary of Theories Discussed in the Study 
 
7.2.1 The Rule of Law 
 
The rule of law is essential to every society.919 It envisages a society organised according to 
laws that guarantee a good degree of objectivity in the dispensing of justice while 
simultaneously promoting peace and prosperity.920 The rule of law defines the legal limits of 
acceptable conduct, on the part of both public officials and private citizens. Based on this 
premise, Tamanaha states that government officials must abide by valid laws in force at the 
time of any given government action.921 Furthermore, officials must remain within established 
legal bounds when exercising the power attached to their public positions.922  Wade similarly 
argues that all acts must be in accordance with the law to be valid, and that government activity 
must be conducted within a framework of defined rules and regulations.923 
Based on the foregoing as it relates to PPP, government officials must abide by the rules 
laid down to ensure that there is transparency and accountability. Following the rules will stem 
corrupt practices and ensure clarity. Court decisions will be respected. However, in the cases 
presented in Chapter Four of this study, disregard for the rule of law by public officials has 
resulted in protracted litigation and project failure. This clearly demonstrates that the rule of 
law is a cardinal requirement for economic growth, and if the government desires to improve 
the wellbeing of its citizens, having due regard for the rule of law must be a priority.  
  
                                                      
919 Elijah Okon John op cit note 123 at 211. 
920 R C Onwuanibe op cit note 124 at 171. 
921 Brian Tamanaha op cit note 125 at 4. 
922 Ibid. 
923 W Wade & CF Forsyth op cit note 139 at 30. 
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7.2.1 Sanctity of Contract 
 
 
Because of the emergence of the private sector in the provision of infrastructure, the notion of 
the sanctity of contract has become more compelling. Sanctity of contract is the principle of 
law that once parties enter into a contract, they must honour their obligations under that 
contract. The essence of doctrine of the sanctity of contract has been re-emphasised by Sagay 
in the following words: 
We must next consider why the law does enforce agreements at all. The 
commercial and economic life of modern society consists very largely of 
agreements. Trade and commerce would be chaotic, if not impossible, if the 
law permitted a promisor to break his promise without at least placing him 
under an obligation to pay compensation for the loss occasioned by his 
default.924 
 
The position of the law was restated in Arjay Limited & Ors v Airline Management Support 
Limited925 where the Supreme Court of Nigeria per Niki Tobi JSC stated as follows: 
 It is an elementary law that where parties have entered into a contract or an 
agreement, they are bound by the provisions of the contract or agreement. 
Accordingly, a party cannot ordinarily resile from a contract or agreement just 
because he later found that the conditions of the contract or agreement are not 
favourable to him. This is the whole essence of the doctrine of the sanctity of 
contract or agreement. The court is bound to construe the terms of the contract 
or agreement and the terms only in the event of an action arising therefrom.926 
 
Thus, a valid contract is binding on the parties to that contract and it may only be modified or 
terminated by consent of the parties or if provided by the law. The principle is the expression 
of the legal theory of ‘good faith,’ without which international contract law (including PPP 
contracts) would be a mere mockery. While the principle does not apply when it would result 
in unfair hardship or lead to illegality, the performance of a contractual obligation is sacrosanct 
to legitimate commercial activity.927  The doctrine of sanctity of contract, pacta sunt servanda 
is established as one of the fundamental pillars of the modern law of contract.928 The other 
pillars being freedom of contract and the good faith.929 Moreover, the law protects the sanctity 
of contracts where third parties meddle or interfere unfairly. Such interference can warrant an 
                                                      
924 IE Sagay Nigerian Law of Contract (2nd ed) 2001 at 1. 
925 (2003) LPELR 555 (SC) at 67 
926 Supra at 67 paras A-E 
927 See BrendenKamp’s case cited supra 
928 Dale Hutchison & Chris-James Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 2nd ed 2012 at para 1.8. 
929 Ibid. 
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action for inducing a breach of contract.930 As mentioned earlier, a government is bound by 
contractual promises no differently from any individual. 
The poor regard for the sanctity of contract and the violation of property rights such as 
occurs in Nigeria presents a warning sign to both local and foreign investors, in spite of the 
potential of the huge population. The Nigerian government and their agents on all tiers are 
prone to show disrespect for contractual agreements. The case of Bi-Courtney Aviation 
Services Ltd and FAAN931 is a good example of the attitude of public sector officials. If 
government is sincere about creating opportunities for the private sector to participate in the 
provision of infrastructure, it must demonstrate a commitment to respect contractual 
obligations. Given that foreign and local investors wish to be assured of the stability of any 
investment regime before committing their assets, the need to provide this assurance cannot be 
overemphasised. Apart from the assurance that investors require, other parties such as lenders 
and prospective sponsors of any project must be convinced that the project will not be 
encumbered or unilaterally cancelled by the government without good cause. For example, the 
cancelling of the Lekki Toll Road Concession and its subsequent buy-back by the Lagos State 
Government is a clear case of unilateral government action without good cause. 
 
7.2.3 Law and Development 
 
The theory of law and development is an interdisciplinary approach to the study of how law 
can be used to promote development. As discussed in Chapter Two of this research, law and 
development promotes the notion that the law can be used to drive development by giving force 
to government policies.932 While this study does not seek to advance any new law and 
development theory, the context of the research suggests to the writer that the law should take 
into cognisance the peculiarity of the local environment.933 While successes in other 
jurisdictions can serve as a guide, the wholesale importation of a highly successful framework 
                                                      
930 Jeffrey S Klein ‘How to protect the sanctity of contracts’ (1990) Los Angeles Times available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/1990-02-22/news/vw-1783_1_business-advantage accessed 28 October 2017. See also  
Omoh Gabriel ‘Sanctity of contract and well defined property rights drive foreign investment’ Vanguard 31 
October 2011. 
931 Discussed at length in Chapter Four (Section 4.7.3) of this study.  
932 Discussed in Chapter Two (Section 2.3 
933 Y S Lee op cit note 116 at 433. Lee refers to the need for the law to take into cognisance the local environment 
as adaptability to socio-economic conditions.  
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without adjusting it to the local situation courts failure from the start.934 Having the political 
will to implement the law is therefore significant.935 Certain lessons may be learned from how 
effective the law has been in giving efficacy to government policies in jurisdictions like 
Nigeria. The example of South Africa therefore suits the purpose of this study. In the same 
vein, Lee notes that several developing countries, including Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar and 
Bangladesh have expressed the desire to adopt certain Korea laws.936 
Far from using the law as a tool to promote development, as far as PPP is concerned 
policy makers in Nigeria seem to have got it the other way around. While the law on PPP was 
passed in 2005, the policy for PPP was released in 2008. It is clear from the government’s 
action that it sought to fill the void in the law with policy. It is suggested that the new law on 
PPP which is being contemplated consider both the various gaps in the law and instances where 
different laws overlap and create confusion. This is necessary since PPPs are recognised 
globally as an attractive development instrument that can be channelled to foster economic 
growth. The law therefore ought to reflect the government’s desire to diversify the economy 
by stimulating local and foreign private sector investment, in order to sustain a pipeline of 
projects that the government cannot afford alone due to budget constraints. 
 
7.3 Does the Current PPP Regulatory Framework in Nigeria Ensure the Protection of 
Investors’ Assets? 
 
The attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) to any economy is dependent on the legal 
framework for investment as well as the availability of the appropriate mechanism to resolve 
disputes when they arise.937 Certainty and clarity in legal frameworks are important for the 
purposes of attracting the levels of investment required.938 As emerged from the discussion in 
Chapter Four of this research, there is not enough in the current PPP law and policy framework 
to ensure that investors’ assets are protected. Given that investments in infrastructure are long 
term in nature, investors are circumspect and may not want to test the waters in a jurisdiction 
                                                      
934 Ibid. 
935 Ibid at 454. 
936 Ibid at 444. 
937 Paul Idornigie op cit note 226 at 162.. 
938 Yinka Omorogbe & Ada Ordor ‘Achieving effective law and policy frameworks for access to sustainable 
energy in Africa – A multidimensional effort’ in Yinka Omorogbe & Ada Ordor (eds) Ending Africa’s Energy 
Deficit (2018) at 386. 
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where they are not assured of the safety of their assets. Similarly, lenders are wary of climates 
where transactions entered into between the private sector and government are almost sure to 
end up in dispute, or where the government unilaterally revokes agreements because of policy 
changes. A situation where government is not seen as a continuum as one administration 
succeeds another is not in the interests of a successful PPP regime. For instance, the private 
sector partner of the Rivers State Monorail Project939 pulled out from the project because it was 
not sure that the succeeding administration would continue with the project. True to prediction, 
the present governor of Rivers State, Mr Nyesom Wike justified the cancellation of the project 
by announcing that ‘Rivers people have told me not to touch the monorail project left behind 
by the other government.’940 Concessionaires are aware of this negative tendency of 
government to disregard projects initiated by a past administration. The lack of political will 
to see through the policies of previous administrations in Nigeria needs to be addressed in 
future amendments of PPP laws. 
The present framework is weak and without the right measures to protect 
concessionaires. The ICRC appears to be powerless in its interaction with other government 
institutions. Under the law, the ICRC does not have overriding powers like other regulatory 
bodies in the country, for example, the power to sanction state broadcast media houses as the 
National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) has. In the face of whether Bi-Courtney and the 
FAAN should refer their dispute to arbitration, the ICRC could not rise to the responsibility of 
a PPP regulator to direct the FAAN to seek an amicable solution to the conflict. 
There is the possibility, as Amadi argues, that the law could fail in the drive to achieve 
government policy goals.941 However, this writer considers this as a failure in the application 
of the law than as failure of law per se. Such failure is exemplified in the electricity power 
sector reform in Nigeria.942 This shows that legal reform alone is not an end. Amadi considers 
as false hope, a belief that the mere creation of an independent regulatory body by legislation 
or the provision of immunity to private investors from political interference can on its own lead 
to success.943 This is especially so, where the private sector partner lacks the experience or 
                                                      
939 The project was initiated under the administration of Governor Rotimi Amaechi who, after eight years in office, 
was succeeded by Mr Nyesom Wike on May 29, 2015. 
940 Chukwudi Akasike, ‘Rivers abandons monorail project’ The Punch 29 March 2016 available at 
http://punchng.com/rivers-abandons-monorail-project/ accessed 29 October 2017. 
941 Sam Amadi op cit note 14 at 344. 
942 Ibid at 372. 
943 Ibid. 
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capacity to deliver.944 It is on this basis, that Amadi suggests, and rightly so, that the law should 
not only promote reform, but also promote the engagement process of only private sector 
partners who have the finance and technical competence to ensure that projects are delivered.945 
Furthermore, the ICRC Act 2005 does not make any provision for such disputes as may 
arise from PPP contracts. This weakness has brought a situation where there is protracted 
litigation in court without either party shifting its ground. The result is low investor confidence 
and a private sector reluctant to do business with the public sector. 
 
7.4 Conclusions on the Protection of Public-Private Partnership Assets 
 
One of the ways to ensure that investors’ assets in PPPs are protected is to ensure that good 
governance measures are adopted. Governance in this sense relates to exercising political, 
economic and administrative authority to properly guide a nation’s socio-economy.946 Good 
governance as it relates to PPP connotes the sustenance of a healthy relationship between the 
public-sector institutions and the private sector, and between public institutions inter se in the 
administration and regulation of PPP. To achieve this, certain drivers have been identified, 
such as accountability and transparency on the part of public officials, political stability, the 
competence and effectiveness of public officials, the quality of regulation provided by the 
regulatory bodies, respect for the rule of law and the sanctity of contract, and control of 
corruption.947 Promoting good governance will therefore provide prospective investors with 
the assurance that their assets are protected. 
The right risk allocation strategy is important for PPP success. Each risk must be 
properly allocated to the party that is best suited to take it on. This must be clear right from the 
contract negotiation phase. The case of the Bi-Courtney Highway Services Ltd-Lagos Ibadan 
Expressway Concession, another PPP project, exemplifies the lessons that can be learned from 
improper or lack of allocation of risk. It is important to note that risk that cannot be managed 
by the concessionaire, such as foreign exchange risk, must be held by the public sector. 
                                                      
944 Ibid at 375. This was the case in the Bi-Courtney Highway Services Ltd – Lagos Ibadan Expressway PPP 
Project where the private sector partner lacked the financial capacity and finance to deliver the project. 
945 Ibid. 
946 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), Governance in Public Private Partnerships for 
Infrastructure Development (2004) at 4. 
947 Ibid at 4. 
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The government must be willing to provide guarantees for projects to give lenders the 
confidence they need. Bi-Courtney was unable to convince any lender to fund the Lagos-Ibadan 
Expressway Concession in the absence of a guarantee from the federal government of Nigeria. 
The guarantee proved to be elusive, as public officials in a government that appeared to be 
promoting PPP frustrated all the efforts of the concessionaire to get actual government support. 
Determined to ensure that Bi-Courtney failed, government officials acted contrary to the 
aspirations of the very government that they represented. This may not be unconnected to the 
fact that public sector officials erroneously assume that private sector concessionaires are 
enemies who would deprive them of their jobs. It is important that government at all levels 
consider the fact that the attraction, promotion and protection of both foreign and local 
investments in infrastructure is a primary interest of the State, and as such, a strategy must be 
put in place and deliberate efforts made to protect facilities and, when necessary, provide 
guarantees to investors and lenders. Thus, individuals or corporations, whether local or foreign, 
who invest in infrastructure in the host country by lawful means must benefit from the 
protection of the government. 
 
7.5 Lessons from South Africa 
 
While there may be no perfect PPP framework anywhere in the world, some are better than 
others and South Africa’s PPP structure and process can definitely serve as a template for other 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. As one author observes, South Africa ‘has the greatest 
cumulative experience of public-private partnerships in Africa....’948 South Africa’s practice of 
PPP dates to 1994, and with many successes in different sectors including toll roads, ports, 
prisons, water supply, hospitals and tourism, there is much that other African countries can 
learn from it, and not only in order to avoid pitfalls and establish successful PPP regimes.  
Although Burger argues that there is still a shortage of skilled personnel in government 
departments and provinces to match the pace at which the government of South Africa can roll 
out PPPs,949 this writer is of the view that compared to other African countries, South Africa 
has a clear edge and is far ahead in terms of PPP specialists and technical know-how.  Besides, 
some of the PPPs arranged in South Africa have been among the most successful in sub-
                                                      
948 Peter Farlam op cit note 747 at 1. 
949 Philippe Burger ‘The dedicated PPP Unit of the South African National Treasury’ available at 
https://www.oecd.org/mena/governance/37147218.pdf accessed 31 October 2017. 
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Saharan Africa.950   South Africa’s extensive PPP experience offers both positive and negative 
lessons for the rest of the continent. 
 
7.5.1 Positive Lessons  
 
First, South Africa’s PPP Unit is made up of 17 professional staff who actively participate in 
policy formation and PPP training. They are allocated projects depending on their individual 
sector expertise, which includes health, energy, water, transport, ICT, tourism, waste, 
accommodation, education, budget support, contract management, project development, 
business development and international relations.951 Compared to public service staffing size 
elsewhere in Africa, the staffing of the unit is moderate. Unlike the case of South Africa, where 
the number of staff in the PPP Unit is available on the website of the National Treasury PPP 
unit, Nigeria’s ICRC website does not provide the number of professional staff on the 
Commission.  
Secondly, the institutional framework for PPP in South Africa is clear-cut. A 
prospective investor or anyone interested in the framework for PPP in South Africa is not left 
confused about the number of agencies that are to be dealt with when negotiating or executing 
a PPP contract. These are simply the PPP unit and the institution or the province initiating the 
project. This is not the case with Nigeria, where the process is more complex.952 The less 
complex a process is, the greater the interest of prospective investors, lenders and sponsors. 
Thirdly, South Africa’s well developed financial market is a plus for the development 
of a successful PPP regime. Despite an economy challenged by recession and damaging ratings 
downgrades, the stock exchange and indeed the financial markets in the country have 
maintained good fundamentals and performed consistently well.953 The availability and ease 
of access to credit in South Africa places it ahead of its peers on the continent. Developing the 
financial market of any country is fundamental, not only to the growth of the economy but also 
for the development of new business opportunities. Furthermore, South Africa’s infrastructure 
                                                      
950 Madeleine C Fombad, ‘Accountability challenges in public-private partnerships from a South African 
perspective’ (2013) 7.1 African Journal of Business Ethics (2013) at 11. 
951 National Treasury PPP Unit, ‘About the PPP Unit,’ available at http://www.ppp.gov.za/Pages/About.aspx 
accessed 31 October 2017. 
952 Discussed in detail in Chapter Four (Section 4.4) of the study. 
953 For example, see Ed Stoddard & T J Strydom ‘South Africa’s stock market defies recession, scales record 
highs’ Reuters Business News 31 July 2017. 
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funds like the SAIF954 can serve as a lifeline for projects requiring funding. The successful 
divestment of that fund is also a good lesson for other African countries, including Nigeria. 
Finally, without the commitment of the government of South Africa, many PPP 
arrangements and projects could have failed, for example the N4 Toll Road and the Gautrain 
project. There are several projects that have outlived the administration that initiated them, an 
area of grave concern in Nigeria. It has been argued, and rightly so, that because of the huge 
investment it requires, any wasteful result in a PPP is a drawback for development.955 South 
Africa’s successes in the Hospital Co-Location project in Bloemfontein and the N4 Toll Road 
provide good examples of political commitment on the part of the government.956 Clear 
political will and a determination on the part of government to ensure the success of PPPs 
increases the momentum of these projects and goes a long way towards ensuring that targets 
are duly met. 
 
7.5.2 Negative Lessons 
 
Despite South Africa’s relative success with PPP, there have been errors and pitfalls that could 
have been or can be avoided. Other African countries studying the South African framework 
and wishing to borrow from it may have much to learn from these. Some of them are 
highlighted below. 
South African PPP rules require that before a project is arranged as a PPP, at the 
inception stage, the institution957 sponsoring the project must register the project with the 
relevant treasury, for a project officer and a transaction advisor to be appointed.958 What the 
rules omit to state is that public consultation is fundamental. This omission in the rules could 
lead to avoidable challenges. For instance, J Stephen criticises the Gautrain Rapid Rail link 
Project for insufficient public consultation and legislative debate before the project was 
approved and put to tender.959 It is pertinent to note that although the Gautrain Rapid Link 
Project is a success, the need to consult with stakeholders before embarking on PPP projects is 
                                                      
954 Discussed in 6.5.1 above. 
955 Solly Matshonisa Seeletse ‘Performance of South African public-private partnerships’ (2016) 14.2 Problems 
and Perspectives in Management 19. 
956 Discussed in Chapter Five (Section 5.6.1 and 5.6.2) of the study. 
957 In this case the Ministry, Department or Province. 
958 See PPP Manual 2004. 
959 J Stephen ‘Fears Gautrain will be a large, expensive white elephant’ The Star 9 November 2005. 
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essential. Fombad has argued that a lack of transparency could negatively affect PPPs in South 
Africa, referring to superficial and inconsistent disclosure of PPP information online via the 
PPP Quarterly. 960 The argument here is that with little information being made available to 
the public, the principle of transparency is compromised. No matter how successful a project 
is, it often remains tainted where there are questions of ethical and procedural irregularity in 
concluding the contract and executing the project. 
This writer is of the firm belief that insisting on a Black Economic Empowerment 
Code961 for PPP, as is currently the case in South Africa, is an extreme burden at this emerging 
stage of PPP. PPP is a partnership between the public sector and the private sector. Putting a 
burden on the private sector to deal with domestic inequality issues could deter foreign interest 
or encourage corruption. Companies who have the experience and wherewithal to promote and 
execute flawless projects may find it difficult to meet the Black Economic Empowerment 
targets, and be ruled out of the reckoning in favour of less experienced sponsors who may just 
superficially appear to be BEE-compliant. It is important that the government deals with issues 
of inequality in such a way as not to deter legitimate private sector ventures, which must be 
allowed to manage their business as best they can. PPPs are very complex arrangements and 
anything that can make a PPP arrangement less complex should be welcomed. 
  
                                                      
960  Madeleine C Fombad op cit note 930 at 15. 




PPP is no doubt challenging terrain. Even developed countries like the UK, Canada and 
Australia have had to grapple with issues that were never expected when the relevant model 
was adopted. At one point in Quebec, Canada, the acronym PPP was referred to as: ‘Problem, 
Problem, Problem’! The important thing is that countries continue to seek ways to improve on 
their framework for PPP. The door to improving or simplifying the process for PPP 
arrangements and execution cannot and should not be closed. It is noted that even leading PPP 
jurisdictions like Canada and Australia ‘employ a variety of arrangements, rather than having 
one national PPP model.’962 It is therefore important that policy makers seek ways of improving 
on the structure and procedure for PPP contracts and projects. It is not enough to adopt a PPP 
policy and set it on auto-pilot mode. The ongoing need to review the process, to amend or 
repeal laws that hamper PPP progress, cannot be over emphasised. In this regard, the study 
makes a number of recommendations that are set out in the following sections. 
 
7.6.1 Recommendations for Nigeria 
 
First, the Infrastructure Concession and Regulatory Commissio (Establishment Etc.) Act 2005 
is being reviewed for amendment by stakeholders in the country, and this is a step in the right 
direction. One can hardly believe that despite its flaws, it has been in operation for seventeen 
years without review. This writer believes that PPP must be clearly distinguished from 
traditional public procurement and other similar forms. As such, the silence in the PPP law, 
which allows for the application of the Public Procurement Act to PPP projects, must be 
addressed. Similarly, the funding dynamics of PPPs, a fundamental aspect of the concept, must 
be provided for in the law regulating the process. A situation in which policy is used to address 
gaps in the law is akin to putting the cart before the horse. It is important that the law gives 
effect to policy and not the other way around. The current situation suggests that the law was 
not well thought out before being passed. 
Secondly, the process for the initiation and approval of PPP projects needs to be 
simplified. The current 12-stage process is unnecessarily complicated in the business context. 
A manageable reduction of the process into five or six stages is ideal and should make for 
simplicity and clarity. 
                                                      
962 Anthony E Boardman, Carsten Greve & Graeme A Hodge ‘Comparative analyses of infrastructure public-
private partnerships’ (2015) 17.5 Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis at 442. 
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Thirdly, even though the country seeks to attract foreign investment for infrastructure, it is 
important that the local financial market is strengthened and opportunities to raise funds are 
unlocked. The point is that despite the business that foreign funds can create, there is no point 
in exposing the country to a high foreign exchange risk. If the country continues to be largely 
dependent on oil revenues while at the same time remaining a mainly ‘import’ economy, there 
is little that can be done about foreign exchange stability. The best option is to develop the 
local market by encouraging a savings culture. If the funds held by Pension Fund 
Administrators (PFAs) as Retirement Savings Accounts (RSAs) are anything to go by (about 
N7 trillion or $19.4 billion as at July 2017),963 there is a lot that can be achieved if other 
employee savings schemes are put in place, supported by legislation. The government needs to 
encourage such schemes as less than seven million out of a population of over 180 million 
Nigerians are pension fund contributors. Another option is to encourage fund managers to have 
replica infrastructure funds with lower entry thresholds that can cater to the investment needs 
of a population ranked by the World Bank as lower-middle income. Such funds would grow 
over time like pension funds, helping to provide the local funding needed for PPPs and curb 
the high foreign exchange risk that PPP projects in the country are exposed to. 
Fourthly, there is a need for legal provisions requiring a new administration to continue 
with the policies of a preceding administration unless reasonable cause is shown, or face clearly 
defined consequences including impeachment proceedings in respect of elected officers. Even 
where reasonable cause is shown, there need to be rules around discharging a project in a way 
that prevents or minimises waste or loss to stakeholders. This writer believes that such legal 
provisions will serve as precautionary and punitive measures to ensure continuity in long-term 
government commitments. This will give local and foreign investors, sponsors and lenders the 
confidence that PPP projects will outlive the administration that initiated them.  
A fifth recommendation is that apart from providing incentives to investors and 
promoters of PPP projects, the public sector must commit to jealously guarding and managing 
PPP projects to make sure they succeed. A case like that of the Bi-Courtney Highway Services 
Ltd Lagos-Ibadan Expressway Project, where it seemed that the public sector was more 
interested in the failure of the project than its success, must not be allowed to repeat itself: it 
                                                      
963 This is over a 12-year period, given that the new pension system in Nigeria became fully operational in 2005. 
Even though some funds were transferred from the defunct NSITF to individual pension fund accounts, it is also 
noteworthy that the pension funds of members of the armed forces were liquidated and transferred back to pension 
funds managed by military authorities. 
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sends the wrong signals to prospective investors and sponsors, while leaving the country’s 
infrastructure needs unaddressed. 
In the sixth place, the government and its agencies must be willing to submit to 
arbitration in cases where conflicts arise. It is also important that both the private- and public-
sector partners seek a balance in their approach to the settlement of disputes. The parties must 
always strive to achieve a win-win for all rather than a winner-takes-all approach, which often 
ends up in protracted disputes and wasteful litigation. 
A seventh recommendation is that public officials should receive ongoing PPP 
information and updates so as fully to appreciate the role that they can play in ensuring PPP 
success. There should also be on-going trainings for the staff of the ICRC and other public 
officials involved in PPP transactions in the country. A similar process should be implemented 
at the sub-national level for state governments that have adopted the PPP model. 
Finally, there is the need to ensure that PPPs are structured properly as PPPs and not in 
a hybrid form. The attempt in 2018, by the Federal Ministry of Transportation to revive a carrier 
for Nigeria in the form of a PPP seems to suggest a mix between a PPP and privatisation. The 
problem with this kind of arrangement is that it lacks the essentials to make a PPP what is. One 
of which is that at the end of the contract, the facility is returned to the government. It is 
therefore recommended that PPPs should be structured strictly as PPPs and not in a hybrid 
form to avoid confusion. 
 
7.6.2 Recommendations for South Africa 
 
Although it is reputed to be the PPP powerhouse in Africa, the South African framework for 
the regulation and monitoring of PPP projects can still be improved for better results. The South 
African PPP framework has received its fair share of criticism, e.g. for a lack of public 
consultation and for accountability issues.964 Some of this criticism is out of place and seems 
to assume that PPP is some kind of magic wand that can solve all the infrastructure problems 
of a country overnight. Nevertheless, to improve on the current framework, the following steps 
might be considered. 
 First, it is important to decentralise PPP experience in the country so that more people 
become skilled in structuring PPP arrangements. Going forward, it cannot make sense to assign 
all responsibility for the guiding and monitoring of PPP in the country at the national, 
                                                      
964 See Fombad op cit note 930 at 8. 
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provincial and municipal levels to only 17 professional staff’ at the national treasury PPP unit. 
It would make sense to establish sub-PPP units in all the provinces to help ensure that the skills 
and experience available at the national level are transferred to others. This will enhance the 
development of PPP practice in the country. Decentralisation could also provide more 
opportunities for the skilling and involvement of a more diverse group of people, indirectly 
meeting BEE goals. 
Secondly, policy makers need to expunge the requirements that PPP must follow the 
strict BEE targets that appear in the PPP Manual 2004. Let BEE remain a target for the public 
sector and let private partners focus on providing expertise and funding for PPP projects. Such 
a burden is unnecessary and is quite herculean for investors or project promoters who are new 
to South Africa. 
South Africa needs to consider the issue of PPP transparency more critically. It is vital 
to ensure that there is adequate public consultation among the communities where projects are 
to be sited, experts and other stakeholders before final arrangements are made. A failure to do 




Since the private sector is now playing a significant role in the development of infrastructure 
by way of PPP in many jurisdictions across the world, the need to arouse interest in such deals 
and gain the support of private sector promoters, financiers and lenders is paramount. Investors 
are constantly seeking avenues to grow their capital and generate returns over time, and since 
the shock collapse of equity prices across various stock markets around the world due to the 
financial crisis between 2008 and 2009,965 there has been keen interest in alternative investment 
instruments, including infrastructure. Sustained interest in infrastructure as an alternative 
investment instrument can only be assured if investors are confident of the protection of their 
                                                      
965 The financial crisis in the late 2000s which is also referred to as the US ‘subprime’ crisis that started in the 
summer of 2007 spread to several other advanced economies because of the combination of the direct exposure 
to subprime assets and the drying up of wholesale financial markets. This sparked a withdrawal of foreign assets 
from capital markets like that of Nigeria. The unexpected capital outflows led to price falls and panic sales which 
further propelled the market into a prolonged bearish run. Since many entrants into the market came during the 
early 2007 market boom, the crash affected investor confidence in equities and encouraged the search for 
alternative investment instruments. See for details Ouarda Merrouche & Erlend Nier, ‘what caused the global 
financial crisis? – evidence on the drivers of financial imbalances 1999–2007’ (2010) IMF Working Paper 
WP/10/265, 4. 
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assets because of the long-term nature of infrastructure investments, usually spanning between 
20 and 30 years.  
This research therefore advocates that measures be put in place by policy makers to 
protect funds and assets invested in PPPs in Nigeria. It has been suggested that as a matter of 
policy, there must be continuity in the administration of government projects. The policies of 
any one administration must not be jettisoned by a succeeding administration merely for the 
sake of wanting to fulfil the new administration’s election promises. Government at all levels 
must be bound by promises made in contracts and must ensure that it respects the decisions 
reached at arbitration. Where, for any reason, a dispute is taken to the courts, the public sector 
must respect court decisions. It must no longer be business as usual for public servants who 
wilfully violate court orders and judgments. The judiciary should be approached to take 
decisive measures against public officials who hide under the cloak of office to disregard or 
violate court orders. This research highlights the areas in which the law can be used as a tool 
for development, to bring about change and attract both foreign and local participation in the 
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Appendix 5: Project Finance for a Road Concession 












Source: Jeffrey Delmon 
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Appendix 7: Lekki-Epe Expressway Project 
 
Source: Lagos State Government 
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Appendix 8: How PPPs Can Help Solve the Infrastructure Problem 
 






Appendix 9: Typical PPP Structure 
 
 
Source: Jeffrey Delmon 
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Appendix 10: BEE in South African PPPs 
 
Source: National Treasury PPP Unit  (South Africa) 
 
 247 
Appendix 11: PPP Project Cycle in South Africa 
 
Source: National Treasury PPP Unit (South Africa) 
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Appendix 12: The Public-Private Partnership Process 
 
Source: The World Bank 
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Appendix 13: Life Cycle for Public-Private Partnership in Nigeria 
 
Source: ICRC Nigeria 
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Appendix 14: Contractual Structure of a Public-Private Partnership 
 
Source: ICRC Nigeria 
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• The procurement of assets by the 
public sector using conventional 
funding
• Design, build, finance & transfer
• Build, operate & transfer
Build, operate & own
• Design, build , finance & operate












A Public-Private Partnership is a contractual agreement between a public
agency (federal, state or local) and  a private sector entity. Through this  
agreement, the skills and assets of each sector (public and private) are shared in 
delivering a service  or facility for the use of the general public. In addition to the 
sharing  of resources, each party shares in the risks and rewards potential  in 
the delivery of the  service and/or facility.




Small and depleting 
Government resources
Urgent need for 





Appendix 17: Seven Essential Conditions that Define a Public-Private Partnership 
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Source: Jeffrey Delmon 
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Appendix 22: Key PPP Drivers and Enablers Proposed by the European PPP Survey 2001 -
D & P 
 
Drivers Enablers 
• Financial need, e.g. budget deficit 
• Ageing or poor infrastructure 
• Growing demands or expectations on 
public sector services 
• Search for greater efficiency and 
creativity 
• Desire to introduce competition 
• Shortage of domestic experience or 
skills 
• Desire to educate national contractors 
and remain competitive 
• Bandwagon effect 
• Political framework: stability, explicit 
political will or commitment, e.g. a 
dedicated unit, ability to push schemes 
through, creative and willing local 
government 
• Legal framework: no roadblocks, and 
documentation not excessively 
complicated 
• Public acceptance: acceptance of private 
sector involvement and specific impacts, 
e.g. environmental impact of new roads 
• Quality practitioners: good quality, 
experienced project sponsors and lenders 
• Readily available finance: Including EU 
and EIB funding in some cases; mature or 
































Appendix 23: Appendix 24: Constraints to Infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships as 
Identified by Young 
Constraints Implications 
Lack of acceptability to PPPs • Project unduly stalled 
• Difficulty to structure cost reflective 
tariffs; may involve subsidy elements 
Lack of clear policy statement • PPP programme do not get off the 
ground 
• Lack of understanding on the use of 
PPPs 
Poor capacity of the public sector • Difficulties and delays in PPP 
transactions 
• Inability to negotiate and communicate 
effectively with the private sector; 
difficulty in resolving conflicts 
Inappropriate enabling environment  • Lack of private investor/developer 
confidence 
 
High cost of project and development • Private developers deterred from 
developing projects 
• Few bidders 
Absence of long-term debt • Lack of investment in infrastructure 
Lack of affordability • Requirement of government subsidies, 
which can have alternative uses as well. 
Small size of economy/sector • ‘Unbankable’ projects given size is 























Appendix 24: Summary of Contract Management Framework for Public-Private Partnership 
 
PPP Life Cycle 
Phase 
 Key Functions  




PPP Inception and 
feasibility 
Identify and specify 
- Service delivery 
specifications 
-  Affordability limit 
- PSC/PPP and VfM 
benchmark 




- Appoint the project 
officer & Project 
team 
- Decide on project 
























establish the PPP 
contract 
management team 
-Prepare the PPP 
contract 
management plan 
Develop and prepare 
the PPP contract 
management plan 



























-Updating the PPP 
contract 
management manual 
PPP Delivery Monitor and manage 
-Risk 
-Performance in 









Review and revise 
PPP contract 
management plan 

































-Record the lessons 







































Appendix 25: Preliminary Assessment Form for Public-Private Partnership in Nigeria 
 
SN Particulars Details (To be filled in by the MDA) 
1 Project name Provide the name of the project 
2 MDA name Provide the name of the MDA acting as procuring entity 
3 Brief description of 
the project 
Provide a description of the project including location, 
capacity, size etc. 
4 Project being 
implemented under 
which MDA 
Provide the line ministry under which the project is 
implemented 
5 Objective of the 
project and expected 
outcomes 
The objectives for pursuing this project and the outcomes 
expected are to be provided here 
6 Technical feasibility The MDA’s preliminary view on the technical feasibility of 
the project. Successful precedent of similar projects may be 
included here 
7 Legal framework The MDA’s view on the legal framework on the 
implementation of the project 
8 Project impact and 
suitability 
The MDA’s preliminary view on the likely impact of the 
project on the environment and community as well as social 
acceptability and public benefits of the project. Long-term 
impact of on the goals and position of the MDA. Please add 
more details as an annexure to this form 
9 Brief description of 
social and community 
requirements 
Please add more details as an annexure to this form 
10 Estimated capital 
expenditure 
This should be a preliminary estimate and need not be a 
detailed calculation.  
11 Estimated O & M This should be a preliminary estimate and need not be a 
detailed calculation. The projected O & M expenditure over 
the asset life should be discounted to arrive at the present 
value 
12 Estimated investment Summation of capital expenditure and present value of O & 
M expenditure 
13 Revenue generating 
potential 
State the various sources of revenues for this project. If 
available, also include the preliminary annual expected 
revenues 
14 Proposed means of 
financing 
State the various means of financing the project, indicative of 
proportions and amount 
source Proportion (%) Amount (Naira 
Mn) 
Private sector   




Any other (specify)   
Total   
 
SN Particulars  Details (To be filled in by the MDA) 
 263 
15 Estimated project IRR 
(Internal rate of 
return) where 
developed 
If estimation of returns is very difficult at this stage then, do 
not include at this stage 
16 Key risks envisaged The key risks identified for this project should be provided 
under this section 
17 Does the preliminary 
assessment show that 
the project is suitable 
for PPP 
Reasons and necessity for involving private sector in the 
project and analysis of suitability of alternative models of 
project delivery. Roles of MDA and private sector 









Signature and seal 
Name of the authorised signatory: 
Designation of the authorised signatory: 





























Appendix 26: Feasibility Checklist 
 




1 General    
1.1 Name of the project    
1.2 Type of PPP (BOT, BOOT etc.)    
1.3 Location (Province/District/Town)    
1.4 Responsible Ministry/Department    
2 Project Description    
2.1 Brief description of the project    
2.2 Justification for the project    
2.3 Possible alternatives, if any    
2.4 Estimated capital costs with break-up under 
major heads of expenditure also indicate the 
underlying assumptions 
   
2.5 Phasing of investment (if required)    
3 Financing Arrangements    
3.1 Sources of financing (equity, debt. 
Mezzanine capital etc.) 
   
3.2 Indicate the revenue streams of the project 
(annual flows over project life). Also indicate 
underlying assumptions 
   
3.3 Indicate the net present value (NPV) of 
revenue streams where appropriate 
   
3.4 Who will fix the tariff/user charges? Please 
specify in detail 
   
3.5  Have any financial institutions been 
approached? If yes, their response may be 
indicated 
   
4 IRR    
4.1 Economic IRR (if computed)    
4.2 Financial IRR (project and equity), indicating 
various assumptions 
   
5 Clearance    
5.1 Status of environmental clearances    
5.2 Clearance required from the MDA    
5.3 Other support required from MDA    
6 Federal and/or State Government Support    
6.1 Viability Gap Funding/capital grant or 
availability payment support if required 
   
6.2 Federal Government of Nigeria guarantees 
being sought, if any 
   
7 Concession Agreement    
7.1 Heads of terms of the proposed concession 
agreement 
   
8 Criteria for shortlisting RFQ stage    
8.1 Indicate the criteria or shortlisting    
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Appendix 27: Summary of Pension Assets in Nigeria as at March 2018 
 























Appendix 28: Outline Business Case Compliance for Nigeria Air 
 
 
Source: ICRC Nigeria 
 
